As if Donald Trump’s tribulations were not bad enough, we learned
today that Brazilian President Temer has been caught on tape endorsing bribery
payments. The net result was that Brazilian financial markets took a hammering
with the equity market opening 10 per cent down, which triggered an automatic
halt in trading, whilst the currency wiped all its year-to-date gains. This
comes a day after US – and by definition global – markets suffered heavily in
the wake of mounting disquiet regarding the conduct of President Trump.
Without making any comment on the rights and wrongs of their
respective actions, what is most fascinating was the market response which has
been extremely negative. We should not overlook the fact that the VIX index – a
measure of option volatility on the S&P500 – was at 24 year lows at the
start of last week. This index is often referred to in the financial press as
the “fear index” because the extent to which volatility changes is associated
with changes in market sentiment. As it happens, this is a little misleading
because the VIX is a measure of market perceived volatility in either direction.
But a surge from a low below 10 last week to above 15 today is a measure of a
market which is nervous.
What has struck many investors as odd over recent months has
been the extent to which markets have been able to shrug off the uncertainties in
the wake of Donald Trump’s election, driving US equity indices to record highs
and volatility to multi-year lows. The surge in prices has clearly been driven
by expectations of the Trump reflation trade. But as I noted at the start of
the year, “I suspect markets will not get the benefit of the hoped-for fiscal
stimulus” and I still stand by that view, primarily because the president’s
difficulties will make it much harder for him to drive through his economic
agenda. Predicting that markets will correct is a mug’s game but in the absence
of a tailwind from expectations of stronger growth, it might be harder for
equities to make big gains from here, particularly when valuations are already
high and the Fed is raising rates.
Last week’s interview by The Economist of the President, which resulted in a
scathing assessment of Trumponomics, did not fill me with much
hope that a growth plan is forthcoming. The Q&A transcript struck me as a rambling and superficial overview of his plan. However, none of
this should have come as any surprise. So it always felt strange to me that
markets could be so sanguine and, despite the fact we are living in some of
the most extraordinary economic times in recent history, that equity volatility
could decline so far.
This supports the view which I have held for many months
that whilst markets can price risk they cannot price uncertainty, and as a
result have simply given up trying to do so. This difference between risk and
uncertainty is a long-held tenet in economic and financial circles and stems
from Frank Knight’s 1921 book “Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit” which made a
clear distinction between known unknowns and unknown unknowns (long before
Donald Rumsfeld picked up on the concept). It does go a long way towards
explaining why markets can suddenly switch from a stable state to an unstable
one. In the wake of both the Brexit referendum result and Trump’s election, markets
realised very quickly that sharp sell-offs were unnecessary and that there was
potential for a rally. Investors knew full well that it could all go wrong but probably
rationalised the view that there was no point in waiting for the other shoe to
drop. Far better to ride the cycle on the way up and deal with the consequences
of the sell-off as and when it happened.
But just as many of us failed to pick
up the tail risks last year, so investors have to beware the possibility that
these risks begin to manifest, perhaps in the form of no Trump reflation trade.
If we can’t price uncertainty, then maybe investors will be forced to pay more
for risk protection. That alone might take the edge off the recent US rally. Of course, it may not, but if and when the correction finally does occur, it could be all
the more painful.
Thursday, 18 May 2017
Tuesday, 16 May 2017
Labour's fiscal policy: Marks for effort
The UK election campaign, which is being met with
indifference at home never mind abroad, took a radical turn today with the
publication of the Labour Party’s manifesto. Much of what was leaked last
Thursday was included in today’s plan, with one or two additions, and it is
very much a series of tax and spend proposals which offers a radical alternative
to the economic status quo of market over state. It is, I suspect, the economic
plan of a party which does not expect to win an election: Many of the proposals
would simply not be acceptable to higher earners or corporates, which will bear
the brunt of additional tax rises. At a time when companies have to think
about where they want to be located post-Brexit, it is a plan which will encourage
footloose capital to move elsewhere. Nonetheless, it does raise very big
questions about the nature of the state and the role of fiscal policy, which
have been neglected for too long.
The philosophy which the UK electorate has bought into since Thatcher’s time is that a relatively small state is a good thing and that markets provide freedom of choice. But this is not always true. For one thing, private companies are not always as efficient as their proponents claim because they waste resources in the competitive process which could otherwise be used more effectively for service provision – a bit like moving parts which generate heat rather than mechanical energy. Whilst on the whole, they do deliver lower cost services there are real questions as to whether private entities are run for the benefit of shareholders or their customers.
In a competitive market the two sets of interests are aligned, but certain industries are best viewed as natural monopolies. Gas, electricity and water supply all fall into this category and so unpopular is the notion that private sector energy companies are ripping off the consumer, that the Conservatives have stolen one of Labour’s old ideas by planning to impose price caps (what price free markets?). Nor are huge infrastructure projects necessarily suited to a private sector which does always not have the scale to manage them properly. For example, the UK has outsourced the construction of the Hinkley Point nuclear power station to EDF – a French state-owned company – and a state-backed Chinese entity. The first decade after the privatisation of the UK rail network was characterised by a shambolic series of events which means that today, the Labour Party’s policy of re-nationalising the rail network is actually very popular (it plans to do this as local franchises expire which means that the cost to the Exchequer is limited).
