Brexit turbulence increases

It has been an interesting day, to say the least, as the UK parliament prepares itself for next Tuesday’s all-important vote on the EU Withdrawal Bill. It started with the ECJ Advocate General who opined that the UK may be able to unilaterally rescind its Article 50 notification. It ended with parliament beginning the first of five days of parliamentary deliberation on the Withdrawal Agreement and the government suffering some major defeats on legislative matters.

Although the ECJ Advocate General, Manuel Campos Sanchez-Bordona, merely expressed his opinion, which is not the same as a legal ruling, the suggestion that the UK may be able to unilaterally rescind its Article 50 notice was significant. In order for this to become law, it would have to be ratified by the judges but it is generally believed they will back the Advocate General’s stance. What is important is that although the law currently requires unanimity between the negotiating partners in order to extend Article 50 beyond the default two year period, it says nothing about the process to be followed in the event that one or more party wishes to withdraw the notice.

But in the view of Mr Sanchez-Bordona, there are a number of caveats. It would have to be conducted in accordance with the UK’s constitutional arrangements, which in effect means it would require an Act of Parliament – the government cannot simply decide by itself. Moreover, the UK would have to act in “good faith.” This means the UK cannot withdraw its Article 50 application simply to improve its bargaining position. Nonetheless, this offers the UK a potential get-out-of-jail card in the event that it is unable to secure an acceptable Brexit. More importantly, it is perhaps the first sign that the EU is prepared to offer the UK a face-saving way to remain a member should the need arise.

Domestic events were dominated by the parliamentary debate on the Withdrawal Bill. Prior to the debate taking place, the government was defeated on key ballots which highlight the extent to which parliament is taking control of the Brexit process from the government. In the first instance, parliament won a vote allowing MPs to instruct ministers on how to proceed in the likely event that the government loses next week’s vote. This will effectively give MPs the power to look at alternatives to a no-deal Brexit (the government’s apparent “Plan B” at present) which can only be good news since it reduces the chances of crashing out of the EU without a deal.

Equally significant was the fact that the government was held “in contempt of parliament” (in other words, a charge of obstructing the working of parliament) for failing to reveal the confidential advice given to ministers regarding the Withdrawal Agreement. This information will now be released to parliament tomorrow and it will clearly highlight a lot of the unattractive features of the deal, notably the limited extent to which the UK has room for manoeuvre in its dealings with the EU under the present terms of the Agreement.

What is particularly concerning is the extent to which government lawyers believe the UK will become trapped by the Irish backstop. Recall that the backstop agreement envisages the UK remaining in the European customs union and that in the absence of another solution, the UK will only be able to leave with the consent of the EU. Moreover, the UK will not legally be able to negotiate free trade agreements with third countries so long as it remains in the customs union, so in effect the UK will only be able to pursue FTAs with the consent of the EU. Anybody who thinks that the terms of the deal are unattractive now will surely be confirmed in their view by the legal advice. Although the contempt charge probably sounds a lot worse than it is, today marks the first occasion that ministers have been charged with this ancient offence. By forcing the government to reveal the full extent of its legal advice, this reinforces the view that government is losing control of proceedings.

It is, of course, easy to be sucked into the media frenzy that occurs when big parliamentary events take place. But if we have learned anything today, it is that Theresa May’s chances of getting parliament to pass her deal have receded further. The ECJ’s legal opinion may embolden MPs to believe that the choice of May’s deal or no deal does not represent the full spectrum of events. For what it is worth, I continue to believe that an extension of the Article 50 period is very much an option. A week from now, we should know which way the vote has gone. If the deal is rejected, expect a new debate to begin about what kind of Brexit the UK wants – a debate politicians should have been having for the past two years.

Just a little respect

The late great Aretha Franklin demanded, and indeed commanded, respect. After a difficult 24 hours during which the EU27 decisively rejected Theresa May’s Chequers plan at the Salzburg summit, the prime minister was only able to demand it. It was not her finest hour! The EU’s rejection should have come as less of a surprise than the British press made out. It was less an “ambush” (as even the normally sober FT described it) and more a failure of the British government to correctly interpret the EU’s stance during the summer months.

