Vox populi

If Brexit was an earthquake which echoed throughout Europe then the performance of the AfD in yesterday’s German election is clearly one of the aftershocks. Like the performance of Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party in the Dutch election or the performance of Marine Le Pen in getting through to the second round of the French presidential election, the AfD has upset the fragile balance of domestic politics. More than six months after the Dutch election, the determination of prime minister Mark Rutte to keep the Freedom Party out of government means that as yet it has proven impossible to finalise the composition of the coalition. Angela Merkel faces a similarly difficult task to put together a coalition given that the SPD has indicated it will not continue the current arrangement. Moreover, with the leader of the Bavarian CSU faction apparently questioning whether it should continue in coalition with Merkel’s CDU, the picture has been further complicated.

The election clearly was not a Brexit moment for Germany. In that sense, we should not over-dramatise the rise of AfD. The general consensus is that it represents a protest which has gained momentum on the back of Merkel’s opening of German borders to huge numbers of refugees. Perhaps the tide of outrage prompted by the actions in 2015 may subside over time, but there should be no doubt that the German elite misjudged the domestic mood in much the same way as politicians did in the US, UK and France. Whilst The Economist does not speak for Germany, its views are very much in tune with well-educated liberal voters across the western world. But even two years ago, its editorial comment that “Willkommenskultur shows that the people of Europe are more welcoming than their nervous politicians assume. The politics of fear can be trumped by the politics of dignity” did appear a little complacent. No-one doubts that it was the morally right thing to do but Merkel’s unilateral decision enraged the likes of Hungary and prompted unprecedented border closures throughout the EU. With the passage of time, many domestic voters are beginning to wonder if it was such a good idea.

But we should not forget that AfD was originally formed as a party to protest against the Greek bailout. It was a protest movement in the truest sense. However, it morphed into something else as it attracted voters with rather more nationalist views. One of its founders was the economist Bernd Lucke who has since drifted away from the party. In an excellent overview of AfD’s rise to prominence, the Financial Times quotes Lucke as saying “[Its] views are opposite to the ones I had when I founded it …When I led it, I had the support of 7 per cent [of voters]. That doubled when they became anti-Islam and anti-immigrant.” 

Nonetheless, the surge in support for AfD was “part of a bigger shrinkage of the political centre” to quote Gideon Rachman in today’s FT. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that this represents more a reorientation of the political landscape. Voters have every reason to be unhappy with the response of their governments in the wake of the financial crisis, though some countries have more cause for complaint than others. Excessive austerity in many European economies, coupled with intensified pressures from globalisation and the use of market solutions to price people back into work (zero hours contracts in the UK, for example) have proven a toxic cocktail which eroded many workers’ faith in the present system. There is also a lingering grievance that the “elite” were bailed out during the financial crisis and that the ordinary working person has paid the price. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that many voters feel the system is loaded against them.

US voters went for the full nationalist option in the form of Donald Trump. The Brexit vote was also partially driven by nationalism whilst the 2017 election result indicated that many British voters sought an alternative to solutions which rely on more market and additional austerity. Italian voters last December rejected constitutional amendments, in part because it was a chance to stick two fingers up to the establishment which supported the changes. Even in France, where Emmanuel Macron swept the board in presidential and parliamentary elections earlier this year, the new president’s polling ratings have dipped sharply and Macron’s party performed poorly in yesterday’s elections to the upper house, gaining only 8% of the vote.

Research by the political scientist Gabriel Lenz suggests that in the case of economic data, voters focus on the most recent evidence “in large part because of the way the news media and the government report economic statistics.” He goes on to point out that “voter behavior appears to reflect a pervasive human tendency to inadvertently substitute an easily available attribute for an unavailable one, a tendency that Daniel Kahneman calls ‘attribute substitution.’”

This explains why populists can get away with making outrageous claims: They are simply not challenged on the evidence, which allows them to propose solutions designed to placate anxious voters but which will make many of them worse off in the long-term. But as Trump, Brexit and to a lesser extent the AfD have shown, appealing to reason will not work if that is not the message which people want to hear. As Charles Dickens wrote in 1859 in A Tale of Two Cities, “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity.” Some things never change.