It is widely expected that the Bank of England will raise
interest rates this week for the first time since 2007. There have been some
influential academic voices suggesting that this would be the wrong time to
raise rates – the more I think about it, the more I disagree with them. And
before we all get carried away, the expected increase from 0.25% to 0.5% would
only represent a move from the lowest level in history to the second lowest.
The first reason for disagreeing with some of the wiser
heads is purely to do with the signalling effect. Having suggested in September
that “some withdrawal of monetary
stimulus was likely to be appropriate over the coming months” financial
markets have increasingly interpreted this as meaning that a rate move is
likely in November and are now pricing such action with a probability of almost
90%. Although the BoE has suggested in the past that a near-term rate hike
might be in the offing – which subsequently never materialised – not since Mark
Carney assumed his post in 2013 have markets been so convinced about the
likelihood of a rate hike at the upcoming meeting as they are now. The only
comparable degree of market conviction was in the wake of the EU referendum,
when in July 2016 markets fully priced a 25 bps rate cut at the August 2016 MPC
meeting (a reduction which was duly delivered).
Of course, it is not the MPC’s job to reinforce the market’s
conviction. But to the extent that the strategy of forward guidance relies on
the predictability and credibility of central bank communication, any decision
to hold interest rates unchanged in view of current market expectations would
seriously undermine this plank of monetary policy because it would suggest that
communication has not been sufficiently clear.
Another strong argument in favour of raising interest rates
is that they are (arguably) too low given where we are in the economic cycle.
Much of the academic opposition to a rate hike stems from the fact that wage
inflation remains low, and uncertainty surrounding the Brexit decision suggests
that this is not a good time to tighten policy. I have sympathy with these
views. Indeed, I have argued recently that the inflation excuse used to justify
the need for higher interest rates does not wash because it reflects a one-off
spike triggered by currency depreciation. But opponents of a rate hike may be guilty
of confusing the impact of interest rate levels
and a change in rates. Even though
the UK economy has lost momentum over the course of this year it is still
growing at a rate of around 1.5% in real terms. Inflation, at 3%, is right at
the top end of the threshold above which the BoE Governor has to write to the
Chancellor explaining what he intends to do in order to bring it back towards
target. Moreover, monetary policy is still operating on a setting designed to
promote recovery in the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, with an additional
bit of Brexit insurance thrown in. The UK simply does not need rates at current
levels.
Arguably, the BoE should have raised rates in 2014 or 2015
when growth was back at trend and house price inflation was running at
double-digit rates. However, the global interest rate cycle was not then
supportive of a unilateral move by the BoE, with the Fed not yet having
commenced its rate hiking cycle and the ECB beginning a phase of more
aggressive monetary easing. As it turned out, with UK inflation running close
to zero during 2015 and H1 2016, the BoE would have run the risk of repeating
the mistake of the Swedish Riksbank which began tightening in 2010 only to have
to reverse course in the face of a collapse in inflation.
As for Brexit risks, the BoE has been clear all along that
this represents an economic shock against which interest rates can only provide
limited insulation. In any case, taking back the precautionary 25 bps rate cut
implemented in summer 2016 makes sense in view of the fact that the worst case
scenario did not materialise. But a wider point is that ultra-expansionary
monetary policy can inflict just as much harm as an overly restrictive stance –
perhaps in ways we do not yet fully understand. We do know that low interest
rates have helped to propel equity markets to record highs and produced an
unjustified tightening of credit spreads. To the extent that investors have
become less discriminating about what they buy when they are simply chasing
yield, low interest rates distort normal market behaviour. And as the Japanese
experience has shown, a lax monetary stance is no guarantee of economic
recovery.
Rising interest rates will hurt – mortgage payments, for
example, will go up which is no fun at a time when real wages are falling. But
as those professionals treating drug addicts will tell you, sometimes it is
necessary to take a clear look at where we are, how we have got there and
accept that a bit of cold turkey is necessary for the longer term good.
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