Breakthrough, breakdown or breakup?

Boris Johnson has long promised that he would deliver Brexit by 31 October and today’s agreement between the UK and EU has opened up the possibility that he can now deliver on his word. But in doing so, he has effectively thrown the DUP under the bus and raises the question of how likely it is that the deal will be ratified by the British parliament on Saturday. 

I have long suspected that Johnson would ultimately sell out the DUP. Aside from the fact he is not trustworthy, when you are prepared to withdraw the whip from your own MPs and operate a government with a minority of 45 seats, the loss of a further 10 is probably not going to make that much difference. Let us also not forget that in June 2016 Northern Ireland voted 56%-44% to remain. There was never really much chance that the Tories would allow the province to stand in the way of what increasingly looks like an English nationalist movement. Recent opinion polls now suggest that the electorate is roughly evenly split between remaining as part of the union and joining the Republic and I am increasingly of the opinion that a United Ireland will eventually be formed.

Ironically, the deal struck between the two parties today ensures that Northern Ireland remains in the British customs union even though EU regulations will continue to apply to all goods in the province. This implies there will be border checks, with the customs border between the UK and the island of Ireland running down the middle of the Irish Sea. Britain will be responsible for collecting VAT and excise duties in Northern Ireland but revenues resulting from transactions taxable in the province will accrue to the rest of the UK. The Northern Irish Assembly will be given a chance to decide whether these arrangements remain in place four years after they come into effect. Johnson had originally suggested that the agreement would only be implemented once the assembly had ratified it, which would have given the DUP a veto. 

There are two problems here: (i) the fact that the arrangements will be subject to approval every four years means that they could break down, and are far from the permanent solution to preventing the imposition of a hard border that the EU was looking for; (ii) the Assembly has been suspended since January 2017 with the DUP at least partially responsible. This  raises the suspicion that the UK has little interest in allowing the Assembly to have much meaningful influence over the Brexit process given the dysfunctional nature of Northern Irish politics.

For all the optimism regarding the prospect of a deal between the UK and EU, the initial enthusiasm has been tempered by the fact that it is far from certain it will be ratified by parliament on Saturday. Clearly, the DUP has no incentive to provide any support, so that is ten votes gone. The Conservatives have two additional problems. One is to ensure that the 21 MPs who were suspended last month will lend their support to the Johnson plan. The other is the question of how the ultra-hard-line Brexiteers (the so-called Spartans) will vote. In the past, they have tended to side with the DUP but there is no guarantee that will be the case this time around (further enhancing the DUP’s view that they have been thrown under the bus). The Spartans number around 30 so if they all vote for Johnson’s deal and 20 of those who had the whip withdrawn do likewise, on the basis that they will be readmitted to the party, that adds up to 307 votes (287 Conservative MPs are eligible to vote and a majority requires 320 votes). 

To make up the shortfall requires the support of any Labour MPs prepared to defy their leadership’s order to vote against the agreement since the Lib Dems, SNP and large numbers of independent MPs will certainly hold out against it. If we can find 13 Labour rebels, it might be possible to ratify the deal by the thinnest of margins.

But this assumes that the number of Tory (and former Tory) rebels is limited to one (the one is Ken Clarke, who I assume will not sign up to it). The more Tories who vote against their leadership’s wishes, the more support from outside the party will be required to pass it. There is an argument that the number of Labour rebels might be bigger than we think because many of them sit in Leave voting constituencies and they might feel obligated to enact the “will of the people”. Indeed, many MPs – on both sides – only rebelled against their party leadership’s wishes in order to avoid a hard Brexit. But this prospect is no longer on the table. Thus whatever happens, it is likely that any vote on Saturday will be very close. 

If the vote does go through, the UK will leave the EU on 31 October. If the vote fails, it is likely that the EU and UK will try to find another solution next week in time for an emergency summit before month-end, but departure on the 31^st would then be unlikely. That may not be a problem if the UK applies for a 3 month extension but manages to deliver Brexit in (say) early November. Johnson could still sell the process as a great triumph. However, none of this is the end of the story. The UK remains traumatised by the Brexit process and delivering an EU departure may exacerbate divisions rather than heal them. 

Indeed, the great irony is that MPs are being allowed their fourth Brexit vote in nine months whereas the public – in whose name all this is being conducted – got one vote three years ago. As US President Woodrow Wilson said many years ago, “the government, which was designed for the people, has got into the hands of the bosses and their employers, the special interests. An invisible empire has been set up above the forms of democracy.” A century on, it feels very much like we are there again.