Of course, not all privatised utilities are bad. No-one would seriously advocate renationalising the telecoms network. But it is right to have a debate about which industries require more state involvement, and we should not dismiss the issue as being one for the socialists. Incidentally, the privatisation programme sparked by the Thatcher government in the 1980s was designed to create a nation of small shareholders, in which households held a stake in the nationalised utilities. But that idea faded quickly as shares were snapped up by institutions which in turn sold out to foreign utilities. Whatever the rights and wrongs of today’s energy and water markets in the UK, what we have now is not what was envisaged in the 1980s.
Looking more closely at Labour’s plans, there was more detail on the tax and spending pledges which will result in a tax rise of £48.6bn by the end of the next parliament, or just over 2% of GDP. According to the sober analysis of the Financial Times, this would put taxes relative to GDP at their highest since 1949. But even then, the state will still be significantly smaller than in many other European countries. As I noted last week, a large chunk of the additional taxes will fall on corporates, which are expected to contribute almost £20bn of the £48.6bn increase, and another £6.4bn from higher income taxpayers in what the Daily Mail helpfully described as Corbyn’s class war. What was truly radical was the idea that a Labour government would “consider new options such as a land value tax” which ironically was supported by the likes of Adam Smith, a hero of many on the Conservative right.
The philosophy which the UK electorate has bought into since Thatcher’s time is that a relatively small state is a good thing and that markets provide freedom of choice. But this is not always true. For one thing, private companies are not always as efficient as their proponents claim because they waste resources in the competitive process which could otherwise be used more effectively for service provision – a bit like moving parts which generate heat rather than mechanical energy. Whilst on the whole, they do deliver lower cost services there are real questions as to whether private entities are run for the benefit of shareholders or their customers.
In a competitive market the two sets of interests are aligned, but certain industries are best viewed as natural monopolies. Gas, electricity and water supply all fall into this category and so unpopular is the notion that private sector energy companies are ripping off the consumer, that the Conservatives have stolen one of Labour’s old ideas by planning to impose price caps (what price free markets?). Nor are huge infrastructure projects necessarily suited to a private sector which does always not have the scale to manage them properly. For example, the UK has outsourced the construction of the Hinkley Point nuclear power station to EDF – a French state-owned company – and a state-backed Chinese entity. The first decade after the privatisation of the UK rail network was characterised by a shambolic series of events which means that today, the Labour Party’s policy of re-nationalising the rail network is actually very popular (it plans to do this as local franchises expire which means that the cost to the Exchequer is limited).
Of course, not all privatised utilities are bad. No-one would seriously advocate renationalising the telecoms network. But it is right to have a debate about which industries require more state involvement, and we should not dismiss the issue as being one for the socialists. Incidentally, the privatisation programme sparked by the Thatcher government in the 1980s was designed to create a nation of small shareholders, in which households held a stake in the nationalised utilities. But that idea faded quickly as shares were snapped up by institutions which in turn sold out to foreign utilities. Whatever the rights and wrongs of today’s energy and water markets in the UK, what we have now is not what was envisaged in the 1980s.
Looking more closely at Labour’s plans, there was more detail on the tax and spending pledges which will result in a tax rise of £48.6bn by the end of the next parliament, or just over 2% of GDP. According to the sober analysis of the Financial Times, this would put taxes relative to GDP at their highest since 1949. But even then, the state will still be significantly smaller than in many other European countries. As I noted last week, a large chunk of the additional taxes will fall on corporates, which are expected to contribute almost £20bn of the £48.6bn increase, and another £6.4bn from higher income taxpayers in what the Daily Mail helpfully described as Corbyn’s class war. What was truly radical was the idea that a Labour government would “consider new options such as a land value tax” which ironically was supported by the likes of Adam Smith, a hero of many on the Conservative right.
It is questionable whether these figures would ever be
realised, however. Raising taxes changes the behaviour of those on whom the tax
is levied so if tax elasticities are high, revenues may well be far lower than
anticipated. Nonetheless, Labour did a good job of allaying fears of an unfunded
rise in current spending, even if many people will be less than happy about the
prospect of higher taxes. A potential Labour government will, of course, have
to borrow to fund its capital spending plans. That is normal. At
issue is how much it would need to borrow and what would the market charge. I
suspect we will never get the chance to find out.
Even if one does not like the ideas presented today, they represent a rather more grown-up approach to the question of fiscal policy than we have become used to in recent decades. If we want a better healthcare system, we are going to have to pay for it. More policemen? Fine, but the money has to come from somewhere. There is, however, a whiff of the 1970s about the plan. It fails to account for the fact that more money does not necessarily mean better services. It also treats the UK as a small closed economy whereas in reality a globalised environment will pose limits on the government’s ability to operate the fiscal levers. A former Labour prime minister, Jim Callaghan, recognised as such in 1976 when he said “We used to think that you could spend your way out of a recession, and increase employment by cutting taxes and boosting Government spending. I tell you in all candour that that option no longer exists.” Still, I will give Labour marks for trying, and we should not be too surprised if some its ideas ultimately end up being adopted by the Conservatives. It would not be the first time.
Even if one does not like the ideas presented today, they represent a rather more grown-up approach to the question of fiscal policy than we have become used to in recent decades. If we want a better healthcare system, we are going to have to pay for it. More policemen? Fine, but the money has to come from somewhere. There is, however, a whiff of the 1970s about the plan. It fails to account for the fact that more money does not necessarily mean better services. It also treats the UK as a small closed economy whereas in reality a globalised environment will pose limits on the government’s ability to operate the fiscal levers. A former Labour prime minister, Jim Callaghan, recognised as such in 1976 when he said “We used to think that you could spend your way out of a recession, and increase employment by cutting taxes and boosting Government spending. I tell you in all candour that that option no longer exists.” Still, I will give Labour marks for trying, and we should not be too surprised if some its ideas ultimately end up being adopted by the Conservatives. It would not be the first time.
