Showing posts with label uncertainty. Show all posts
Showing posts with label uncertainty. Show all posts

Wednesday 18 September 2019

Five years and two referendums later

I was reminded today of the fact that it is exactly five years since the Scottish electorate voted by a majority of 55% to 45% in favour of remaining in the United Kingdom. Those were what have now come to be seen as the good old days. The decision came just two years after the 2012 Olympics when it felt like the country was pulling together. Despite concerns about the direction of economic policy, the Scottish referendum outcome reflected a decision to bury differences as the country looked to the future with some optimism.

Looking back at what I wrote at the time, I noted: “This may not be the end of the story. For one thing, given the significant swell of support for the pro-independence campaign it cannot be absolutely ruled out that they will push for a second referendum. This will add further fuel to a nascent English nationalist movement led by UKIP, which will thus set the tone for the May 2015 General Election. Once the election is out of the way, the next big item on the political agenda will be the prospect of a UK referendum on EU membership. The main lesson from the Scottish campaign is that it will cause a lot of bitterness.” I could not have foreseen in 2014 just how right that would prove to be.

It is extraordinary to think that less than two years separated the Scottish independence and EU referendums, such was the change in political sentiment during this period. The long-awaited publication of David Cameron’s memoirs, which have been splashed all over the newspapers in recent days, suggests he is deeply saddened by how the EU debate played out and he is scathing about the behaviour of colleagues such as Michael Gove and Boris Johnson during the campaign. But just as Tony Blair could never admit that the UK’s involvement in the Iraq War was a mistake, so Cameron cannot accept that he made a mistake in calling the EU referendum. He believes that a public vote was “ultimately inevitable.” But he is wrong. In early 2016, only 10% of voters believed relations with the EU were a pressing issue for the UK. It was well documented at the time that Cameron was trying to spike the guns of UKIP and I have consistently expressed the view since early 2013 that his call for a referendum was a gamble with the national interest.

Arguably, Cameron’s success in securing the "right" result on the Scottish referendum emboldened his decision to hold an EU referendum. With the benefit of hindsight maybe if the Scots had voted for independence Cameron might not have been so gung-ho about the EU plebiscite, and although UKIP would have continued to be an irritant, the rest of the country may not have torn itself apart over the EU issue. As it is, we are now in a position where the UK is only 43 days away from crashing out of the EU without a deal.

The release last week of the summary Operation Yellowhammer documents make clear the scale of the economic risks facing the UK if it does crash out without a deal. The document notes that “When the UK ceases to be a member of the EU in October 2019 all rights and reciprocal arrangements with the EU end. No bilateral deals have been concluded with individual member states [and] public and business readiness for a no-deal will remain at a low level, and will decrease to lower levels, because the absence of a clear decision on the form of EU Exit (customs union, no deal etc) does not provide a concrete situation for third parties to prepare for.” These are the outcomes that government told us not too long ago were unthinkable and now we find they are government policy.

Just to highlight the specific nature of some of the Brexit-related risks, “the reliance of medicines and medical products' supply chains on the short straits crossing make them particularly vulnerable to severe extended delays. Any disruption to reduce, delay or stop supply of medicines for UK veterinary use would reduce our ability to prevent and control disease outbreaks, with potential detrimental impacts for animal health and welfare, the environment, and wider food safety/availability and zoonotic diseases which can directly impact human health. Certain types of fresh food supply will decrease.

In other words, the UK government’s inability or unwillingness to accept the deal negotiated with the EU last November poses potential health risks to the country’s population. These are not the hysterical ramblings of desperate Remainers – this is what the government has been forced to admit might actually happen. To further highlight the collapse in effective governance, far from preparing to meet the challenge, the government has suspended parliament in case it asks too many inconvenient questions and is now fighting a challenge to its actions in the Supreme Court. Nor does the madness stop there. For all the obvious shortcomings of Boris Johnson as Prime Minister, opinion polls suggest the Conservatives are actually extending their lead over Labour. To counter this, the Liberal Democrats have now adopted a repeal of the Article 50 notification as their official policy which is (a) unlikely to happen; (b) not particularly wise and (c) not the threat to democracy that the foaming-at-the mouth brigade would have us believe because all you have to do is not vote Lib Dem.