Perhaps some EU politicians and officials did give the impression there were things in the Chequers plan that they liked which lulled the British government into a false sense of security. But even at the start of this month there were clear signs that the Irish border problem was not going well. Moreover, as I noted in July (here) the UK was always running a risk by asking for restrictions on the freedom of movement whilst calling for an association agreement which, to all intents and purposes, was a request to remain in the single market (at least for goods). Chequers was a cherry-picking plan par excellence and the UK government knew it. 

The way ahead has now become a lot less certain. European Council President Tusk announced that the “moment of truth” in Brexit talks would come at the EU summit on 18 October, by which time the EU expects to see a credible proposal for the Irish border issue. Recall that the October deadline was supposed to be the point at which the EU and UK would agree on the terms of the post-March 2019 arrangements, which would in turn be put to EU governments and the EU Parliament for ratification. That is now off the agenda. The hope is that an emergency summit in November will be the point at which these details can be thrashed out. But as Tusk noted, only if there is progress next month will the EU even agree to a November summit. Thus, October has become a critical deadline but for the wrong reasons – and failure to make progress here would substantially raise the risk of a disorderly Brexit next March. 

Domestic politics remains a major sticking point. Theresa May will next week have to face the Conservative Party’s annual conference without any support from Brussels and in the knowledge that domestic opposition to her Chequers plan is mounting. It is in this context that we should assess her extraordinary speech this afternoon in which she called for the EU to show more “respect.” The suggestion that “the EU is still only offering us two options” is actually the situation which UK voters faced in June 2016, and the choices are stay or go.

In the PM’s view, “the first option would involve the UK staying in the European Economic Area and a customs union with the EU … [but] that would make a mockery of the referendum we had two years ago.” She’s not often right but she’s wrong again!  Unless we all missed something, the decision to leave the single market and customs union was never on the ballot paper. Indeed, we were promised by many prominent leave supporters that exiting the single market was not an option. This interpretation of the vote is used by Brexiteers to justify their subsequent actions. However, it is –  to be blunt – a lie; fake news of epic proportions. And what is worrying is that this lie is being peddled by the PM. But whilst at first glance the PM appears not to understand the dynamics of the Brexit negotiations, which says a lot about her or those advising her, there is another interpretation. It is an appeal to the hardliners in her party ahead of next week’s conference. Simply put, this was Theresa May pleading for her job! 

The PM’s problem is that having set so much store by Chequers, it is difficult for her to abandon it. The Brexiteers have long opposed the Chequers plan because in their view it does not put sufficient clear water between the UK and the current EU arrangements. This highlights the British government’s dilemma: It cannot put together a plan that simultaneously satisfies both the EU and Leave supporters, and efforts to find a compromise have merely angered both sides. Recent suggestions by prominent Brexiteers that any deal agreed could be unpicked by a future government  or that the UK will not pay its financial obligations if there is no deal have done nothing to bolster the UK’s credibility in Brussels.

It is increasingly obvious that the simplest solution to many of the problems will be to postpone departure from the Customs Union – a policy which never made any economic sense. It will help to reconcile the objectives of reducing trade frictions whilst limiting the free movement of labour and is the only sensible solution to the Irish border problem. As it currently stands, the EU’s solution to the Irish border problem only  involves making provisions for Northern Ireland and not for the UK as a whole, which is (rightly) unacceptable to the UK government as it implies an internal UK customs border. But the UK’s backstop proposal envisages remaining in the Customs Union beyond 2020 (assuming a transition agreement is signed first).

Proposing to remain in the Customs Union would anger the Brexiteers. The question is whether the PM has the backbone to take them on. Only the Brexit ultras support leaving the Customs Union and my guess is that if she were to make this proposal to parliament, she would have the numbers to carry it through. At issue is whether she is prepared to demonstrate the leadership qualities required of a prime minister to make choices in the national, rather than the party, interest. I am not hopeful! 

As for Theresa May’s own position, speculation will mount that she is unlikely to survive too much longer, particularly since Boris Johnson is effectively mounting a leadership challenge via his weekly column in the Daily Telegraph. Consequently, the rhetoric at the party conference next week will sound as hawkish as ever with no talk of compromise. But make no mistake, that will come later – it has to! In any case, it is not clear that a change of leader resolves anything. May remains in post only because nobody else really wants the poisoned chalice. There is thus a good chance that she will remain in office until March but thereafter anything is possible.