Sunday, 14 May 2017
The case for a National Investment Bank
One of the policy proposals put forward in the leaked Labour
Party manifesto last week was the establishment of a National Investment Bank (NIB)
to facilitate £250bn of spending on infrastructure over the next ten years.
There was no detail in the document about how this might be set up, but there
is some merit to the idea if done properly and in this post I offer a look at
how it might work.
It is important to be clear at the outset what it should not be. It should not be a conduit for monetary creation by the Bank of England – the so-called People’s QE plan proposed by Jeremy Corbyn when he took over as Labour leader in 2015. PQE essentially requires the central bank to buy the bonds necessary to capitalise such an institution. But this policy is fraught with danger primarily because it erodes the boundaries between government and central bank to an unacceptable degree. In the form envisaged, it allows government to force the central bank to create money to finance whatever projects it deems fit. Moreover, a policy which requires monetary creation on such a scale would also have potential inflationary consequences and no central banker worth their salt is ever likely to endorse such a plan.
That said, there is no reason why a NIB should not work. The UK has tried it before and it was remarkably successful though perhaps not in the way initially envisaged. The Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation (ICFC) was set up in 1945 by the Bank of England with funding from major commercial lenders to provide capital to small and medium-sized companies. In order to free itself from the constraints of relying on the clearing banks for funds, the ICFC began to tap the market to raise capital. This had an adverse side effect in as much as it raised pressure to generate greater returns on equity, which in turn led to a shift away from longer term, less attractive returns which its core mission delivered, to shorter term higher return projects, which caused problems during times of economic downturn. But by the 1980s it had shifted focus to become a leading provider of finance for management buyouts and had expanded internationally. It became a public limited company in 1987, when the banks sold their stakes, and it was fully privatised in 1994.
Currently, the UK is the only G7 economy not to have an institution which provides finance to the SME sector. In Germany, the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) has supported industry since 1948 and in the US, the Small Business Administration (SBA) has operated since 1953. Admittedly, the UK government did dip its toes into the water recently when it established the Green Investment Bank (GIB) in 2012. But despite apparently being successful, it was sold to Macquarie Bank last month for a price (£2.3bn) less than the initial £3.8bn of capital injected by the government.
In an excellent paper commissioned for the Labour Party in 2011, the lawyer Nick Tott outlined the case for a NIB. But just to show that the case was not party political, former MPC member Adam Posen made a similarly excellent case in a 2011 speech which suggested that not only was there a case for a NIB, but that there was a need for an “entity to bundle and securitize loans made to SMEs … to create a more liquid and deep market for illiquid securities.” The biggest question remains how to capitalise such an institution. The government could commit up to £5bn as initial seed capital – after all it put almost £4bn into the GIB – and it could issue another (say) £5bn of bonds backed by Treasury guarantee. In future years it could divert part of the income generated by National Savings and Investments (NS&I) which raised £11.3bn for the Exchequer in 2015-16 and has assets of £120bn.
Admittedly, this is pretty small scale stuff and would be in no way able to fund the £25bn per annum of infrastructure which the Labour Party is calling for. This is probably a good argument in favour of limiting the remit of such an institution to SME lending rather than big public infrastructure projects. That, after all, is what such institutions do in other countries. Moreover, as Tott points out, it “would need a wide measure of independence from government.” It cannot simply be an arm of government to finance all sorts of pet projects, otherwise those who brand it a return to 1970s-style profligacy will likely be proved right.
A NIB would have to be run along commercial lines. As Posen pointed out, “The existing banks will scream about the unfair cost of capital advantage such an institution would have, but ... since the major banks in the UK have benefitted from a too-big-to-fail situation, any disadvantage they have in funding conditions is offset by the funding advantage they have over smaller or newer financial institutions, which they have gladly accepted. [Admittedly] public sector banks do tend to underperform private banks in credit allocation, and do tend to erode private banks’ profits. Yet most if not all countries have ongoing public lenders of various types (even the US has the SBA), and their existence on a limited scale, while perhaps wasteful at the margin, does not lead to the destruction of the private-sector banking systems in those countries … Let us remember that the UK and other western private-sector banks did that themselves during a period of financial liberalization and privatization unprecedented in postwar economic history.”
There are good reasons why the UK needs to do something to raise investment. For one thing, it is about to lose its EU funding which will put a hole in the transfers to many of the English regions (places like Hartlepool, which were very much pro-Brexit, have received considerable funding in recent years). A more generic macroeconomic problem is that the rate of business investment growth has been below the rate of depreciation since the great recession. This is not an issue which gets much airplay in the big picture story, and I am not sure of the extent to which it represents a change in business behaviour or whether it is a measurement problem. But it means in effect that the UK capital stock is declining, which may be one explanation behind the slowdown in potential growth in recent years. The UK needs to raise its investment levels. Whether a NIB is the right way to go about it remains to be seen. But it is an idea which should not be dismissed out of hand.
It is important to be clear at the outset what it should not be. It should not be a conduit for monetary creation by the Bank of England – the so-called People’s QE plan proposed by Jeremy Corbyn when he took over as Labour leader in 2015. PQE essentially requires the central bank to buy the bonds necessary to capitalise such an institution. But this policy is fraught with danger primarily because it erodes the boundaries between government and central bank to an unacceptable degree. In the form envisaged, it allows government to force the central bank to create money to finance whatever projects it deems fit. Moreover, a policy which requires monetary creation on such a scale would also have potential inflationary consequences and no central banker worth their salt is ever likely to endorse such a plan.