We live in febrile times and the anger that the Brexit debate has stirred up is not going to dissipate once the UK is out of the EU (or not). To put this into some form of historical context I have combined the post-1998 Baker, Bloom and Davis policy uncertainty index for the UK with their index covering the period 1900 to 2008 (based on a smaller sample so there are some comparability issues). Nonetheless, it shows that policy uncertainty spiked to its highest ever level in the wake of the EU referendum and even now is at levels consistently exceeded only in 1919, 1939 and 1946 (chart above). The UK economy is not merely suffering an economic shock: It is being subject to repeated convulsions which will not easily be healed. I fear it will take a generation to heal current wounds. The apparent civility characterising the Scottish referendum in 2014 seems like a lifetime ago.

Monday 10 December 2018

A void where the government used to be

Just when you think you have seen it all in the Brexit debate, we always find something interesting around the corner. Brexit Secretary Stephen Barclay said yesterday: "The vote is going ahead and that's because it's a good deal and it's the only deal." This morning, Downing Street was telling us that the “meaningful vote” that parliament had been promised on the terms of the Brexit deal was definitely going ahead. This afternoon, the prime minister informed us: “We will … defer the vote scheduled for tomorrow.”

Obviously, the fact that there was a snowball-in-hell’s chance of the deal being ratified would have put the prime minister in an impossible position and called what is left of her authority into question. On only three occasions in the last 100 years has a government been defeated by more than 100 votes and it is pretty easy to construct a scenario in which the Withdrawal Agreement would have been rejected by a majority of around 125. Recall that the 139 vote defeat suffered by Tony Blair’s government in 2003 on the question of involvement in the Iraq War arguably marked the beginning of the end for the prime minister as his authority began to leach away. Theresa May is in a far weaker position and it is questionable whether she would survive such a crushing blow. May’s future, however, is a subject for another day. At issue is where does the UK go from here? 

The PM has made it clear that she intends to meet with other EU leaders to discuss the concerns surrounding the backstop which threatens to leave the UK permanently tied to the EU. However, it is difficult to imagine any circumstances in which the EU will make any concessions. The Commission’s view is likely to be something along the lines of “we gave you a reasonable deal which you can take or leave as you see fit. In any case, you haven’t voted on it yet. Come back and see us when you have.” So May could be forced to put the Withdrawal Agreement to a parliamentary vote, and of course it will be heavily rejected. In this case the prime minister goes to Brussels to repeat her request and the EU27 merely repeats the first part of its answer.

Under these circumstances, the UK would have no option but to request an extension to the Article 50 process. The question is how the UK would then use the extra time made available? Probably the first option it would pursue is a Norway Plus arrangement in which the UK joins EFTA and applies to join the EEA (an option only available to EFTA or EU members). Whilst this would minimise the economic costs, the UK would still be subject to the four freedoms of goods, services, capital and labour. In essence it would be a rule-taker. Indeed, as I noted six years ago in response to the FT’s year-ahead 2013 questionnaireAnyone with notions that we can negotiate a Swiss or Norwegian-style existence on the fringes of the EU is dreaming. Such an existence would still mean that we are subject to large parts of EU legislation but without any power to change it – something which the euro sceptics would like even less than the system they have now.”

What is worrying is that many politicians still don’t understand this point and they have had six whole years to think about it and a whole lot of information put in front of them to demonstrate it. Maybe, just maybe, they will eventually get it in which case the UK would be mad to pursue such a course of action. I suspect that the other alternatives involve either a general election or – and whisper it quietly – a second EU referendum. An election does not do anything to resolve the Brexit question and should be viewed as a side effect of the current political impasse rather than an attempt to resolve it. With regard to a second referendum, I agree with the PM when she says “if you want a second referendum to overturn the result of the first, be honest that this risks dividing the country again” (as I hope I made clear here). But if politicians cannot agree what form of Brexit they want, they may have no choice but to put the question back to the people.

The reason we might end up in this position is primarily due to the fact the government failed to manage the process. The referendum result was never legally binding but May did all she could to make it sound like it was. She was far too late to face down the Brexit ultras who promised unicorns and cakes and indeed pandered to their prejudices (remember “citizens of nowhere” and “queue jumpers”). Perhaps most damningly, the referendum was treated as a winner-take-all outcome in which the near-half of voters who opposed Brexit were completely marginalised. For those who express sympathy with the PM for the near-impossibility of her task, remember that she made it far harder for herself than it needed to be.