But Johnson would be the worst possible candidate to try and negotiate with the EU following Emmanuel Macron’s comments earlier this year that “Nigel Farage and Mr Johnson are responsible for this crime [Brexit]: they sailed the ship into battle and jumped overboard at the moment of crisis.” In the words of one UK official quoted this morning in the FT “Now it’s getting real.”

What have you got?

It is a well-known physical property that when heat is added to a substance the molecules vibrate faster and usually maintain a greater average separation. Ultimately the object expands in size and takes up more space. If we take away the heat source, the molecules move more slowly and if we were to freeze an object containing water, it would actually contract.

The Brexit debate feels a bit like that. The two years following the referendum have generated more heat than light and the whole issue has expanded to take up an increasing amount of media space. Politicians such as Jacob Rees-Mogg and Boris Johnson fan the flames by making outrageous claims as to how to achieve Brexit and what the benefits will be, generating a counter response which fills up a lot of column inches. If, however, we were to dial down the rhetoric a little and think about what the end game might be, we might be better served in terms of working out how to proceed. 

Basic premise: Neither side wants no deal 

We should start from the premise that neither the UK nor EU want a hard Brexit next March. It may not seem that way when we are assailed with stories telling us that the government recommends stockpiling essentials in the event that cross-border trade is about to come to a halt. It certainly does not seem that way when self-serving British politicians fly in the face of all the evidence to argue that “the UK has agreed to hand over £40 billion of taxpayers’ money for two thirds of diddly squat … In adopting the Chequers proposals, we have gone into battle with the white flag fluttering over our leading tank.” Boris Johnson may know how to pen a decent newspaper column but as a frontline politician with a track record of deliverance he has been found wanting and he is as guilty as anyone of pouring fuel on the raging Brexit fire.

What the Brexiteers fail to understand is that the EU has little choice but to act in the way it does. It has consistently been made clear to the British government that access to the single market is based on the four freedoms of goods, services, labour and capital. The EU cannot therefore allow the UK to pick and choose. And whilst both sides agree on the need to maintain an open Irish border, the British proposals to realise this outcome are either unnecessarily complex or unworkable. But with just over six months until the UK leaves the EU, we need to see more flexibility – ideally from both sides – in order to generate the breathing space which can keep negotiations alive.

The UK government’s Chequers Plan clearly does not satisfy anyone domestically, nor in its current form is it acceptable to the EU. But it is the only idea on the table at the moment so it is the point from which we have to start. There have been some reports suggesting that Michel Barnier believes the plan to be ”dead” whilst others indicate that he sees some possibilities. One of the biggest sticking points is that the UK is not prepared to accept free movement of labour. But it may be possible to form a basis in law for a compromise which satisfies both sides. 

A fix for the freedom of movement problem 

As it currently stands the law grants residency rights to EU citizens irrespective of whether they work. For periods of less than three months the only requirement is that they possess a valid identity document or passport (although they may be required to register with the authorities – a requirement never imposed in the UK). For longer stays EU citizens and their family members “must have sufficient resources and sickness insurance to ensure that they do not become a burden on the social services of the host Member State during their stay.” But what if we were to impose quasi-freedom of movement in which the only restriction is that EU citizens require an employment offer before taking up residency?

Admittedly, it is not free movement as envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty but it is a good compromise. Moreover, articles 48 and 49 of the Treaty of Rome make it clear that cross-border flows of people were originally supposed to be conditional on an offer of employment. To enhance the fiction of “taking back control” the government can give the illusion that EU citizens be required to register – as is the case in Germany – via an application for a National Insurance number. In that sense, EU citizens working in the UK experience no obvious changes in their circumstances but the government sells a message that it has stiffened up border controls. Granted, it is far from ideal but it is a far better option than simply throwing up the drawbridge and would at least show that the British are trying to find a solution. 

The government has already proposed a solution for the Irish border 

With regard to Ireland, the UK government has already proposed a solution: The backstop plan outlined in June calls for a "temporary customs arrangement" which keeps the UK in a customs union with the EU for a limited period after the end of the proposed Brexit transition period in December 2020. At the same time, the government proposes that the UK be able to sign and ratify trade agreements with the rest of the world during the temporary arrangement. There are a couple of problems with this: (i) The EU has not (yet) agreed to it and (ii) Brexiteers do not like the idea because they are sold on the idea of leaving the customs union (Theresa May has tried to pacify them by suggesting that such a solution would only need to remain in place until end-2021).

