The Bank of England’s decision to keep interest rates on
hold today may have been what the markets were ultimately expecting – after
having been conditioned between February and late-April to expect a rise – but
I can’t help thinking that the late change of mind has caused more problems
than was strictly necessary.
The forecast upon which the decision was based was not
hugely different from that presented in February. Growth is a bit weaker this
year but that is primarily due to the weakness of Q1 GDP. Inflation is
moderately lower, but we are only talking about a few tenths of a percent.
However, the BoE did go to great lengths to persuade us that some things have
changed – notably the fact that the pass-through from sterling’s depreciation
in 2016 has operated more quickly than expected, and as a result CPI inflation
does slow more quickly in the early part of the forecast period than in
February. As they pointed out, the March inflation figure (2.5%) turned out
some 0.4 percentage points lower than expected three months ago (when the last
observation was the December inflation rate of 3%).
As noted a couple of weeks ago the weakness of Q1 GDP, which at 0.1% q/q undershot even the most modest of
expectations, was the key factor in the decision. In the past, the Bank has
tended to raise rates only when quarterly GDP growth is at 0.5% or higher, so
the majority of MPC members were clearly uncomfortable with tightening policy
when growth is so far below this threshold.
Questions are increasingly being asked as to whether this
slowdown is a one-off triggered by weather effects, or whether it marks
something more serious. The ONS reckoned that the impact of the snowstorms in
early March explained only part of the weakness. They may be right, but
apparently this deduction was derived from a survey it sent out asking firms
whether output had been affected by the snowstorms. When relatively few firms
responded this was the case, the statisticians deduced that the weather effect
was not so significant. In my view, and one which the BoE shares, the impact of
the snowstorm was greater than the weight attributed to it by the ONS. Indeed,
survey-based estimates suggest that Q1 GDP growth was higher than the initial
estimate of +0.1%. The Bank believes that the figure will be revised up. That
being the case, why did it simply not look through the temporary distortion?
Presumably, the decision was partly based on how raising rates when the economy
is going through a soft patch would play with the wider public. Or it could be
that the BoE believes underlying growth is slowing.
Across the channel, we have already seen signs that the euro
zone economy has lost momentum. And there is a school of thought which suggests
the slowdown in UK monetary aggregates is a sign of weaker growth to come (see
this FT article by Chris Giles). It is always difficult to disentangle the direction
of causality between monetary growth and real economic activity. But as Giles
notes, “simple correlations show that
measures of money have moved closely with the cycle this decade, raising the
possibility that monetary indicators are due for a revival in economics.” But
the slowdown evident in the money data is not yet evident in survey-based
estimates (although last month’s retail sales activity was weak according to
the British Retail Consortium). Consequently, the jury is still out on where
the economy goes from here, but it seems set to continue growing much more
slowly than prior to the EU referendum.
Not surprisingly, the big issue at the Inflation Report
press conference was the BoE’s communication strategy. Having built markets up to
expect a rate hike in May, only to backtrack in the face of the data, has led
to accusations of inconsistency in expectations management. The BoE will point
out, of course, that the decision was conditional – in this case on the data – so
that a change of heart was the rational response. And there was a sense of testiness
on the part of Bank officials when faced with intense grilling on the subject.
Governor Carney sought to deflect criticism of misleading markets by referring
to the fact he is trying to appeal to firms and households rather than just markets.
But since markets set prices which impact on the decisions of firms and
households, I am not sure I fully buy it.
However, I can see both sides of the debate. The BoE makes
conditional forecasts and when the conditioning assumptions change it is
entitled to change its view. The press in particular may not always understand the
nature of a conditional forecast. Arguably, however, the BoE has to work harder
to make sure that the conditional nature of its forecasts is better understood.If the BoE wants to improve its communication strategy, this might be a good place
to start. But
there is a wider problem. The MPC is comprised of nine members, each of whom is
independent. Given the tendency of economists to disagree on any given issue,
one could be forgiven for suspecting that it will prove almost impossible to
get the MPC to speak with one voice, thus reducing the effectiveness of the forward guidance strategy.
No comments:
Post a Comment