I would not like to predict the outcome of a second referendum (I wouldn’t even like to predict the question on the ballot paper). But if it is a choice of “Remain” or “Accept the current deal” the likelihood is that the UK might not even leave the EU (some polling data here, for what it is worth). Further support for this option comes from today’s ECJ ruling that the UK can unilaterally rescind its Article 50 notification, for it suggests that the EU is giving the UK room for manoeuvre if it changes its mind on Brexit.

Nothing that has happened today has helped markets, with sterling falling to its lowest since April 2017. Although markets fear that today’s events have raised the likelihood that the UK will leave the EU without a deal, I don’t buy it. Nonetheless, there is major uncertainty regarding the nature of the UK’s future relationship with the EU which has put sterling under great pressure and 3-month GBP option volatility is on a par with what we saw around the time of the 2016 referendum (chart). Like nature, markets abhor a vacuum and today’s decision to withdraw the parliamentary vote has exposed a major void where the government used to be.

Thursday 8 February 2018

A risky business

The recent equity sell-off has focused investors’ attention on measures of market volatility, which have been abnormally low for much of the last four years. I did point out last summer that implied equity and bond market had fallen to all-time lows, and that there was a risk of a nasty surprise if investors believed that central banks would no longer continue to provide the unlimited support that they had hitherto (here). In the event, equity market volatility measures fell even further, bottoming out in November, whilst both the Fed and Bank of England since have raised interest rates.


Naturally, this raises the question, why now? And the truth is we don’t know. Many ex-post rationalisations have been offered but I suspect that markets had simply been living off fresh air for too long. It is thus possible that someone, somewhere simply placed a sell order that was picked up by algorithmic trading systems and triggered a widespread bout of selling. But nobody was really surprised that markets did correct sharply downwards, even if the magnitude of the correction caught many people out. Indeed, I pointed out last summer that “if the Fed starts to run down its balance sheet and put some upward pressure on global bond yields, the equity world may look different.

At this stage, I do not have enough evidence to change my year ahead prediction that equities will finish 2018 up by 5-10% on year-end 2017 levels. But that view looks a little more shaky than it did five weeks ago. Whilst much attention focused on the fact that the correction in the S&P500 on Monday was the largest single daily points decline on record, it is only the 39th biggest percentage decline on daily data back to 1980 (although that puts it well inside the top 0.5%). Slightly more worrying is the fact that exactly 10 years previously, on 5th February 2008, the S&P500 fell by 3.2% on the day – at the time, the 30th biggest daily fall since 1980. And we all know what happened later that year …

Recent trends in volatility raise a number of key questions. First, is volatility mean reverting? If so, neither the extremely low levels of 2017 nor the elevated levels of today will be sustained. Second, if market volatility measures do move back towards more “normal” levels, how quickly is this likely to occur? And third, is it possible that the trend volatility level has changed (i.e. that investors risk appetite has changed)?

With regard to the first question, the post-1990 evidence does suggest that equity volatility is mean-reverting although it can diverge from the mean for a considerable period of time. On average since 1990, each period of over- or undervaluation relative to the mean lasted for 17 months, which suggests that the period of adjustment is relatively slow. With regard to the second issue, in 88% of cases since 1990 the VIX was within one standard deviation of the mean (although on only 38% of occasions was it within half a standard deviation). One standard deviation represents a 7-point move in the VIX which is relatively tolerable. It is only when we see the kinds of spikes associated with the bursting of the tech bubble between 1999 and 2002, or the post-crisis period of 2008-09, would high equity volatility threaten to derail the markets.

However, there is a risk that an extended period of low volatility sows the seeds for a period of higher vol. Lower volatility during periods of economic upswing tends to result in higher risk taking and excessive leverage, with the result that even small price declines can force investors to dump asset holdings, depressing prices further and generating higher volatility. This triggers a second round of price declines and volatility spikes which could turn into a self-reinforcing spiral. But as it currently stands, despite the sharp spike in equity volatility in early February, the forward vol curve is pricing in a decline back to levels close to the long-run average over a five month horizon (chart). This downward sloping volatility curve is not indicative of a market which is expecting a significant change in risk conditions.

