The weekend’s big TV debate between the two main candidates
in the German election highlighted both the good and bad sides of German
politics. It was a pretty tame affair. Even the German press called it the duel
that never was, with both Angela Merkel and the challenger Martin Schulz
trading pleasantries rather than political blows. In fairness, neither Merkel
nor Schulz are particularly charismatic and the format was not conducive to a
lively debate. For one thing there were four interviewers from rival channels,
all keen to get their questions across. Moreover the interviewers were perhaps rather
more respectful towards the candidates than was warranted by an occasion as
important as this. The absence of a studio audience was another buzz-killer and
as a result there was no interaction with the general public, which is
guaranteed to keep politicians on their toes. That said, German voters like
their politicians serious and sober (ironically Schulz is a reformed alcoholic)
and do not expect to see their representatives treat the political stage as
another branch of showbusiness, as happens elsewhere.
Merkel was deemed to have won on points with Schulz unable
to land any decisive blows, and as a result she looks a shoo-in to be re-elected
as Chancellor on 24 September. As might be expected, the debate was focused on
those issues important to German voters so no surprise that Brexit never got a
mention. Immigration topped the bill with a large slice of the available time
devoted to this hot topic. But according to Thorsten Benner, Director of the
Global Public Policy Institute, immigration is not the biggest problem facing
Germany (see box below). Whilst acknowledging his superior knowledge of the German political scene, I am not sure I would totally agree. It is not the biggest economic issue but it remains a huge political problem. After all it
has helped fuel the surge in support for AfD, and although they may struggle to
pass the 5% threshold required for Bundestag representation, the fact the party
has any support at all worries mainstream politicians.
Like most political debates of recent years, the economy did
not figure highly. Why should it? After all, Germany is growing relatively
rapidly, inflation and unemployment are low and it is an export powerhouse
producing some of the highest quality manufactured goods in the world. In
short, everything looks to be running smoothly. But as Benner pointed out, the
car industry also enjoyed a good run, but it has recently been undone by the
problems of dieselgate.
Criticism has come from many other quarters too: The
newspaper Die Welt has been
particularly critical of the Merkel government of late and following the
debate, it pointed out that although Germany is one of the most interesting
countries in Europe with the world looking to Berlin, its domestic politics is
curiously austere and provincial. In an article last weekend, the newspaper
highlighted that Germany has under-invested in infrastructure and education.
There is some truth in this: After all, the huge current account surplus
represents an excess of domestic saving over investment. But as Wolfgang
Schäuble has suggested, it makes sense for an ageing society to save for a
rainy day. The problem is that Germany has been running a big surplus for the
past 10 years with no sign of a reduction. The fact that what are increasingly
seen across Europe as excessively large surpluses are rarely spoken about at
home is a sign that the savings investment problem is unlikely to be addressed
any time soon.
For all that the debate was a bit dull and skirted around
many of the issues which economists might wish to have seen tackled, it was
also devoid of the bombast that accompanied the US election and the
emotionally-charged atmosphere of the Brexit referendum. For that we should be
thankful, since at least one significant western power offers political
stability. From an international perspective, four more years of Merkel at the
helm would not be the worst outcome in these turbulent times. Those of us
dealing with dysfunctional governments in the UK, let alone the US, look to
German political stability with a degree of envy.
There are many things to admire about modern Germany and a
lot of them were evident during a recent visit which, unusually for me, was a
private rather than business trip. One of the things that always strikes me is
the sense that Germany is still a big manufacturing economy. You notice this in
the vicinity of all the big cities, where there is always lots of traffic and a
large number of lorries delivering industrial goods. Indeed, a high proportion
of the lorries are themselves German made.
But perhaps the thing that always impresses me the most is
the sense that it is a prosperous country where the wealth is shared relatively
evenly. According to OECD data, Germany’s income Gini coefficient in 2014 was
0.289 (the lower the number, the higher the degree of equality) which ranks it
13 out of 33 OECD countries. It is certainly well below the UK with a Gini
coefficient of 0.356, ranking at 29. We should also not forget that it was
Bismarck who introduced the first national pension scheme in Germany in 1889,
almost 20 years before the UK followed suit. Travelling around northern Germany,
through the smaller towns, they appear solid and well cared for, which in my
view is a sign of communities that display a sense of civic pride. Many German
economists complain that the infrastructure is crumbling and that the
government does not spend enough on maintenance and renewal. I can safely say this
is not something which is evident in the same way as it is in Britain, although
I guess you have to live there to notice it on a day-to-day basis.
This is certainly not evident in Hamburg, where the
magnificent new conference venue, die Elbphilharmonie,
is a symbol of modern German economic confidence. In a sign of the difference
between the German and British economic systems visitors are able to visit the
Plaza for free, giving a magnificent view of the harbour, whereas comparable
venues in London such as The Shard or London Eye levy hefty visitor charges.
There are some things which still grate on the modern
traveller. Deutsche Bahn's inability to accept certain forms of plastic payment
card is an oddity which I thought had been confined to the past. Even stranger
is that a card which works perfectly well in Frankfurt will not work in
Hamburg. Indeed, cash is much more widely used in Germany than in Britain,
where I rarely carry very much, and cash in circulation across the euro area
relative to GDP is three times that in the UK.
During the course of my recent travels, one question which
inevitably came up was that of Brexit, with many Germans puzzled as to why the
British voted as they did. It is hard to explain to them that the Brexit vote
occurred in large part because the UK has rejected many aspects that German
society takes so seriously. I have long extolled the virtues of German
inclusivity. That is not what we have in the UK where we operate a system in
which the devil increasingly takes the hindmost, as the safety net which
underpins the more vulnerable elements of society is withdrawn. Many people in
the UK simply do not see that the government is acting in their interests and
this is something which is hard to explain to many Germans.
