The Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010 added to suspicions
that the playing field may not altogether be level. BP was fined more than
$20bn for "gross negligence and willful misconduct”, in addition to
$45bn of outlays in compensation and clean-up costs. Meanwhile, Houston-based
Transocean, the company that owned and operated the oil rig which exploded, was
hit with a fine of $1.4bn and Halliburton – the company responsible for doing
the cement work which was the primary contributor to the well blow-out – escaped
with a fine of $1.1bn.
As The Economist
points out it is hard to prove that “America
treads more lightly at home than abroad.” US firms generally have a pretty clean track record. But a very insightful piece into the murky takeover of French company Alstom by GE suggests that there are
some dark forces at work. Alstom was already the subject of an investigation by
the US Department of Justice into allegations of corruption when a senior
Alstom official was arrested by the US on bribery charges. He entered into a
plea bargain on the understanding that his jail term would be significantly
reduced, but in the event served five years in detention. Shortly after the
guilty plea, Alstom began to explore the possibility of a deal with GE. The Economist suggests that the DOJ’s
investigations “distorted Alstom’s sale
process, giving an edge to a potential American purchaser.” But “in order to be legitimate, a legal process
must be transparent and independent – and be seen to be so. In this case, the
legal process and the commercial one become uncomfortably intertwined.”
All of this goes to the heart of one of the biggest economic
concerns underpinning the current shift towards economic nationalism – the idea
that countries are increasingly prepared to use their leverage to secure their
own interests rather than uphold the rule of law. The US is better placed than
most to flex its muscle given the dollar’s position as the global reserve
currency. Under the Obama Administration, which increasingly started imposing
secondary sanctions, the US began a policy of issuing sanctions against any
non-US individual or business which did not adhere sufficiently to US sanction
regulations. Since dollar transactions ultimately almost always have to be conducted
via US banks, the US authorities are in a position to obtain information on
virtually all global dollar transactions and can use their leverage over access
to the dollar payments system to extend their judicial reach.
I first became aware of this at a seminar three years ago
which discussed business opportunities in Iran following the end of sanctions.
Despite the optimism that Iran was once again being welcomed back into the
international fold, many of the bankers present warned that they were very
uncertain as to their position in the event they were required to provide
dollar funding for Iranian projects. Although sanctions against Iran had formally ended,
the US authorities even then were less willing to provide the green light. The
election of Donald Trump suggested that all parties were wise to be circumspect
given subsequent efforts to renew the sanctions.
Such apparently capricious policymaking raises a question of
what this might do to the status of the US dollar as the world’s reserve
currency? The choice of reserve currency is determined by three main
considerations:
- Size. Large economies generate a lot of foreign exchange transactions which puts a lot of currency into circulation;
- An advanced financial system which offers liquidity and a range of ancillary services;
- Stability. The currency needs to act as a store of value. Political stability is another prerequisite.
Just because the dollar remains the dominant reserve
currency today does not mean that it always will be. Prior to 1918, the US
dollar accounted for a negligibly small share of global foreign debt with the
UK accounting for 90% (chart). Within the space of five years, however, the dollar
increased its share of global reserves to almost 40%. The US gained at the UK’s
expense due to having a bigger economy, less indebtedness and a quantum leap in
sophistication of financial markets following the foundation of the Fed in
1913. Between 1918 and 1945 there was not one single global reserve currency: The
US and UK shared the burden.Who can say that we will not move towards a multipolar world in future?
I am not suggesting that we are yet at anything like the
watershed moment of a century ago. But history suggests that changing trade
patterns and a shift in the balance of economic power may be setting up the
dollar for a reduction in status as other currencies take up some of the slack.
Wielding the big stick, as President Trump is doing today, might hasten the
search for alternatives.
Interesting piece Peter. But I am not quite clear why you have to use the USD as a medium of transaction, even if it remains the world's major reserve currency. If, say, you wanted to invest in Iran, I'm sure they will take euros as readily as USD.
ReplyDeleteIran may be happy to take euros but those banks which provide euro funding also deal extensively in USD which allows the US authorities to exert leverage. In essence they have to decide whether the gains from dealing with Iran outweigh any losses from being locked out of USD business. For most major institutions this is not the case.
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