Showing posts with label investment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label investment. Show all posts

Saturday 6 March 2021

Corporate health risks

Whilst the presentation of the government’s financial plans in many countries is often a dry affair focused on the impact of the fiscal measures on public finances, it is increasingly used as a showpiece political event in the UK as the government tries to put the rosiest possible spin on tax and spending measures. Not only does the UK budget generate a lot of commentary and analysis ahead of the event, but the sheer volume of the material released on Budget Day means that it often pays to avoid instant commentary as the full implications of the measures percolate through. The Office for Budget Responsibility’s Economic and Fiscal Outlook alone represented 222 pages of detailed analysis of the UK’s economic situation, covering everything you might want to know (and a lot that you don’t), and there is a lot more besides.

By general consent, Wednesday’s budget was a “spend now, tax later” affair in which the government plans to continue providing a significant amount of economic support in the near-term but intends to pursue a more aggressive fiscal tightening beyond 2023. Indeed, the fiscal expansion measures over the next two years are offset by a planned fiscal tightening over the following three years and by 2026 the ratio of tax revenue to GDP is projected to reach its highest since the late-1960s (chart 1). The fact that the majority of the fiscal tightening falls on tax increases rather than spending cuts is a recognition that it will be politically difficult to repeat the austerity measures that were implemented in the wake of the 2009-09 recession. Indeed, I have been pointing out for some years that planned cuts in corporate taxes were putting an unnecessary strain on the budget deficit.

The impact of raising corporate tax rates

The primary tax measure announced in the budget was a rise in corporate taxes from the current rate of 19% to 25% in 2023 which would leave it in the middle of the range of a group of 37 countries, rather than significantly below (chart 2). This flies in the face of the low tax orthodoxy espoused by successive Conservative governments over the past 40 years and represents the first increase since 1974, when it was raised from an already-high rate of 40% to an eye-watering 52%. This week’s announcement was driven by two factors. First, in its 2019 manifesto the Conservative party committed to not raising income tax, national insurance or VAT rates, leaving it with few alternatives. Second, there has been growing disquiet in recent years that efforts to slash corporate taxes meant that many companies were getting off lightly at a time when individuals were bearing the costs of austerity.

The OBR highlighted that although the tax rate has been slashed sharply over the years, the share of corporate tax receipts in GDP has fluctuated in a narrow range centred around 3%. This reflects the fact that the tax base has been widened over time, thus offsetting the revenue-dampening effects. In theory, applying higher tax rates to a wider base ought to significantly increase revenue. One concession applied to the latest package is that companies generating less than £50k per annum in profits will continue to pay a tax rate of 19% with a graduated scale applicable on profits above this limit, to a maximum of 25%. The government reckons that 70% of companies will continue to pay a rate of 19%. The fact that the remaining 30% will contribute an extra £20bn in taxes by 2026 compared to estimates made in November (an increase of 31%) suggests that larger companies will be hit hard. Fears expressed in EU circles that the UK would embark on a regime of tax competition to undercut companies in continental Europe appear to be unfounded.

But tax increases have consequences. In the first instance, companies that may be considering whether they need to continue operations in the UK after Brexit may use higher taxes as a reason to move elsewhere. In addition, curbs on corporate profitability may have adverse effects on job creation in the medium-term. Moreover, expectations of reduced future profitability will depress the capacity to pay out dividends, fund buybacks and pay down debt, not to mention reducing the net present value of corporate earnings. All of these factors might be expected to depress UK equity valuations relative to other markets. Raising taxes will, other things being equal, also reduce the capacity to fund capital investment.

Pros and cons of generous investment allowances

In order to offset the worst of the investment problem, the government unveiled a generous two-year temporary capital allowance covering the fiscal years 2021-22 and 2022-23, in which companies will be able to offset 130% of investment spending on eligible plant and machinery against profits. The evidence does suggest that such measures have a stimulatory impact on investment since they reduce the user cost of capital (the tax-adjusted marginal cost of capital). Moreover, tax incentives tend to have a bigger impact on long-lasting assets. At a time when the UK is keen to encourage the switch away from combustion-engine vehicles, which will require significant investment in the infrastructure to support the adoption of battery-powered vehicles, the tax breaks could give this particular project a big shot in the arm.