That said, there is no reason why a NIB should not work. The UK has tried it before and it was remarkably successful though perhaps not in the way initially envisaged. The Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation (ICFC) was set up in 1945 by the Bank of England with funding from major commercial lenders to provide capital to small and medium-sized companies. In order to free itself from the constraints of relying on the clearing banks for funds, the ICFC began to tap the market to raise capital. This had an adverse side effect in as much as it raised pressure to generate greater returns on equity, which in turn led to a shift away from longer term, less attractive returns which its core mission delivered, to shorter term higher return projects, which caused problems during times of economic downturn. But by the 1980s it had shifted focus to become a leading provider of finance for management buyouts and had expanded internationally. It became a public limited company in 1987, when the banks sold their stakes, and it was fully privatised in 1994.
Currently, the UK is the only G7 economy not to have an institution which provides finance to the SME sector. In Germany, the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) has supported industry since 1948 and in the US, the Small Business Administration (SBA) has operated since 1953. Admittedly, the UK government did dip its toes into the water recently when it established the Green Investment Bank (GIB) in 2012. But despite apparently being successful, it was sold to Macquarie Bank last month for a price (£2.3bn) less than the initial £3.8bn of capital injected by the government.
In an excellent paper commissioned for the Labour Party in 2011, the lawyer Nick Tott outlined the case for a NIB. But just to show that the case was not party political, former MPC member Adam Posen made a similarly excellent case in a 2011 speech which suggested that not only was there a case for a NIB, but that there was a need for an “entity to bundle and securitize loans made to SMEs … to create a more liquid and deep market for illiquid securities.” The biggest question remains how to capitalise such an institution. The government could commit up to £5bn as initial seed capital – after all it put almost £4bn into the GIB – and it could issue another (say) £5bn of bonds backed by Treasury guarantee. In future years it could divert part of the income generated by National Savings and Investments (NS&I) which raised £11.3bn for the Exchequer in 2015-16 and has assets of £120bn.
Admittedly, this is pretty small scale stuff and would be in no way able to fund the £25bn per annum of infrastructure which the Labour Party is calling for. This is probably a good argument in favour of limiting the remit of such an institution to SME lending rather than big public infrastructure projects. That, after all, is what such institutions do in other countries. Moreover, as Tott points out, it “would need a wide measure of independence from government.” It cannot simply be an arm of government to finance all sorts of pet projects, otherwise those who brand it a return to 1970s-style profligacy will likely be proved right.
A NIB would have to be run along commercial lines. As Posen pointed out, “The existing banks will scream about the unfair cost of capital advantage such an institution would have, but ... since the major banks in the UK have benefitted from a too-big-to-fail situation, any disadvantage they have in funding conditions is offset by the funding advantage they have over smaller or newer financial institutions, which they have gladly accepted. [Admittedly] public sector banks do tend to underperform private banks in credit allocation, and do tend to erode private banks’ profits. Yet most if not all countries have ongoing public lenders of various types (even the US has the SBA), and their existence on a limited scale, while perhaps wasteful at the margin, does not lead to the destruction of the private-sector banking systems in those countries … Let us remember that the UK and other western private-sector banks did that themselves during a period of financial liberalization and privatization unprecedented in postwar economic history.”
There are good reasons why the UK needs to do something to raise investment. For one thing, it is about to lose its EU funding which will put a hole in the transfers to many of the English regions (places like Hartlepool, which were very much pro-Brexit, have received considerable funding in recent years). A more generic macroeconomic problem is that the rate of business investment growth has been below the rate of depreciation since the great recession. This is not an issue which gets much airplay in the big picture story, and I am not sure of the extent to which it represents a change in business behaviour or whether it is a measurement problem. But it means in effect that the UK capital stock is declining, which may be one explanation behind the slowdown in potential growth in recent years. The UK needs to raise its investment levels. Whether a NIB is the right way to go about it remains to be seen. But it is an idea which should not be dismissed out of hand.
Thursday, 11 May 2017
High Labour costs
Four weeks from today, the main UK political parties will go
head-to-head in an election we do not really need to have. No prizes for
guessing that Brexit will be the key battleground on which it will be fought.
But with changes in the leadership of all main parties since 2015, this really
should be an opportunity to address many of the key economic issues which have
plagued the UK over the last seven years. The lack of investment; the
over-reliance on austerity and a chance to reset the terms of the EU debate
which David Cameron got so totally wrong and which Theresa May is not helping
to improve. One might have thought that by now, the parties would have their
economic plans ready to roll in order to give us time to assess the issues.
Well, not exactly. The Conservatives are not planning to publish their
manifesto until next week, and the best we have from Labour is a leaked draft
which was splashed all over the press, framed as a socialist document worse than
the longest suicide note in history, as their 1983 agenda was dubbed.
If you actually read through the leaked draft of the Labour Party manifesto, rather than rely in the headlines which tell us how very socialist it is, there are some rather interesting ideas in there. Jeremy Corbyn, for all his many faults, is trying to fight an election on issues of fairness and responsibility. The key message is that the vast majority of the electorate has been squeezed since the financial crisis-induced economic collapse, and Labour wants to do something about rectifying it. Thus the plans outlined so far indicate more spending on the NHS and the creation of a National Care Service; the building of more new houses; the scrapping of university tuition fees and the reintroduction of student maintenance grants. Add in the prospect of establishing a National Investment Bank to facilitate £250bn of spending on infrastructure over the next ten years (which is not a bad idea and I will deal with it another time), and you have what sounds like a classic fiscal stimulus. I would use the phrase “pump priming” but Donald Trump has apparently just invented it. (“Have you heard that expression used before? Because I haven’t heard it. I mean, I just…I came up with it a couple of days ago and I thought it was good”).