As for the third question of whether there has been a shift in the trend level of the VIX, and therefore a shift in investor risk tolerance, the jury is still out. We will probably only know after a prolonged period of tighter monetary policy. The most four dangerous words in finance are “this time it’s different.” Any data series which shows strong mean-reverting trends should be treated as such until we have overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

All in all, I am inclined to treat the current trends in markets as some of the air coming out of the bubble rather than as the beginning of a more prolonged sell-off. As many people have pointed out, the fundamental factors which drove markets higher in the first place – strengthening growth and the impact of US tax cuts on corporate earnings – remain in play. But the spike in volatility acts as a reminder that markets are like wild animals: they can act unpredictably and you can never tame them, so you have to act cautiously to avoid getting your face ripped off.

Monday 13 November 2017

It's very quiet out there

As UK political uncertainty mounts, it is striking that sterling-denominated assets have held up reasonably well of late. Sterling has traded in a relatively narrow range over the past year with the trade weighted index registering a high of 79 in May and a low of 74 in August. Surprisingly, investor net speculative positions in sterling, which were heavily negative early this year, have now turned flat to slightly positive. This reflects the fact that FX investors are currently not expecting a significant sterling collapse, although the timing of the move does appear to be correlated with changes in the market’s position on BoE rate hikes. Meanwhile, although the FTSE100 has trailed indices such as the Eurostoxx  50 year-to-date, they have moved broadly in line since May and the FTSE has managed a year-to-date return of 3.8%  – not great when set against other markets but nonetheless positive. Moreover, the weakness of sterling tends to be a positive factor for UK equities given how much revenue is booked in foreign currencies (around 70%).

Thus, political uncertainty appears to be conspicuous by its absence so far as markets are concerned, which reflects the fact that investors are looking through all the rhetoric and concluding that the likelihood of a cliff-edge Brexit is low. Since we are still more than 16 months away from the expiry of the Article 50 negotiation phase, markets take the view that there is no sense in panicking now – there will be plenty of time for that later. Nonetheless, the closer we get to the deadline without agreement, the greater the likelihood that assets will come under pressure, but that is probably a story for next year.

To get a sense of how the market and economic agents assess uncertainty in the UK at present, I constructed an uncertainty index based upon eight variables: (i) FTSE100 equity volatility; (ii) EUR/GBP FX volatility; (iii) GBP/USD FX volatility; (iv) the Baker, Bloom and Davis policy uncertainty indicator; (v) GfK survey data for expected consumer finances; (vi)  expected unemployment and (vii) expected economic situation. The final component is (viii) the CBI’s estimate of uncertainty as a factor limiting capex. Furthermore, if we strip out the equity and currency vol measures, we have a five variable index of domestic uncertainty.

The chart suggests that the aggregate uncertainty index has dipped back close to its long-term average (2000-2015). Whilst the domestic indicator has not fallen quite as sharply, it is well below its summer 2016 highs with only the Baker et al policy uncertainty index showing any extended deviation. The interesting thing is that this policy uncertainty index is based on an online trawl of newspaper websites looking for various keywords which express uncertainty. To the extent that much of the concern expressed about Brexit has indeed come via the media (not to mention the blogosphere, so I am as guilty as anyone), it highlights the noise inherent in the debate without necessarily shedding much light on how the economy is performing. Indeed, many of the other indicators normalised very quickly, which suggests that most economic agents generally got on with life in the wake of the Brexit vote.

This does not mean to say that everything will remain so quiet. The GfK survey data point to a deterioration in expectations for the future economic situation with sentiment now back at levels last seen in spring 2013. Moreover, with inflation beginning to put the squeeze on consumers, we are starting to see some deterioration in expectations for consumer finances.

It is worth noting that the indicator is not a good predictor of longer-term trends. Even in the early months of 2008, when there were signs that trouble was brewing in the banking sector and the economy was losing some momentum, both the aggregate and domestic uncertainty indices remained at low levels. A lurch towards the cliff-edge of Brexit could change perceptions quite markedly. Perhaps UK consumers and corporates need to hurt even more before they realise the potential economic consequences of Brexit. This is why just looking at the current relative stability of the uncertainty index is not necessarily a good guide to future trends. In my view – and that of most of the economics profession – a number of senior British politicians do not seem to understand the risk they are taking with the wider economy. It is incumbent upon them to get it right or the electorate may be in a less forgiving mood than it has been of late.