But imagine that the EU does agree. The UK will find it extremely difficult to ratify any meaningful trade deals by end-2021 and thus continues to extend its membership of this arrangement. The longer the UK remains in the customs union, the less likely it is to want to drop out, resulting in a BINO solution (Brexit in name only) which is probably the least damaging economic option. 

They may be bad ideas but show us something better 

There are all sorts of reasons why these are thoroughly bad ideas. Like the Chequers Plan, they will satisfy neither leavers nor remainers. But they represent an attempt to reconcile the demands of the EU with the apparent need to respect the referendum result. And yes, they are politically devious solutions but Brexit is nothing other than a political issue and it is going to require some chicanery to extract the UK from the mess it has created for itself. But if Johnson or any other of the Brexit zealots has a better plan, we are all ears, because all we have heard so far is what is wrong with the current set of options. C’mon, show us what you’ve got!

Stuck in the middle (with who?)

This week promises to be an important one for Brexit legislation with parliament voting on amendments to the EU Withdrawal Bill following its return from the House of Lords (see below). With time running out ahead of the EU summit on 28-29 June, the government is further behind on its legislative agenda than is needed at this stage of the proceedings. As ever, the issue remains the split within government regarding the nature of the deal which the UK is seeking with the EU.

Davis and the Irish border 

The big story last week was the apparent threat by Brexit Secretary David Davis to resign on the basis that the backstop plan for the Irish border issue contained no end date. As a consequence he perceived a real threat that the UK would be tied to the EU customs union indefinitely. It is not the first time that Davis has threatened to withdraw his services. It is exactly 10 years since Davis resigned as an MP over the issue of the erosion of civil liberties following a parliamentary vote which saw the detention period for terrorist suspects extended from 28 to 42 days. In Davis’ words, this represented "the slow strangulation of fundamental freedoms by this government.” The irony is, of course, that the current government has tried to keep parliament out of the Brexit process and it was only thanks to the intervention of the courts that it was given any form of jurisdiction.

According to the New Statesman, this marked Davis’ fifth resignation threat. Given the lack of progress in Brexit negotiations so far, many people are wondering whether the chief negotiator might be part of the problem, and it speaks volumes for the weakness of Theresa May’s position that she has not called his bluff. In the end, the prime minister acceded to the threat by publishing a document outlining the backstop plan in which the temporary customs arrangement with the EU “should be time limited” and run to the end of 2021.

There are a number of issues with this suggestion. On the one hand, a backstop is designed to be put in place on the assumption that the first best solution does not work out. By definition, it cannot be temporary. Second, it incorporates a date that the EU has not agreed to and runs a year beyond the end of the planned transition agreement (which the EU has still not yet signed off).

In response to the UK’s proposal, the EU yesterday released an infographic (here) outlining how it sees the solution to the border problem. This plan envisages an open border between Ireland and Northern Ireland with the north retaining access to the single market for goods. In the Commission’s view, “the EU backstop proposal to apply unless and until another solution is found.” The key difference with the British plan is that it allows no prospect for the UK to remain within the customs union primarily because, in the Commission’s view, the UK’s plan leaves too much “uncertainty on the scope of EU trade policy applicable to the UK.”

Whilst the UK government is way too ambitious and its plans do smack of cherry-picking, the Commission’s response has been criticised by some trade experts as being overly provocative (see this Twitter thread from David Henig). For example, the slide pack released by the Commission requests “Full application of EU VAT and excise rules on goods in Northern Ireland” which no UK government is likely to grant. Given that the EU sees no alternative to its plan and holds all of the aces ahead of the summit this puts the UK in a very awkward position. Either it will have to cross yet more of its red lines in order to get a trade agreement or we run the risk of moving ever closer to the cliff edge, as the chance of a deal by October would look very remote. 

Seeking domestic compromise 

As it happens, the likelihood that the UK will leave the EU without a deal has been significantly reduced by the concessions offered to MPs who planned to vote against the government on the second reading of the Withdrawal Bill. In order to stave off defeat, the prime minister promised rebels that she would put down a new amendment, expected to give MPs new powers over the final stages of Brexit. The proposals are designed such that in the event of parliament rejecting the final Brexit deal, ministers would have seven days to set out a fresh approach. In the case of talks with the EU breaking down, they would have until 30 November to try to strike a new deal. Rebel MPs also previously demanded that if there was still no deal by 15 February 2019, the government would have had to hand over stewardship of the process to the House of Commons to set its Brexit strategy (though this has not been adopted). In effect, the plan envisaged two years ago that the government (not parliament) would handle the Brexit negotiations has been scuppered. And rightly so.

