The cult of the expert is very much under attack and
nowhere, it seems, is this more evident than in the realms of central banking –
and by extension, economics. This was eloquently expressed in a thought
provoking article written by the journalist Sebastian Mallaby in The Guardian entitled
“The cult of the expert – and how it collapsed”.
The thrust of the argument is that by depoliticising monetary policy and
handing it over to technocrats, central bankers have been able to side step
many of the checks and balances which exist in our democratic system. This in
turn has allowed them to amass a very large degree of influence, enabling them
to take decisions which may not necessarily be in the best interests of society
as a whole.
Mallaby, who has recently published a highly acclaimed biography
of Alan Greenspan, argues that the man formerly known as Maestro was “the ultimate embodiment of empowered gurudom.”
Whilst Mallaby’s criticism is restrained, he offers a powerful indictment of
Greenspan as one who combined “high-calibre
expert analysis with raw political methods” with the former acting as cover
for the latter. That is a pretty serious charge because in effect Mallaby accuses
Greenspan of being an unelected official using his position to wield political
influence – in other words subverting the democratic process. If, as Mallaby
claims, “he embraced politics, and loved
the game” that might explain why Greenspan hung around as Fed Chairman for
so long (almost 19 years). One way to limit the degree of power which officials
are able to accumulate is to set term limits for central bank governors – as indeed
the Bank of England and ECB have done.
But this debate is about more than the way in which Greenspan
went about his business. It is about whether decisions taken in the last eight
years have been in the wider interests of society. Perhaps this has not always
been the case, which explains why public discontent with technocratic policy
making has risen so strongly. However, what is missing from Mallaby’s critique
is that governments have failed to step up to the plate. As a consequence
central banks have had to do all the policy heavy lifting because governments
have refused to countenance fiscal easing. This is in part the result of
political ideological conviction and partly due to the teachings of influential
economists like Robert Lucas who argue that fiscal policy is ineffective. In a
bid to bring together these disparate economic arguments, we have been subject
to the ridiculous notion of expansionary fiscal contractions, used by some
economists and politicians to justify why a tight fiscal stance can help boost
the economy.
As a result economists are open to the charge that they do
not know what they are talking about, and it is notable that a large proportion
of the reader comments under the Guardian article ridiculed the economics
profession. This is understandable for, as I have pointed out before, central
banks have increasingly been portrayed as institutions designed to manage
the economic cycle and in the wake of what happened in 2008 they have failed on
that score. But this view is too simplistic. For one thing, it is generally the
media which sets up economists as “experts.” We can provide some context and a
little understanding of what is happening, and what is likely to happen if
certain policy choices are followed. But we are not soothsayers.
It is not a “failure” if our predictions for GDP growth at
the start of the year turn out to be half a percentage point too high or low,
or if our monthly projections for the upcoming CPI inflation or unemployment rate
turn out to be off by 0.1 percentage points. Getting the general direction of
travel right will suffice. It is true that the profession failed to foresee the
crash of 2008 but economists were not alone in that. The causes of the crash
were far more complex than many politicians were prepared to admit in the
immediate aftermath but suffice to say that blame can be shared across
governments, financial regulators, central banks and households themselves. Indeed,
the great lessons economics taught us in the wake of the 1929 crash were: (i) there
is a role for government in helping to get the economy back on its feet; (ii)
beggar-thy-neighbour tariff policies are self-defeating and (iii) fixed exchange
rates can exacerbate the extent of shocks. Lesson (ii) has been taken on board
across the globe but particularly in Europe, lessons (i) and (iii) have to a
greater or lesser extent been ignored.
Policy prescriptions are like fashion – they change over the
years. As Mallaby noted in his article, “the
inflationary catastrophe sparked by 1970s populism has faded from the public
memory, and no longer serves as a cautionary tale … [but] The saving grace of
anti-expert populists is that they do discredit themselves, simply because
policies originating from the gut tend to be lousy. If Donald Trump were to be
elected, he would almost certainly cure voters of populism for decades.” So
the economics profession is going to have to take all the abuse hurled in its
direction on the chin. But whilst macroeconomics takes a lot of stick for its
forecasting record, there have been lots of interesting real-world applications
emanating from the field of microeconomics (auction theory and contract theory
to name but two). As Noah Smith pointed out in an excellent blog post (here) “if you think that predicting recessions
is economists’ only mission in life, think again.”
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