There is just one tiny problem: The plan sounds horrendously expensive – and that is before we even talk about the renationalisation of rail and energy. Let’s start with education. The Institute for Fiscal Studies reckons that Labour’s Higher Education policy would raise the deficit by over £8bn (about 0.5% of GDP at current prices). Investing £250bn in infrastructure over a ten year period implies a boost equivalent to 1.5% of GDP per year. To secure the financing, taxes must inevitably go up. Labour has suggested that it will raise income taxes on those earning over £80,000 per year (the top 5%), though has not said by how much, and “will ask large corporations to pay a little more.”
Some back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that there are 1.1 million taxpayers earning between £80k and £150k per year paying higher rate tax at 40%, and 0.3 million earning above £150k paying a 45% rate. This means that only 25% of all higher rate taxpayers earn more than £80k. We can thus take the HMRC’s tax rate elasticity multiplier which calculates the full effect of raising higher rates taxes, and assume a 25% efficiency rate compared to the full impact. Running through the numbers, each 1% rise in tax on those earning above £80k per year will yield around £0.5bn in revenue per year. If the tax rate is whacked up by 4 to 5 percentage points, we could thus fund the education costs. The ready reckoner also suggests that each 1% on the corporate rate will reap around £2.4bn per annum. Thus, reversing the planned 3 percentage point cut in corporate taxes by 2020 yields another £7.2bn over three years. A Labour government could even raise corporate taxes back towards 25% over (say) five years, yielding an extra £12bn by 2022. Adding up these numbers (an effective 8 percentage point rise in corporate taxes and 5 points on taxes for higher earners), we thus start to get close to the £25bn needed for annual infrastructure spending.
But funding the reprivatisation would be enormously expensive. A brokerage report by Jefferies in 2015 put the cost of renationalising the energy sector at £185bn (~11% of GDP). They also pointed out that “if a future Labour government restricted itself to just acquiring the UK assets of the big six generators plus National Grid, the cost would be £124bn.” I have no idea what renationalising the rail sector would cost but let’s say £60bn for the sake of argument. An increase of £184bn in public outlays would raise the debt-to-GDP ratio by 11% at one stroke. Even assuming this is not a problem, the markets would almost certainly demand a higher risk premium on gilts, so debt servicing costs would rise. But here is the kicker: Labour has proposed a Fiscal Credibility Rule which plans to reduce the current balance to zero on a five year rolling timescale (which sounds to me like a never-never rule), but also that the debt-to-GDP ratio be lower at the end of the parliamentary term than at the beginning. Nationalising rail and energy would blow a hole in that, but fortunately Labour proposes to suspend the operation of the rule so long as monetary policy is operating at the lower bound. So that’s all right then!
All of these numbers are back of the envelope calculations and in no way constitute a detailed analysis of the costs. Although many commentators liken this document to Labour’s 1983 election manifesto, its 1974 document which called for “more control over the powerful private forces that at present dominate our economic life” was at least as damaging because the party was actually in government. Labour’s main failure in the 1970s was to recognise that the poor performance of the British economy was not due simply to the failings of the capitalist system: It was largely due to an insular view of the economic problems. It feels very much like we are at that point again today.
If you actually read through the leaked draft of the Labour Party manifesto, rather than rely in the headlines which tell us how very socialist it is, there are some rather interesting ideas in there. Jeremy Corbyn, for all his many faults, is trying to fight an election on issues of fairness and responsibility. The key message is that the vast majority of the electorate has been squeezed since the financial crisis-induced economic collapse, and Labour wants to do something about rectifying it. Thus the plans outlined so far indicate more spending on the NHS and the creation of a National Care Service; the building of more new houses; the scrapping of university tuition fees and the reintroduction of student maintenance grants. Add in the prospect of establishing a National Investment Bank to facilitate £250bn of spending on infrastructure over the next ten years (which is not a bad idea and I will deal with it another time), and you have what sounds like a classic fiscal stimulus. I would use the phrase “pump priming” but Donald Trump has apparently just invented it. (“Have you heard that expression used before? Because I haven’t heard it. I mean, I just…I came up with it a couple of days ago and I thought it was good”).
There is just one tiny problem: The plan sounds horrendously expensive – and that is before we even talk about the renationalisation of rail and energy. Let’s start with education. The Institute for Fiscal Studies reckons that Labour’s Higher Education policy would raise the deficit by over £8bn (about 0.5% of GDP at current prices). Investing £250bn in infrastructure over a ten year period implies a boost equivalent to 1.5% of GDP per year. To secure the financing, taxes must inevitably go up. Labour has suggested that it will raise income taxes on those earning over £80,000 per year (the top 5%), though has not said by how much, and “will ask large corporations to pay a little more.”
Some back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that there are 1.1 million taxpayers earning between £80k and £150k per year paying higher rate tax at 40%, and 0.3 million earning above £150k paying a 45% rate. This means that only 25% of all higher rate taxpayers earn more than £80k. We can thus take the HMRC’s tax rate elasticity multiplier which calculates the full effect of raising higher rates taxes, and assume a 25% efficiency rate compared to the full impact. Running through the numbers, each 1% rise in tax on those earning above £80k per year will yield around £0.5bn in revenue per year. If the tax rate is whacked up by 4 to 5 percentage points, we could thus fund the education costs. The ready reckoner also suggests that each 1% on the corporate rate will reap around £2.4bn per annum. Thus, reversing the planned 3 percentage point cut in corporate taxes by 2020 yields another £7.2bn over three years. A Labour government could even raise corporate taxes back towards 25% over (say) five years, yielding an extra £12bn by 2022. Adding up these numbers (an effective 8 percentage point rise in corporate taxes and 5 points on taxes for higher earners), we thus start to get close to the £25bn needed for annual infrastructure spending.