But the Brexit department issued a statement suggesting “we have not, and will not, agree to the House of Commons binding the government’s hands in the negotiations.” So we are clearly not yet home and dry. Moreover, there is a worrying sense of authoritarianism in that comment because parliament is the people’s representative body: Cutting it out of the loop makes the negotiating process a partisan party-related matter. Theresa May finds herself increasingly under pressure. On the one hand, she has to balance her domestic problems but on the other she has to deal with an EU27 that shows no sign of accepting the UK’s Irish border solutions.

Of course, all sides at present are still playing poker and there will be a considerable amount of give and take along the way. At home, the Brexit camp is beginning to realise that the realities of delivering Brexit on the terms suggested two years ago are not what was envisaged. And as obstinate as Theresa May’s government has proven to be in the Brexit negotiations with the EU27, both sides know that the alternative is a UK government that is much more hard-line – think of Boris Johnson or Michael Gove as PM – which would be even more unpalatable for the EU27. We may be in a desperate situation today but it could be an awful lot worse – believe it or not.

More Frankenstein's Monster than Schrödinger's Cat

Last week, the cabinet agreed to a ”backstop” that would see the UK aligned to EU tariffs after 2020 if the two sides cannot agree on customs arrangements. Predictably, the Brexiteers in government were concerned that this might represent an attempt to remain in the customs union, although the prime minister appears to have convinced them it is a backstop that is unlikely to be triggered. I would not be so sure about that.

The government essentially has two plans on the table ahead of the EU summit in late June. Theresa May’s preferred plan is the customs partnership in which the UK collects external tariffs on behalf of the EU. Under this option, goods would cross borders with tariffs levied at the highest of the UK or EU rates with refunds claimed at a later date (in the same way as VAT is treated today). This would require far more cross-border tracking than is currently necessary, which would hugely increase the administrative burden. This plan has been dismissed by EU negotiators as “magical thinking” and it is opposed by Brexit supporters who view it as maintaining ties with the EU that they wish to see ended.

Consequently, they favour the so-called maximum facilitation (max fac) option in which the application of technology and the implementation of a “trusted trader” scheme will obviate the need for a physical border. But the technology to ensure that such a procedure can be implemented does not yet exist. Moreover, it would require the EU to put a similar system in place in order to work and it has been dismissed out of hand.

On the assumption that neither the customs partnership nor the max fac plans are acceptable to the EU, the backstop certainly has its attractions. Whilst it would give the UK a bit of breathing space to iron out its own internal difficulties, it may not be an easy sell in Brussels. Although the prime minister’s plan assumes that current arrangements can continue beyond end-2020, the EU may well decide to play hardball since it regards the border problem as a Northern Irish issue and appears to have no interest in applying a UK-wide solution in order to resolve it. In addition, it would fly in the face of the EU’s desire to set a limit on the transition period. But a more serious objection from the EU’s perspective is that it would allow the UK to remain a “quasi member” of the EU and thus escape the adverse consequences of a hard Brexit.

It is thus pretty obvious that a resolution to the Irish border problem is not imminent. Moreover, the UK government appears to be furiously back-pedalling on its more aggressive positions because it realises the intractability of the problem. But there is nothing new in any of this. I recently came across a filmed presentation that I gave in March 2016 when I explicitly warned that a Brexit vote would simply swap one set of problems for another and that no thought had been given by Brexit supporters to the consequences of their actions. Almost two years on from the referendum, the questions I am increasingly asking myself are “who owns Brexit” and “what do its supporters want out of it?” It seems to me that government rhetoric has pandered to the demands of those who want to pull up the drawbridge against the outside world whilst simultaneously trying to placate those who believe Brexit is a great opportunity to promote free trade. The trouble is that no one is satisfied – primarily because no-one in government is prepared to take responsibility for implementing a policy which is likely to have major adverse economic consequences.