However, temporary tax breaks suffice only to shift the timing of investment projects rather than leading to a permanent increase. The OBR’s forecast indeed suggests that a big investment surge in 2022 will be followed by only a moderate increase thereafter. Between 2007 and 2016, business fixed investment increased at a paltry annual rate averaging just 1.6%. Between 2016 and 2019, in the wake of the Brexit referendum, it barely increased at all and despite the budget measures introduced last week the OBR’s projections point to growth of just 0.8% per annum between 2016 and 2025 (chart 3).

Moreover, there are particularly high levels of uncertainty at present which run the risk that efforts to stimulate investment may not have the desired effect. Incentive measures presuppose that there is a lot of investment waiting to be brought online. As MPC member Jonathan Haskel noted in a speech yesterday, “residual uncertainty and risk aversion over the recovery are likely to continue to weigh on investment,” particularly in the wake of Brexit. There is also a lot of spare capacity in the economy at present – my own estimates suggest that the output gap this year is likely to average -2.6%, narrowing to -0.7% in 2022. In addition, the tax incentives are only useful if companies generate a profit. In the post-pandemic recovery phase profitability may remain under pressure, although to mitigate this effect the government has extended the loss carry back rules which allow companies to offset past trading losses against profits.

Whilst efforts to boost investment are welcome, one of the drawbacks associated with the tax allowance is that it is aimed squarely at tangible assets but there is no incentive for investment in intangibles which is a problem in an increasingly digital economy. This may continue to act as a drag on multifactor productivity, which in the past decade has posted its slowest growth in a century, which will in turn hold back potential GDP growth. 

Last word

When asked last year whether I expected the Chancellor to announce fiscal consolidation measures in 2021, my response was “it is likely that some form of fiscal consolidation will be announced in 2021 though may not necessarily be immediately implemented.” This expectation has been borne out. It was inevitable that corporates would be asked to shoulder a bigger part of the fiscal repair bill and the government has tried to sweeten the pill by offering generous investment allowances. But the strategy does represent a risk to the health of UK PLC. Like many aspects of budgetary policy, however, we will only know the outcome many years from now.

Sunday 27 January 2019

The business end of Brexit


The warnings by business leaders over the past three years that Brexit would be bad for the British economy have gone largely unheeded. One of the most frequently cited examples is that of Sunderland, in the north of England, which voted 61.3% in favour of Leave despite the threat this posed to the region's largest employer, Nissan. Even today TV camera crews can found on the streets of Sunderland filming the views of locals who continue to insist that Nissan will not leave the town. Yet two years ago Nissan executive, Colin Lawther, appearing before a parliamentary committee indicated the difficulties for companies like Nissan in dealing with a hard Brexit. The plant receives 5 million parts a day, 85% of which are imported, but the plant holds only enough parts for half a day’s production due to the costs of storing them. Just-in-time inventory management, facilitated by free movement of goods, is crucial to the plant’s success.

As long ago as September, BMW announced that it would bring forward its annual maintenance shutdown to late March in order to deal with any potential problems. Since the turn of the year we have seen a number of other companies announcing Brexit contingency measures. A couple of weeks ago Honda announced that it would shut its factory in Swindon for 6 days in April to ensure it could adjust to "all possible outcomes caused by logistics and border issues." Jaguar Land Rover has also decided to shut down its four main factories for an extra week at the start of April on top of a previously planned maintenance pause because of “potential Brexit disruption.” Not convinced yet?

