Saturday, 11 April 2020

Playing the long game is the only game in town

The support programmes implemented by governments have barely got off the ground but already central banks are stepping in to lend their support. The US Federal Reserve plans to offer an extra $2.3 trillion of credit and support the market for high-yield corporate debt in a bid to ensure that small and medium-sized businesses can access the central bank’s largesse. Meanwhile the UK government will borrow from the Bank of England to meet its financing needs via its long-established Ways and Means facility. This will allow the government to sidestep the bond market in order to ensure it has access to its funding needs. Since the amount borrowed is due to be repaid by the end of the year it does not constitute monetary deficit financing. But given the current strong demand for safe haven securities – a gilt auction this week had a bid-to-cover ratio of more than 3 – we have opened the floodgates to such unconventional financing measures much earlier than I expected.

In the BoE’s case, the irony is that the latest announcement came just a few days after the new Governor wrote a column in the FT making it clear that the BoE is not and will not be engaged in monetary financing. Andrew Bailey emphasised that “the UK’s institutional safeguards rule out this approach … [and] the MPC remains in full control” of the policy instruments designed to increase the central bank balance sheet. Simply put, if the BoE buys financial assets this is purely in line with the BoE’s inflation remit. But the element that is often overlooked is that the remit is “to maintain price stability; and subject to that, to support the economic policy” of the government, where the government’s policy objectives include a “credible fiscal policy, returning the public finances to health, while providing the flexibility to support the economy.” The BoE’s policy remit is about far more than simply controlling inflation – whatever it says in public.

But what is monetary deficit financing and why is it so “bad”? In simple terms, it amounts to central banks creating money to pay off the government’s creditors. The conventional argument is that it results in excessive liquidity creation that eventually results in higher inflation (too much money chasing too few goods). The textbook example of such a policy is the action of the Weimar government in Germany following World War I which chose to inflate away its debt by printing money but which instead resulted in the great hyperinflation of 1923. Admittedly it was successful as a debt reduction strategy but disastrous in terms of its other economic side effects. A century on from this experience, Germany remains scarred by the memory and was instrumental in writing the provision into the Maastricht Treaty that prohibits monetary deficit financing in the euro zone. More recently, it was practiced by Zimbabwe and the policy was only stopped when the currency became so devalued that the government was reputedly unable to pay for the ink required to print more banknotes.

It is thus generally accepted that allowing governments to control the monetary printing press is a bad idea for it may encourage them to over-expand the money supply. The conventional narrative is that allowing central banks to enjoy a degree of autonomy over monetary policy in the last two decades is one of the key factors helping to curb inflation. I have argued before that this is far from the whole story but it has certainly played a role. However, over the past decade central banks have bought huge amounts of government debt which has led to a massive rise in central bank reserves (i.e. liquidity creation) but not resulted in higher inflation. Indeed, the BoJ and ECB have struggled to push inflation towards their target goal of 2% despite a balance sheet worth 100% and 40% of GDP respectively (see chart, taken from the St Louis Fed). This is in part because the institutions which sold their securities to the central bank have simply gone out and bought other assets, notably equities, thus pushing up their price. There may not have been too much money chasing too few goods but there was a lot of it chasing a dwindling pool of high yielding assets. I have little doubt that liquidity creation will be inflationary in some form. It will surely push up asset prices although whether it inflates consumer prices remains to be seen.

The actions of the Fed and BoE in recent days confirm my suspicion that we will be engaged in financial repression for a long time to come (i.e. central banks will do everything in their power to keep interest rates low). They are likely to go further: The BoJ has been buying assets on an industrial scale for almost 20 years and both the Fed and BoE have a lot of headroom to ramp up their balance sheets without necessarily sparking CPI inflation if the Japanese experience is anything to go by. As it currently stands, central banks buy debt in the secondary market (i.e. not directly from the issuer) and for the foreseeable future they are going to be buying a lot of assets. Past experience suggests that at some point they will call a halt to the process. At that point, they can sit on their bond holdings indefinitely. As bonds mature, they can roll over the debt by cashing in the proceeds and use them to buy an equivalent amount of additional securities. In this way, the central bank balance sheet remains unchanged and it continues to hold the same amount of government debt.

Technically, this is not monetary deficit financing because the presumption is that at some point the central bank will sell its debt holdings back to the private sector. A small complication arises from the fact that in the UK, the BoE hands over the interest it earns from its bond holdings back to the Treasury so it is in effect monetising the interest payments, but that is small beer. A bigger issue is whether at some point the central bank will simply write off its government debt holdings. It is not going to happen anytime soon, so we can rest easy on that score. But they may surreptitiously be able to do so in the longer term. The BoE plans to hold £645 bn of bonds, which amounts to around 30% of annual GDP. Suppose that in the long-term nominal GDP growth averages 3.5% per year and that the BoE rolls over its debt holdings ad infinitum. After 25 years, the bond holdings are worth 13% of GDP and in 50 years just 5% of GDP.

Is anyone going to complain if in 50 years’ time, the BoE writes off (say) half of these holdings? The current generation of central bankers will be long gone and I certainly won’t be around to do so! Therefore, the issue of whether central banks are likely to monetise the debt holdings built up over the last decade is something we will only be able to judge long after the current crisis is past. Sometimes playing the long game really is the only game in town.

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