The project has been heavily criticised for a number of reasons – the most common being that it reflects greed on the part of the owners who wish to maximise their income irrespective of the consequences for grassroots football (including the women’s game which is now gaining traction across Europe). It is indeed notable that no German clubs signed up, which may have a lot to do with the ownership structure (the 50+1 rule which gives fans majority voting rights). Support for the ESL appears to be confined to the board room as players past and present, football administrators from across the continent and, most importantly, fans lined up to condemn the idea. Obviously UEFA was not pleased that some of the continent’s best-known clubs are planning an alternative to its money-spinning Champions League competition and threatened the imposition of retaliatory sanctions. But there are a lot of issues at play here, not to mention a nice line in hypocrisy from many of those in football who have suddenly discovered an interest in the welfare of fans.
The financial angle
Looking first at the finances of the G12 (or the dirty dozen), 11 of them occupy the top 14 places in the annual Deloitte’s Football Money League revenue ranking (the 12th is AC Milan which occupies 30th spot). But according to Swiss Ramble (one of the best commentators on European football finances), the G12 made a financial loss of £1.2 billion (€1.05 billion) in season 2019-20 before player sales were taken into account. He also calculates that they owe a “staggering” €7.4 billion of debt (chart) on €5.59 of revenue (my calculations), implying a debt-to-income ratio of 132%. On that basis it is not difficult to understand why they are keen to take part in a competition which increases their revenue stream, particularly in the wake of Covid which has had a dramatic effect on finances.
But whilst the elite clubs have the option of being able to join a super league which protects their revenue stream, most do not and the enforced absence of spectators since March 2020 has had a major impact on their revenues. Even before Covid struck, the finances of English Premier League (EPL) teams were shaky. The top teams in England have generated a huge rise in income over the last 30 years thanks to the money pumped in by TV companies keen to secure the broadcasting rights. Some of this has been used to fund the construction of more modern stadiums fit for the 21st century but to a large extent it has ended up in the pockets of players with wages making up an average of 65% of clubs’ income.
The finances of teams lower down the pyramid have not kept pace as the gap between the rich and poor continues to widen. We should not kid ourselves that top-level football is an altruistic institution with clubs at the top looking out for those lower down the scale. In 2019 Bury FC, one of the oldest professional clubs in England, was forced into bankruptcy over a debt of less than £2 million. The two EPL clubs closest to Bury, Manchester United and Manchester City, have a combined weekly wage bill of over £6 million. Indeed, for all the outrage generated by the EPL over the breakaway league, we should not forget that the EPL itself was formed in 1992 as a breakaway from the Football League (the administrator of league football in England) to allow clubs to maximise revenue from the sale of TV rights and sponsorship arrangements. As I noted in this post, its record on financial probity is spotty and it cannot be said to be looking after the interests of fans.
Business or sport?
The advent of the ESL is perhaps an inevitable consequence of allowing the big clubs to grab an ever larger slice of the pie. This prescient film clip from 1994 accurately foreshadowed the consequences for the sport of allowing TV to call the shots, with participants in the documentary predicting with uncanny accuracy how little the voice of the fans would count in the brave new footballing world (although the extent of fans’ discontent did clearly convince club owners that the ESL was a step too far).
Football is not a conventional business and it is therefore difficult to ascribe standard business practices. I have long characterised football as operating in an imperfect oligopolistic market in which the products are differentiated by branding and where there are significant barriers to entry. Matters are made more complex by the fact that it is a product which has global appeal but is rooted in domestic structures. This makes valuing the ESL a difficult prospect. However, I would argue that the owners of elite clubs have miscalculated the value of their brand and arguably they do not understand the underpinnings of their industry.
This is reinforced by the findings of Peter Sloane, one of the pioneers in the economics of football who has been studying the area since the early-1970s. In a paper published in 2015[1] he noted that there are significant differences in the conduct of North American and European team sports management: “While it is assumed by most protagonists in North America that clubs attempt to maximise profits, in Europe the most common assumption is the maximisation of playing success subject to a break-even constraint.” Sloane went on to point out that “North American leagues are closed to new entrants through the granting of exclusive territorial rights, though with allowance for some franchise mobility, whereas in Europe leagues are open to entry through a system of promotion and relegation.” It is notable that three of the English clubs signing up to the ESL are owned by Americans and arguably they made a mistake by applying the American model in the wrong setting.
Sloane touches on another interesting point: Although there may appear to be little solidarity between clubs in the same league, “mutual inter-dependence is generally regarded as a sine qua non of professional sporting leagues.” An inherent paradox of competition is that while clubs strive for playing success at the expense of the opposition, they each have an interest in the survival of rivals as they require healthy teams to play against. A revenue sharing structure, rather than a profit maximising model, best ensures this by ensuring that smaller clubs can receive additional revenue to buy better players in order to improve their performance, thereby raising the quality of the product. Although the ESL model does allow for revenue sharing, it only does so for elite clubs already in the clique. The uncertainty of result required to ensure continued consumer interest is correspondingly reduced. Accordingly, a successful league can best be described as a joint venture between the administrative body which sets the overarching competitive framework and the clubs which operate as independent entities within it. Changing this fragile balance will lead to system failure.
The future
The attempt to form the ESL is not the first time that big clubs have tried to increase their revenue at the expense of smaller clubs and it is unlikely to be the last. As I have pointed out before, if football is allowed to be conducted along casino capitalism lines with light-touch self-regulation it is inevitable that the more powerful will try to assert their market power. In its 2019 election manifesto, the Conservative Party promised to “set up a fan-led review of football governance, which will include consideration of the Owners and Directors Test.” There have also been calls to set up an independent regulator to oversee governance of the sport although past performance suggests that they generally tend to be toothless bodies.
However, football finances do clearly need to be overhauled. Some of the lessons football can learn from US team sports are the introduction of wage caps, restrictions on transfer fees and restrictions on stock market flotation. There is also a case for limiting the amount of debt that clubs are able to carry. Over the last 30 years football has failed to reform itself. Maybe it is time to impose reform upon it.
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