Earlier this week, Airbus CEO Tom Enders warned that the company might be forced to quit the UK in the event of a hard Brexit. In Enders’ words, “please don’t listen to the Brexiteers’ madness, which asserts that because we have huge plants here we will not move and we will always be here. They are wrong.” Indeed, Enders gets to the nub of a problem which has been a running sore in the Brexit debate with some politicians having demonstrated extraordinary arrogance with regard to business. Last summer, when asked about corporate concerns over a hard Brexit at an event for EU diplomats in London Boris Johnson is reported to have replied: "F*** business." A couple of weeks ago he was at it again: When presented with the not-unreasonable claim that Jaguar Land Rover boss Ralf Speth might know more about the car industry than he does, Johnson replied “I’m not certain he does.”

A few months ago, Owen Paterson MP also dismissed claims by car manufacturers that Brexit would have consequences for their business. In his words: “If we really do leave the Customs Union, Jaguar Land Rover will have access to cheaper parts and components all around the world and the European suppliers will be forced to compete or they will lose Jaguar Land Rover’s business.” This is peak Bluffocracy and is reminiscent of armchair fans who claim that they would make better football managers than the present incumbent. Clearly there is something seriously wrong with our political culture when MPs can make such claims in public and not suffer the ridicule they deserve.

But it is one thing to ignore the warnings of business: It is another thing entirely for politicians not to take any decisions at all which hugely complicates the difficulties in the business decision-making process, particularly when there are very long lead times involved. This lack of certainty acts as a brake on corporate activity, and business investment declined in volume terms in each of the three quarters of 2018 for which we have data. In the nine quarters since the EU referendum, UK business investment volume has increased by just 0.6% compared with 5.7% in the nine quarters leading up to it. CBI survey data indicates that investment intentions in plant and equipment have been lower over the past six months than at any time since 2009. This is not indicative of a business community that has any faith in the government’s Brexit assurances.

Business is no longer taking government on trust. The Guardian reports today that firms are planning a mass exodus in the event of a no-deal Brexit. In the financial services industry, banks have long been preparing for the worst case outcome. Since the passporting legislation, which allows banks to be regulated in one EU country but conduct business throughout the EU, cannot be guaranteed beyond 29 March this has prompted them to put in place contingency plans to transfer staff to other EU locations to maintain business continuity.  Although the numbers involved so far are relatively small, probably of the order of 7000, firms are also transferring assets out of London as balance sheets are run down. And this is only to keep business running in April – the shift will be far larger in future. 

The experience of Nordea bank acts as a cautionary tale. Nordea was involved in a tax dispute with the Swedish government and threatened to shift its headquarters from Stockholm to either Copenhagen or Helsinki. When the Swedish government refused to back down, Nordea management persuaded shareholders to sanction a move to the Finnish capital which was not only one in the eye for Sweden but allowed the bank to base itself inside the euro zone’s banking union. The moral of the story is that businesses do not issue threats they are not prepared to carry out.

Of course, the biggest irony over the last week was the announcement that that Brexit supporter James Dyson is to move his company’s HQ to Singapore. There may indeed be good business reasons for the move but it is a PR own goal of mammoth proportions. It does not sound as though Dyson has great faith in the UK’s role at the heart of a new global trading hub. Still, it is consistent with the actions of the likes of Jacob Rees-Mogg whose investment fund decided last summer to set up a fund in Dublin, as asset managers worry about being cut off from European investors. A case of “do as I say, not what I do.”

Sunday 14 May 2017

The case for a National Investment Bank

One of the policy proposals put forward in the leaked Labour Party manifesto last week was the establishment of a National Investment Bank (NIB) to facilitate £250bn of spending on infrastructure over the next ten years. There was no detail in the document about how this might be set up, but there is some merit to the idea if done properly and in this post I offer a look at how it might work.

It is important to be clear at the outset what it should not be. It should not be a conduit for monetary creation by the Bank of England – the so-called People’s QE plan proposed by Jeremy Corbyn when he took over as Labour leader in 2015. PQE essentially requires the central bank to buy the bonds necessary to capitalise such an institution. But this policy is fraught with danger primarily because it erodes the boundaries between government and central bank to an unacceptable degree. In the form envisaged, it allows government to force the central bank to create money to finance whatever projects it deems fit. Moreover, a policy which requires monetary creation on such a scale would also have potential inflationary consequences and no central banker worth their salt is ever likely to endorse such a plan.