But funding the reprivatisation would be enormously expensive. A brokerage report by Jefferies in 2015 put the cost of renationalising the energy sector at £185bn (~11% of GDP). They also pointed out that “if a future Labour government restricted itself to just acquiring the UK assets of the big six generators plus National Grid, the cost would be £124bn.” I have no idea what renationalising the rail sector would cost but let’s say £60bn for the sake of argument. An increase of £184bn in public outlays would raise the debt-to-GDP ratio by 11% at one stroke. Even assuming this is not a problem, the markets would almost certainly demand a higher risk premium on gilts, so debt servicing costs would rise. But here is the kicker: Labour has proposed a Fiscal Credibility Rule which plans to reduce the current balance to zero on a five year rolling timescale (which sounds to me like a never-never rule), but also that the debt-to-GDP ratio be lower at the end of the parliamentary term than at the beginning. Nationalising rail and energy would blow a hole in that, but fortunately Labour proposes to suspend the operation of the rule so long as monetary policy is operating at the lower bound. So that’s all right then!
All of these numbers are back of the envelope calculations and in no way constitute a detailed analysis of the costs. Although many commentators liken this document to Labour’s 1983 election manifesto, its 1974 document which called for “more control over the powerful private forces that at present dominate our economic life” was at least as damaging because the party was actually in government. Labour’s main failure in the 1970s was to recognise that the poor performance of the British economy was not due simply to the failings of the capitalist system: It was largely due to an insular view of the economic problems. It feels very much like we are at that point again today.
Monday, 8 May 2017
Vive la différence
Watching the acceptance speech by the new French president
Emmanuel Macron yesterday, I must confess to a tinge of envy because it
represented everything which is lacking from the UK scene. The French
electorate decisively rejected the knee-jerk politics of division in favour of
a more inclusive EU-friendly alternative whilst at the same time electing a man
who, at 39 years old, is the youngest leader since Napoleon Bonaparte in 1799.
At least for now, Macron represents hope for a more positive future. His
election also breaks the recent trend towards right-wing populism, as represented
by his opponent Marine Le Pen.
Here in the UK an election takes place in just over four weeks’ time and the choices on offer are nowhere near as palatable. Theresa May represents a continuation of the dogmatic opposition to the EU, with the prospect of the economy moving closer to the cliff edge that she claims to want to avoid. But the opposition offers no choice at all. Even accepting that Jeremy Corbyn probably does get a bad press from a media which is viscerally opposed to the Labour Party, he increasingly appears an ineffectual leader unable to rally centrist voters to his cause and who presides over a party which has slipped so far to the left as to be unelectable. The French, of course, had just such a candidate in the first round of presidential voting two weeks ago in the form of Jean-Luc Mélenchon and he trailed in fourth with less than 20% of the votes.
Over the weekend, the shadow Chancellor John McDonnell denied being a Marxist but did suggest that “there is a lot to learn from reading Das Kapital.” Whilst recognising the importance of Marx’s tract as a seminal work in the field of political economy, it is fair to say that from an economic viewpoint there is more to disagree than to agree with, but I’ll leave that for others to debate. However, coming just days after Labour suffered heavy losses in local elections, losing 382 council seats across the country whilst the Conservatives gained 563, it seems that this is a message which the UK electorate does not want to hear. Labour does not have a positive message to sell the voters and with UKIP all but wiped out as a political force, losing 145 of the 146 seats it held, it is difficult to see the Conservatives winning anything other than a landslide victory at the general election scheduled for 8 June.
Quite what the Conservatives’ economic policy will look like is unclear, since it has delayed the publication of its election manifesto until next week. It is likely to maintain a pledge to reduce immigration but will almost certainly not repeat the mistake made in 2015 when it promised not to raise income tax, VAT or national insurance contributions. But as Jagjit Chadha of the National Institute points out, this election should be about more than just Brexit. Answers need to be found to the weakness of UK productivity for only this way will we finally be able to make some progress on the vexed question of stagnating living standards.
Of course, Macron will face all sorts of challenges to get the French economy back on track. Like the UK, fiscal issues will be high on the agenda with Macron planning to reduce the tax burden, including a reduction in the corporate tax rate from 33% to 25%, and to simplify the tax system. At the same time, he has promised to cut public spending to a still-high 52% of GDP (though on the basis of the European Commission’s data this is not exactly a high hurdle). The new president also plans to decentralise the labour market in favour of firm-level rather than collective agreements, and a gradual loosening of the 35 hour working week. As I noted a couple of weeks ago, the extent to whether he gets a mandate to push through his plan will depend on how much support he has in the National Assembly following June elections. He will have his work cut out.
