When asked in a recent TV
interview what Venezuela must do in order to get its economy back on track, my
first answer was “get rid of the government.” Chavismo is a ruinous policy which sought to build a mass
movement of popular democracy in order to establish economic independence,
equitable distribution of revenues and an end to political corruption. It has
failed on every count. It is not popular; has failed to break the dependency on
oil and has resulted in an even less equitable distribution of incomes than
when the policy started. Meanwhile, Transparency International today ranks
Venezuela 166th out of 176 countries in its Corruption Perceptions
Index, compared to 71st in 2000. In short, Venezuela is a classic
example of how not to run a populist policy.
But, I hear you say, this sort of populist nonsense only
happens in third world dictatorships such as Venezuela or Zimbabwe – it would
never happen here. And you would probably be right. But it is interesting to
note that the share of electorates voting for populist parties in the so-called
developed world is at its highest since the 1930s (see chart below). The chart was
taken from a recent excellent study by Bridgewater Associates which is well
worth a read (here)
and which takes a look at how populism emerges, how it runs its course and what
are the wider implications. As the report states, “populism is a political and social phenomenon that arises from the
common man being fed up with 1) wealth and opportunity gaps, 2) perceived
cultural threats from those with different values in the country and from
outsiders, 3) the “establishment elites” in positions of power, and 4)
government not working effectively for them.”
This all sounds very familiar after the events of the last
year, and although neither Brexit nor the election of Donald Trump are expected
to lead to the extreme outcomes associated with past periods of populist
government, they do share certain similarities. Both were motivated by a
certain degree of xenophobia and both to varying degrees involve elements of
anti-free trade, as well as being highly nationalist campaigns. We have also seen some elements of this in the French and
Dutch election campaigns in recent weeks.
The real concern is that populist agendas tend to do more
economic harm than good in the long-run. One of the unsung economic populists
identified by Bridgewater is Robert Muldoon, the New Zealand prime minister
from 1975 to 1984. His policies promised a continuation of New Zealand’s
generous social welfare programs and protections, which resonated with elderly
and rural voters, who helped bring him to power. His policies, which included
setting up a pension system described as “the
most generous universal pension scheme ever introduced in any country in any
era,” came against a worsening domestic and global economic backdrop. The
upshot was that New Zealand was subsequently forced to backtrack and introduced a major
restructuring programme in the mid-1980s (the Rogernomics programme) which caused a lot of pain in order to reverse the excesses of Muldoon's policies.
Donald Trump’s threats to impose barriers to countries
wishing to trade with the US threaten to do more harm than good. Brexit, if not
handled correctly, will cause much greater long-term damage than many of its
current proponents believe. Whilst we may not be about to go along the same
path as Venezuela, the historical evidence makes it clear that politicians who
make promises their economies cannot keep do us all a disservice.
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