That said, there is no reason why a NIB should not work. The UK has tried it before and it was remarkably successful though perhaps not in the way initially envisaged. The Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation (ICFC) was set up in 1945 by the Bank of England with funding from major commercial lenders to provide capital to small and medium-sized companies. In order to free itself from the constraints of relying on the clearing banks for funds, the ICFC began to tap the market to raise capital. This had an adverse side effect in as much as it raised pressure to generate greater returns on equity, which in turn led to a shift away from longer term, less attractive returns which its core mission delivered, to shorter term higher return projects, which caused problems during times of economic downturn. But by the 1980s it had shifted focus to become a leading provider of finance for management buyouts and had expanded internationally. It became a public limited company in 1987, when the banks sold their stakes, and it was fully privatised in 1994.

Currently, the UK is the only G7 economy not to have an institution which provides finance to the SME sector. In Germany, the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) has supported industry since 1948 and in the US, the Small Business Administration (SBA) has operated since 1953. Admittedly, the UK government did dip its toes into the water recently when it established the Green Investment Bank (GIB) in 2012. But despite apparently being successful, it was sold to Macquarie Bank last month for a price (£2.3bn) less than the initial £3.8bn of capital injected by the government.

In an excellent paper commissioned for the Labour Party in 2011, the lawyer Nick Tott outlined the case for a NIB.  But just to show that the case was not party political, former MPC member Adam Posen made a similarly excellent case in a 2011 speech which suggested that not only was there a case for a NIB, but that there was a need for an “entity to bundle and securitize loans made to SMEs … to create a more liquid and deep market for illiquid securities.” The biggest question remains how to capitalise such an institution. The government could commit up to £5bn as initial seed capital – after all it put almost £4bn into the GIB – and it could issue another (say) £5bn of bonds backed by Treasury guarantee. In future years it could divert part of the income generated by National Savings and Investments (NS&I) which raised £11.3bn for the Exchequer in 2015-16 and has assets of £120bn.

Admittedly, this is pretty small scale stuff and would be in no way able to fund the £25bn per annum of infrastructure which the Labour Party is calling for. This is probably a good argument in favour of limiting the remit of such an institution to SME lending rather than big public infrastructure projects. That, after all, is what such institutions do in other countries. Moreover, as Tott points out, it “would need a wide measure of independence from government.” It cannot simply be an arm of government to finance all sorts of pet projects, otherwise those who brand it a return to 1970s-style profligacy will likely be proved right.

A NIB would have to be run along commercial lines. As Posen pointed out, “The existing banks will scream about the unfair cost of capital advantage such an institution would have, but ... since the major banks in the UK have benefitted from a too-big-to-fail situation, any disadvantage they have in funding conditions is offset by the funding advantage they have over smaller or newer financial institutions, which they have gladly accepted. [Admittedly] public sector banks do tend to underperform private banks in credit allocation, and do tend to erode private banks’ profits. Yet most if not all countries have ongoing public lenders of various types (even the US has the SBA), and their existence on a limited scale, while perhaps wasteful at the margin, does not lead to the destruction of the private-sector banking systems in those countries … Let us remember that the UK and other western private-sector banks did that themselves during a period of financial liberalization and privatization unprecedented in postwar economic history.”

There are good reasons why the UK needs to do something to raise investment. For one thing, it is about to lose its EU funding which will put a hole in the transfers to many of the English regions (places like Hartlepool, which were very much pro-Brexit, have received considerable funding in recent years). A more generic macroeconomic problem is that the rate of business investment growth has been below the rate of depreciation since the great recession. This is not an issue which gets much airplay in the big picture story, and I am not sure of the extent to which it represents a change in business behaviour or whether it is a measurement problem. But it means in effect that the UK capital stock is declining, which may be one explanation behind the slowdown in potential growth in recent years. The UK needs to raise its investment levels. Whether a NIB is the right way to go about it remains to be seen. But it is an idea which should not be dismissed out of hand.