Macron’s victory yesterday took my mind back 20 years to the election of another young left-of-centre politician in the form of Tony Blair. Blair was viewed across Europe as a breath of fresh air following the fractious Conservative government of 1992-97. He promised a third way in politics which involved a bit of state intervention and a lot of market forces, and offered hope to social democrats across the continent. He took over as UK prime minister at a time when the European economy was a lot stronger than it is today and he was obviously economically successful for a long time. But the story of how he came to be reviled by his own party should be a lesson to Macron. Today’s fresh face of optimism can just as easily become yesterday’s man. As former PM David Cameron once taunted Blair in 2005, “You were the future, once.” And now Cameron, too, lies on the scrapheap of history. Nemesis is never far away
Here in the UK an election takes place in just over four weeks’ time and the choices on offer are nowhere near as palatable. Theresa May represents a continuation of the dogmatic opposition to the EU, with the prospect of the economy moving closer to the cliff edge that she claims to want to avoid. But the opposition offers no choice at all. Even accepting that Jeremy Corbyn probably does get a bad press from a media which is viscerally opposed to the Labour Party, he increasingly appears an ineffectual leader unable to rally centrist voters to his cause and who presides over a party which has slipped so far to the left as to be unelectable. The French, of course, had just such a candidate in the first round of presidential voting two weeks ago in the form of Jean-Luc Mélenchon and he trailed in fourth with less than 20% of the votes.
Over the weekend, the shadow Chancellor John McDonnell denied being a Marxist but did suggest that “there is a lot to learn from reading Das Kapital.” Whilst recognising the importance of Marx’s tract as a seminal work in the field of political economy, it is fair to say that from an economic viewpoint there is more to disagree than to agree with, but I’ll leave that for others to debate. However, coming just days after Labour suffered heavy losses in local elections, losing 382 council seats across the country whilst the Conservatives gained 563, it seems that this is a message which the UK electorate does not want to hear. Labour does not have a positive message to sell the voters and with UKIP all but wiped out as a political force, losing 145 of the 146 seats it held, it is difficult to see the Conservatives winning anything other than a landslide victory at the general election scheduled for 8 June.
Quite what the Conservatives’ economic policy will look like is unclear, since it has delayed the publication of its election manifesto until next week. It is likely to maintain a pledge to reduce immigration but will almost certainly not repeat the mistake made in 2015 when it promised not to raise income tax, VAT or national insurance contributions. But as Jagjit Chadha of the National Institute points out, this election should be about more than just Brexit. Answers need to be found to the weakness of UK productivity for only this way will we finally be able to make some progress on the vexed question of stagnating living standards.
Of course, Macron will face all sorts of challenges to get the French economy back on track. Like the UK, fiscal issues will be high on the agenda with Macron planning to reduce the tax burden, including a reduction in the corporate tax rate from 33% to 25%, and to simplify the tax system. At the same time, he has promised to cut public spending to a still-high 52% of GDP (though on the basis of the European Commission’s data this is not exactly a high hurdle). The new president also plans to decentralise the labour market in favour of firm-level rather than collective agreements, and a gradual loosening of the 35 hour working week. As I noted a couple of weeks ago, the extent to whether he gets a mandate to push through his plan will depend on how much support he has in the National Assembly following June elections. He will have his work cut out.
Macron’s victory yesterday took my mind back 20 years to the election of another young left-of-centre politician in the form of Tony Blair. Blair was viewed across Europe as a breath of fresh air following the fractious Conservative government of 1992-97. He promised a third way in politics which involved a bit of state intervention and a lot of market forces, and offered hope to social democrats across the continent. He took over as UK prime minister at a time when the European economy was a lot stronger than it is today and he was obviously economically successful for a long time. But the story of how he came to be reviled by his own party should be a lesson to Macron. Today’s fresh face of optimism can just as easily become yesterday’s man. As former PM David Cameron once taunted Blair in 2005, “You were the future, once.” And now Cameron, too, lies on the scrapheap of history. Nemesis is never far away
Sunday, 7 May 2017
Central banks: A balancing act
One of the issues which central banks are going to have to
face up to at some point in future is the question of whether and how to reduce
their balance sheets, which have been swollen by the huge purchases of
financial assets under the QE programme. The balance sheet of the US Federal Reserve,
for example, now stands at $4.5 trillion, which is roughly 25% of GDP compared
to a figure around 7% at the start of the financial crisis, with the expansion comprised
primarily of Treasury and Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS).
From the outset, central banks were clear that it was the stock of assets held on the balance sheet which was important for the purpose of injecting additional liquidity, not the rate at which they were purchased. This was because the purchase of bonds has a counterpart on the liability side of the balance sheet in the form of a credit to the banking system (excess reserves), representing the transfer of funds from the central bank to the seller of the bond. To the extent that the banking system creates liquidity as a multiple of the deposits in the system, this rise in banking sector deposits held at the central bank is what ultimately determines the pace of liquidity creation in the wider economy. The Fed ceased buying assets in October 2014. But as existing bonds matured so they ceased to be an item on the asset side. In order to prevent an unintended decline in the balance sheet, it was forced to rollover maturing securities which means that it is still actively buying assets, albeit on a smaller scale than previously.
But the Fed has indicated that it will ultimately shrink its balance sheet, and thus impose an additional degree of monetary tightening, but not until “normalization of the level of the federal funds rate is well under way.” Whilst markets are concerned about when this is likely to happen, a more interesting question is how rapidly it is likely to proceed. It is widely anticipated that the Fed will allow its maturing bonds to simply disappear from the balance sheet – a form of passive (or less active) reduction compared to the alternative of actively selling bonds. Ben Bernanke (amongst others) has argued that the Fed should simply aim for a given size for the balance sheet and allow the maturing of existing bonds to continue until the desired level is reached.
Perhaps what this all means is that we should stop worrying
too much about the potential impact of big central bank balance sheet
reductions. But it does mean that a more permanent change in the conduct of monetary
policy is about to take hold. Prior to 2008, central banks controlled access to
demand for banking sector liquidity by regulating its price via the overnight rate.