What the government wants is a Schrödinger’s Brexit where we are simultaneously both in and out of the EU, thus delivering all the benefits of membership and all the gains from being outside. Schrödinger’s Cat was, of course, a thought experiment. And the further away we move from the heated rhetoric of spring 2016, the more it looks like the referendum exercise was a giant experiment in how not to conduct policy. More Frankenstein’s Monster than Cat.

Borderline insanity

As we reach the end of another month in which the UK government has failed to make any real Brexit progress, the European Commission has taken the initiative by producing a 119 page draft document detailing the legal text that will form the basis of the UK’s departure from the EU. One of the key protocols indicated that in the absence of any other solution, the EU will establish a common regulatory area in which “the territory of Northern Ireland, excluding the territorial waters of the United Kingdom (the "territory of Northern Ireland"), shall be considered to be part of the customs territory of the Union.”

This puts the UK government in an awkward position. Last summer it produced a Position Paper in which it committed to (i) upholding the Good Friday Agreement; (ii) maintaining the Common Travel Area and (iii) avoiding a hard border for the movement of goods. It did not give any detail on how these objectives could be achieved but instead talked vaguely of “technical solutions” without outlining what they are nor how they would work. Following the December agreement between the UK and EU, the two sides essentially kicked the can down the road, agreeing that progress had been made on the Irish border question without having done anything of the sort (as I noted at the time).

The extent to which influential Leave supporters really do not understand what is at stake was highlighted by Boris Johnson’s  crass remark earlier this week that the Irish border was no more of a problem than boundaries between different boroughs of London. Apart, that is, from the fact that we are talking about a border between two sovereign states with different legal systems – so pretty much identical, then (and this man is the Foreign Secretary for pity’s sake).

Obviously, the EC’s action met with a hostile reaction from both Prime Minister May and Unionist politicians in Northern Ireland who see this as an attempt to drive a wedge between the UK and the province. May told the House of Commons that “No UK prime minister could ever agree to it and I will be making that absolutely clear.” At that point – and you know what is coming next – the EU’s chief negotiator Michel Barnier will politely ask what is the UK’s alternative plan. Unless the UK can magically find a way to introduce the technology to maintain an open border, it seems to me that the only alternatives are either to reject the EU proposal, raising the likelihood of a hard Brexit, or rethink the plan to leave the customs union which would eliminate the Irish problem but annoy those pushing for a hard Brexit.

Jeremy Corbyn has already committed the Labour Party to supporting EU customs union membership following his speech on Monday. And there are plenty of Conservative MPs who support this position, which gives rise to the possibility that a cross-party grouping could yet force the prime minister to abandon her ruinously idiotic policy of leaving the customs union. From an economic perspective, departure makes no sense. Leavers will, of course, claim that it will give the UK the freedom to sign up to trade deals with rapidly growing countries outside the EU. But as I – and many others – have repeatedly pointed out, the gains from such deals are unlikely to make up for losses incurred by leaving the single market and customs union.

However, the Leavers have now convinced themselves that in June 2016 voters opted for leaving the customs union, even though that was never once discussed (let alone appear on the ballot paper). As a result we have head bangers such as Liam Fox claiming that backtracking on this commitment would be a “betrayal” of voters’ wishes in 2016. But it is clear that opposition to this damaging form of Brexit is mounting. Martin Donnelly, a former senior civil servant who served under Fox, recently described current government policy as like “swapping a three-course meal for a packet of crisps.” If leaving the EU represents the crisps diet, then maintaining customs union membership might be seen as swapping our banquet for a miserable course of cheese and biscuits – still sub-optimal but better than the processed potato-based option.

The EC knows, of course, that what it has proposed regarding the Northern Irish customs union is unacceptable to the British government. But at the very least, this intervention might force the UK to commit to what it wants from Brexit rather than simply talking in vague generalities. It could even persuade Theresa May to stand up to the ultras in her party who have commandeered Brexit to further their own ideological ends, rather than looking after the interests of the UK as they were elected to do. That may be a forlorn hope but with time running short and the prime minister increasingly reminiscent of Captain Queeg of The Caine Mutiny fame, someone has to take control. And if the EU forces the UK to take action to end the vacillation, so much the better. After all, despite their tribulations, Greek voters appear to prefer remaining in the EU than hand the keys over to domestic politicians. I increasingly know how they feel.