Nowhere is this more evident than in Germany where Angela Merkel is facing what looks to be a significant fracturing of the political consensus. In summer 2017, the CDU/CSU coalition was running at 39% in the opinion polls with the SPD polling 25% and the AfD 8%. Latest polls put the CDU/CSU at 28%, the SPD at 17% and the AfD at 16%. In the 20 years that the Emnid weekly poll has been running, the share of the CDU/CSU and SPD, which together represent the main German political factions, has never previously fallen below 50%. That the AfD and SPD are running neck-and-neck in the polls is an indication of how things have changed. The fact that the AfD has maintained its polling status even after the riots in Chemnitz is another illustration of that fact.
The ousting this week of a long-term Merkel ally as head of the conservative bloc's parliamentary group is an indication that her domestic opponents have been emboldened by apparent signs of political weakness. With Merkel already one year through her four-year term, and unlikely to stand as Chancellor at the next election, the beginning of the end of her time on the stage is apparently unfolding before us.
Not that Emmanuel Macron has much to be satisfied with. According to latest polling data, only 28% of French voters are satisfied with his performance – down from 35% in July and compared with 60% in summer 2017. This puts him on a par with Francois Hollande’s polling ratings after a similar period in office, and way behind Nicolas Sarkozy. Macron’s problems are: (a) he does not enjoy as much support as his landslide election win suggested – many voters simply chose him because he was not the right wing Marine Le Pen; (b) he has been unable to deliver on his promise of a domestic political revolution, and (c) promises to cut taxes remain so far unfulfilled (see this BBC article for a closer look at Macron’s woes).
As I have noted previously (here), Italian politics has been in flux since the spring election as the League and Five Star parties continue to share an uneasy alliance. Current negotiations regarding the 2019 budget have been dragging on for weeks, with the technocratic finance minister Giovanni Tria under pressure to increase the budget deficit to accommodate the expensive election promises of the populist coalition government. There are concerns that a deficit in excess of 3% of GDP would be a problem for the European Commission, provoking a row over fiscal policy that would result in another general election next year. Whether or not this materialises is not the point: It is yet another distraction that Italian voters – and indeed the EU as a whole – can do without.
Factor in the ongoing problems between Brussels and the governments in Budapest and Warsaw, and the news that the Sweden’s centre-left prime minister has been forced out by the centre-right bloc after an inconclusive election earlier this month, and the scale of the political problems facing EU leaders becomes evident.
Thus, when the British newspapers obsess about Brexit as if it were the only game in town, you can be sure that they have it all wrong. The trials and tribulations faced by Angela Merkel over recent months highlight the extent to which the old order is crumbling. When even the German Chancellor faces mounting domestic problems as a result of the EU migration crisis, it is pretty evident that something is wrong. The likes of Italy and Spain feel that they have been left alone to cope with the waves of migrants arriving on the EU’s doorstep whilst countries such as Austria, which are located on the main land route towards Germany, are concerned that migrants should exit their territory as quickly as possible.
Indeed, immigration is the fault line running through European politics. It was one of the key issues in the Brexit campaign – this was, after all the topic which most exercised UKIP under Nigel Farage – and played an important role in Dutch, French and Italian elections over the past 18 months. There is clearly no easy fix. Aside from any irrational prejudices that people may have, the economic issue is what effect will large migration numbers have on public finances, wages and per capita incomes. The UK evidence does not suggest that there has been any significant adverse impact on the economy. Indeed, much of the empirical work conducted over the last decade suggests that immigration has had no significant negative impact on the job prospects of UK natives. The evidence of its impact on productivity is less clear cut but due to the fact that the skill levels of those entering the UK are generally high – notably those coming from the EU – the empirical studies conclude that a 1 percentage point in the migrant share of the working age population raises productivity by anything between 0.4% and 2%.
But this cuts no ice with electorates which believes this all to be fake news. The fact that populists continue to squeeze the political centre is a concern for those politicians looking for traditional European solutions, involving compromise and rationality, to these 21st century problems. Too many European politicians are fighting their own battles against populists to care too much about what the UK wants. If British politicians want to engage constructively with the EU27, it might help to recognise that the UK is not unique in any way – apart, that is, from being stupid enough to open a Pandora’s Box, in the form of a referendum, that will not easily be closed.
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