After the UK government communicates its desire to leave the
EU, everything changes. The UK no longer has any control over how the
negotiations will proceed and the ball will be very much in the court of its (soon-to-be
erstwhile) EU partners. Although Theresa May has set out her 12 key negotiating
points, I maintain that they are little more than a wish list. And if the key
issue at the heart of the Brexit campaign was immigration, the UK government
does not appear to have developed a clear strategy on how to proceed from here.
Brexit minister David Davis yesterday confirmed that the government will not
seek to cap the number of EU migrants working in the UK after Brexit, but expects
that the government will eventually meet its target of cutting net migration to
the “tens of thousands.” Short of redefining the migration statistics to
exclude students, it most certainly will not be able to do so. I won’t bore you
with the economic arguments about immigration again – suffice to say many
people have it wrong about the balance of costs and benefits.
There are those who argue that the weakness of the EU is a
good opportunity for PM May to press hard for a deal which will benefit the UK.
Allister Heath in the Telegraph argues that “the rise of populism on the
continent, the strength of Britain's economy and Europe's fear of terrorism all
make a good deal for the UK more likely.” I’m not sure I agree that the EU
is as weak as he makes out. The Dutch election earlier this month showed that
Geert Wilders’ brand of populism was decisively rejected and latest polls put Emmanuel
Macron ahead in the French election, suggesting that he will breeze the second
round. The EU is not, in Heath’s words, “on
the verge of the abyss.” It is weakened, for sure. But Brexit may even act
as a catalyst to force it to rethink its strategy.
For those Brexit supporters who claim that it is not curbing
immigration which is the real prize but the opportunity to strike new trade
deals, Gideon Rachman’s recent column in the FT nicely skewers some of that thinking. Rachman argues that the UK establishment
suffers from collective amnesia in which the national story is centred around
the war against the Nazis rather than focusing on Britain’s imperial past. In
Rachman’s words “Most British people,
including leading politicians, are profoundly ignorant of the country’s
imperial history. This imperial amnesia … means that leading Brexiters and
advocates of “Global Britain” … speak warmly of returning to Britain’s
historical vocation as a “great trading nation”, when it was actually a great
imperial nation. That important distinction leads to overconfidence about the
ease of re-creating a global trading destiny, in a world in which Britannia no
longer rules the waves.”
In the first Brexit presentation I made, back in 2013, when
I shared a platform with former Europe Minister Denis MacShane (before his conviction
for expenses fraud), I recall making a similar point. Those who believe that
the UK will be able to rely on our Commonwealth partners, claiming special historical
ties, clearly do not see the imperial position through Indian (or Pakistani or
Kenyan etc) eyes. The former British colonies have emerged from the shadow of
their imperial past and have no desire to return to it. Indeed, Theresa May’s
efforts to conduct a trade deal could be threatened by her refusal to reform
visa restrictions for Indian citizens (here).
For the 48.1% of us who voted in favour of Remain in June,
the decision to trigger Article 50 will signal another step on the path away
from the common Europe of which we hoped to remain part. I would like to think
that whatever deal is struck, it will not inflict too much pain on the UK. But much
will depend on the magnanimity of the EU, for what I have heard so far gives me
little confidence in the UK’s negotiating strategy. When our own prime minster
reckons “no deal for Britain is better than a bad deal for Britain” you really
have to wonder what we are letting ourselves in for.