Tuesday 12 September 2017

Universities challenged

Concerns over ‘fat cat’ salaries have been a recurrent feature in the UK over the years and the issue has been raised again in the context of the earnings of university vice-chancellors. Although it has been going for a long time, my first recollection of the popular outrage associated with excessive pay was in the mid-1990s when Cedric Brown, chief executive of the formerly state-owned British Gas, was criticised for his £500k annual pay packet (equivalent to £900k today). The outrage was not so much the amount he was paid – after all, he was ranked in the middle of the range for FTSE 100 CEOs of the time – as the fact that senior managers in formerly state-owned utilities enjoyed massive increases in pay following privatisation. 

Nonetheless, it struck at the heart of the debate over the nature of market economics. The Conservative government of 1979-1997 turned state monopolies over to the market and a lot of UK households, which bought British Gas shares following its 1986 privatisation, benefited handsomely from the surge in share prices that followed. Yet still there was outrage (manufactured or otherwise) over the fact that world class companies competing in a tough global market should have the temerity to pay their management salaries commensurate with that position.

Fast forward more than 20 years and elements of the same debate are evident in the current furore regarding the salaries paid to vice-chancellors at British universities. These are very senior management positions, equivalent to the post of chief executive who essentially oversee the management of the institution. According to a survey by the University and College Union published in February, university bosses received an average salary package of £278k in the academic year 2015/16 which is “an increase of 2% on the previous year and 6.5 times the average pay of their staff.” Whilst a 2% rise sounds modest, it is double the rate of the average university employee and comes after several years of faster increases: In 2014-15, for instance, average remuneration including pensions jumped by 5.4%.

Some universities rewarded their chief executives exceptionally well: The best paid vice-chancellor was at the University of Bath who received a compensation package of £451k (an 11% increase on the previous year). Even more rapid rates of increase were reported elsewhere, with the vice-chancellor at Bournemouth University getting a 19.6% pay rise whilst Ulster University raised the value of total compensation by 16.6%. Pay increases of this magnitude have raised a lot of political eyebrows. But as has been pointed out in a number of quarters, the current government has gone a long way towards creating a market for education so should they be surprised when market forces operate in the market for talent capable of managing in the cut-throat university sector?

What has changed in UK universities in recent years is that the state provides far less direct funding than previously, with only around a quarter coming from the public purse. University managers have to rely far more heavily on private sector sources to drum up business – in other words, they have to be far more commercially minded than previously. But the main source of funds comes from tuition fees which account for around 45% of university income. UK students now have to pay up to £9,000 per year for tuition, which for most is funded via a student loan. Once we add living costs such as food and accommodation, many students can expect to graduate with up to £50,000 of debt. As monopoly suppliers of higher education, there are those who argue that universities are exploiting their clients and paying their senior management handsomely into the bargain. It certainly is not a satisfactory situation when viewed from the position of a young student who will struggle to get a well-paid job on graduation which comfortably covers their living costs and repayment of student debt (let alone some form of long-term savings plan).

Another often overlooked fact is that UK universities enjoy charitable status. Indeed, English institutions are even exempt from registration with the Charity Commission because “they were considered to be adequately supervised by, or accountable to, some other body or authority, such as Parliament.” Scottish and Welsh universities are required to register for some reason. Nonetheless, all of them are designated as non-profit organisations whose primary purpose is to promote social well-being and serve the common good. This means that the vast majority of university income is exempt from corporation tax though they do pay VAT on certain items and are liable for payroll taxes. To give some perspective, Cambridge University paid £3 million of tax in fiscal 2015-16 on profits of £287 million (including investments) and the University of Manchester paid £2 million on earnings of £61 million, both of which are lower tax rates than paid by the much-maligned Google (20%) and Amazon (41%).

The vice-chancellor of Oxford University recently expressed the view that university managers deserve their pay packages because they operate in the “global marketplace” for talent. I have no doubt that they are good at their job, but given the tax status under which universities operate and the fact that in effect these big packages are being funded by students, this came across as a very self-serving statement (and was indeed disowned by many of her Oxford colleagues).

Nobody denies that the challenges of running a university are far greater today than even ten years ago. But academic institutions are not private sector profit maximising organisations – they are non-profit organisations which still rely on the state for part of their revenue – and to argue that university bosses are poorly paid compared with footballers may be true, but the only way to earn a footballer’s obscenely high salary is to be good at football. Indeed, perhaps universities are just the latest in a line of businesses to demonstrate that the pure application of market forces can result in perverse outcomes which benefit managers at the expense of customers.

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