Polling evidence shows that Europeans and American citizens believe Ukraine should continue its fight to regain the territory occupied by Russia, although in other geopolitically important states there is less support for such a position (chart above). The continental European position is understandable. There is more concern than elsewhere that the war could spill over and draw them in to defend their territory or that of their neighbours. Quite how events will pan out over the next twelve months is difficult to say. The likelihood is that the war of attrition will continue, with Ukraine not having the resources to push Russian forces out of their territory but Russia unable to make significant territorial gains. Further ahead, the manpower differential makes it difficult to see how Ukraine can regain the territory it has lost without regime change in Moscow, suggesting that some form of negotiated settlement might be the best we can hope for.
The economy has so far avoided the worst case outcomes …
Undoubtedly the Ukrainian war has had a big impact on the global economy, following hard on the heels of the Covid pandemic. This has manifested in an inflation shock, the likes of which we have not seen in 40 years, and prompted central banks around the world to raise interest rates, having kept them at historical lows for far too long after the GFC. The slowdown in the global economy has been pronounced but perhaps less dramatic than anticipated towards the end of 2022, with euro area GDP eking out a small rise of 0.1% q/q in 2022Q4, thus ensuring that the economy continues to avoid recession. Germany is facing a tougher haul but even the 0.4% contraction recorded in Q4 was better than anticipated a few months ago.
Germany in particular has coped far better than anticipated in managing its gas storage. As of end-February, storage levels were at 71.7% of capacity (chart below) whilst gas consumption in the week beginning 13 February 2023 was 22.7% below the average for 2018 to 2021. As a consequence, Europe’s largest economy has avoided significant blackouts which has prevented sharper falls in output. But contrary to suggestions expressed in the media of late, we are far from out of the woods. Indeed, although it is likely that Germany – and indeed the rest of Europe – has sufficient gas on hand to get through to the autumn, much depends on how easily gas storage levels can be topped up ahead of the winter. In the event that Germany cannot easily top up supplies from non-Russian sources in 2023, we could go into next winter with perilously low supply levels which would be problematic if there is a cold winter.
A tightening of monetary policy has helped to curb demand but this all points to the fact that rather than a winter 2023 recession, we could instead face a similar outcome in twelve months’ time. For this reason, markets are looking nervously at the actions of central banks as they continue to tighten monetary policy in the face of a rising inflation threat. But it is not headline inflation they care about so much as the pickup in core inflation as prices respond to the big rise in energy costs that occurred in 2022. On top of this central banks also care about the prospect of a response from wage inflation which could set off a wage-price spiral. So they keep nudging rates higher. And the higher they go, the more likely the prospect that the economy finally tips into recession – not as a direct result of higher energy costs but as a result of tighter monetary policy.
That might seem a remote prospect in the US today but the operation of monetary policy involves lags which are often not known with any precision. As interest rates in the US rise and inflation falls, so the real interest rate – which is assumed to be a key factor in driving real activity rates – becomes less negative. Based on latest data, for example, the real Fed funds rate climbed from a low of -8.2% in March 2022 to -1.8% by January 2023. Admittedly this is still in negative territory but add 25bps to the funds rate and assume inflation comes down by another 1.5 percentage points to 4.8% and the real rate is back at zero. The further inflation falls as the energy price shock drops out of the calculations, the greater the upward pressure on real rates and the bigger the drag on the US economy – and by definition the rest of the world.
Back to where we started
Putin calculated that NATO’s European members, which were heavily dependent on Russian gas, would scale back their opposition to the invasion as the restriction of gas supplies put intolerable pressure on the European economy. So far this calculation has not worked out. European opposition may yet soften if the economy falls into recession, either as a result of domestic policy errors or those of the Federal Reserve. However, rather than a short, sharp recession, it is far more likely that the European economy will experience a longer period of little to no growth, which will raise the pressure on policymakers in different ways. Coupled with high budget deficits, which may prompt some form of fiscal consolidation, the near-term outlook for the European economy is not a pretty one. The polling data suggests that European governments can afford to stay the course in 2023. Whether they will be prepared to do so further ahead as elections loom may be another matter.