We also should never underestimate the desire of modern
Germany to learn the lessons of the past. “Never again” means exactly that. I
was fortunate enough to speak to people who were children in the immediate
post-war period, who told me what it was like to grow up hungry and how they
experienced permanent stomach pains without knowing why. The story of how the
women and children used to work in the fields removing Colorado beetles to ensure that the potato crop provided sufficient food for the population
was a fascinating vignette of how it was back then. Faced with such hardships,
it is no surprise that modern Germany has no desire to go back there.
Germany is far from perfect: No modern society is and it may
yet find that the great humanitarian gesture of opening its borders to
countless numbers of immigrants causes more problems than currently imagined.
But its determination to learn from the mistakes of the past is admirable and
something the British can themselves learn from. Many people who voted for
Brexit, especially older voters, are guilty of looking back to a Britain that
never really existed. It may have emerged on the "right" side of
history, but we should not forget that once Lend-Lease was terminated in 1945,
economic circumstances changed overnight. Nor should we forget that the UK
received more Marshall Aid than Germany in the immediate post-war period, but
it was wasted by successive British governments trying to cling on to
superpower status rather than modernising the domestic economy. The grim period
of rationing and slow post-war reconstruction in the UK was at least partly the
result of policy failure. Brexit may not be of the same order of magnitude but
it still threatens economic hardships which are avoidable and which people may
not be ready for.
As
one older German said to me, Brexit is a betrayal of future generations. I
happen to believe he is right. Better to try and reform the EU from the inside
than cut and run. When even a Guardian journalist points out that the potential loss of banking jobs will put a big hole in government finances,
you realise that people are starting to wake up to the fact that Brexit will
have real economic consequences. Many of us told you so all along.
A memorial service was held in Strasbourg yesterday for
former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who died on 16 June. Whilst his death
briefly made headlines in the British press, coverage of what was in effect a
European state funeral barely made a splash on this side of the channel. That
says a lot about the way the British media thinks of European issues. Kohl was,
after all, praised across the continent for being the lead architect in the
construction of the EU – an institution which the British electorate rejected
12 short months ago.
Politically, Kohl was a unifier: In addition to his role on
the European stage, he will forever be remembered as the Chancellor who
reunited Germany. But as the German media has highlighted, one of the great
ironies is that he never managed to unify his family: Even in death, he
remained estranged from his two sons. Nor, despite the eulogies, did he share
Angela Merkel’s vision, particularly with regard to the handling of the euro
crisis. Kohl was a historian with no interest in economics. His was the
politics of the grand vision, regardless of the cost. Very few politicians of
the post-war era would have attempted a project as ambitious as German
reunification. But no reputable economist agreed with the decision to convert
the Ostmark to the Deutschmark at a rate of 1:1 which gave East Germans a
short-lived income boost but which later wiped out the eastern economy.
Many German economists also believe that his push to
introduce the euro was badly handled. The decision to introduce a pan-European currency
without the appropriate leadership structure in the EU, and without a body to direct
common political and economic policies for the euro zone, means that the single
currency effectively remains little more than a glorified fixed income
mechanism. It was created on the basis of the competitive situation which
prevailed in the 1990s, and the pain associated with maintaining
competitiveness was always going to require significant domestic adjustment: Even
the European Commission was clear about this in the mid-1990s. As Die
Zeit put it, “a currency union was
created that only worked when the sun shone.
And when a storm, in the form of a financial crisis, came along, Mr.
Kohl’s peace project became the nucleus of the largest European crisis since
the war.”
Undoubtedly, Kohl’s solution to the Greek debt crisis would
have been to dip deeper into German pockets to find a financial solution. It
might even have worked – for a while. But it does not detract from the fact
that there are significant faults in the construction of monetary union which
need to be fixed. Although Kohl was not honest with his own electorate about
the costs of monetary union – living in Germany at the time, I was acutely
aware of that – we cannot pin all the blame for the euro zone’s ills on his
shoulders. Politicians in other countries signed up willingly to the euro
without realising that their own economies would have to bear a far greater
share of the adjustment burden than Germany.
The election of Emmanuel Macron as French President has been
hailed across the continent as a chance to rebuild the Franco-German axis that
drove the European project forward during the 1980s and 1990s. Macron has
proposed a common fiscal policy, a joint finance minister and the completion of
banking union, and surprisingly he has been given a sympathetic hearing in
Berlin. But we cannot so easily turn back the clock to the halcyon days of Kohl
and Mitterrand. The world has changed, with the rise of Asia having permanently
altered the global economic landscape. Nor is it so certain that the people of
Europe today share the vision for their continent which Kohl espoused. His was a
vision rooted in the past, designed to ensure that the horrors of the first half
of the twentieth century could not be repeated. That was, and is, a laudable
goal. But the survey evidence suggests that European electorates remain
sceptical of the need for further integration.
Europe in early 1995, after Kohl’s fourth election victory,
felt like a good place to be. The EU was a smaller, more manageable institution
with just 15 members. It was moving towards convergence at a pace which felt comfortable
and although progress towards a single currency was ongoing, there were
widespread doubts that it would be operational by 1999. It felt more like a
warm and fuzzy aspiration which made the federalists feel good yet was far
enough away not to worry the sceptics too much. In my view, that was Kohl’s
real achievement: He led the horse to water. It is unfortunate that the purity
of the water did not match up to expectations.