Now that liquidity is plentiful, both the Fed and ECB operate a floor system by
controlling the rate they pay banks on reserves held with the central bank. As
recently as November 2016, the FOMC described the current floor system as
“relatively simple and efficient to administer, relatively straightforward to
communicate, and effective in enabling interest rate control across a wide
range of circumstances.”
Such a policy requires the banking system to be saturated with reserves and implies that the balance sheet may be about to assume a more important role in the conduct of policy as it becomes the tool via which bank reserves are supplied. So maybe central bank watchers will spend less time worrying about the policy rate in future and we will go back to the old-fashioned job of trying to predict how much liquidity central banks are injecting into the market. Now that takes me back a bit …
From the outset, central banks were clear that it was the stock of assets held on the balance sheet which was important for the purpose of injecting additional liquidity, not the rate at which they were purchased. This was because the purchase of bonds has a counterpart on the liability side of the balance sheet in the form of a credit to the banking system (excess reserves), representing the transfer of funds from the central bank to the seller of the bond. To the extent that the banking system creates liquidity as a multiple of the deposits in the system, this rise in banking sector deposits held at the central bank is what ultimately determines the pace of liquidity creation in the wider economy. The Fed ceased buying assets in October 2014. But as existing bonds matured so they ceased to be an item on the asset side. In order to prevent an unintended decline in the balance sheet, it was forced to rollover maturing securities which means that it is still actively buying assets, albeit on a smaller scale than previously.
But the Fed has indicated that it will ultimately shrink its balance sheet, and thus impose an additional degree of monetary tightening, but not until “normalization of the level of the federal funds rate is well under way.” Whilst markets are concerned about when this is likely to happen, a more interesting question is how rapidly it is likely to proceed. It is widely anticipated that the Fed will allow its maturing bonds to simply disappear from the balance sheet – a form of passive (or less active) reduction compared to the alternative of actively selling bonds. Ben Bernanke (amongst others) has argued that the Fed should simply aim for a given size for the balance sheet and allow the maturing of existing bonds to continue until the desired level is reached.
It is pretty likely that wherever we do end up in the
longer-term, the balance sheet will not go back to pre-2008 levels. With Fed
estimates indicating that demand for currency is likely to reach $2.5 trillion
over the next decade, compared to $1.5 trillion today (and $900bn before the
crisis), it is evident that the absolute size of the balance sheet in the
longer term will be far higher than it was 10 years ago. In one sense, this
makes the Fed’s task easier because it will not have to run it down so far. Indeed,
in a nice little blog piece in January, Ben Bernanke reckoned that the optimal size for the balance sheet over the next decade is
likely to be in the region of $2.5 to $4 trillion. If indeed the optimal size
is close to the upper end of the range, it implies that the degree of reduction
will be very small indeed, and would have little impact on markets which fear
that a rundown of the balance sheet will result in a sharp rise in interest
rates.
This absence of a dramatic reduction would be in keeping with past historical evidence. Analysis by Ferguson, Schaab and Schularick which looks at central bank balance sheets over the twentieth century, argues that prior to the onset of the financial crisis balance sheets relative to GDP were very small relative to the size of the economy compared to longer-term historical experience. They also note that “outright nominal reductions of balance sheets are rare. Historically, reductions have typically been achieved by keeping the growth rate of assets below the growth rate of the economy.”
This absence of a dramatic reduction would be in keeping with past historical evidence. Analysis by Ferguson, Schaab and Schularick which looks at central bank balance sheets over the twentieth century, argues that prior to the onset of the financial crisis balance sheets relative to GDP were very small relative to the size of the economy compared to longer-term historical experience. They also note that “outright nominal reductions of balance sheets are rare. Historically, reductions have typically been achieved by keeping the growth rate of assets below the growth rate of the economy.”
Such a policy requires the banking system to be saturated with reserves and implies that the balance sheet may be about to assume a more important role in the conduct of policy as it becomes the tool via which bank reserves are supplied. So maybe central bank watchers will spend less time worrying about the policy rate in future and we will go back to the old-fashioned job of trying to predict how much liquidity central banks are injecting into the market. Now that takes me back a bit …
Wednesday, 3 May 2017
Dial it down
The rhetoric over the Brexit divorce has gone up by a few
notches in the course of recent days. Leaked accounts of last week’s dinner
engagement between Theresa May and Jean-Claude Juncker were splashed all over
the German press at the weekend. Subsequently, the FT has calculated that the
upfront cost of departure is likely to be in the region of €100bn whilst
Theresa May today made the extraordinary allegation that “some in Brussels” did
not want Brexit to succeed. It might be wise at this point to dial down the
rhetoric before things get out of hand.
Dealing first with the politics (I know it’s dull but this whole debate is driven by it), there is little doubt that the European Commission was responsible for the leaks to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. The details were too precise to be made up, and it is clearly designed to rattle the UK’s political cage in order to remind the government that it will not get everything it wants during the Brexit negotiations (if indeed, it gets anything at all). It is not very edifying but that’s politics for you.
As for Theresa May’s statement, she is right – except it is probably more accurate to say that “no-one in Brussels” wants Brexit to succeed. Why would they? We have known all along that the EU has no incentive to make life easy for anyone who wants to leave: If Brexit is a success the whole basis of the EU is threatened. If the EU is serious about holding together in the absence of the UK’s departure, of course it wants to see Brexit fail – to suggest otherwise is an act of incredible naïveté. The suggestion that there is any meddling in the election was, however, a step too far. In any case, this unnecessary election is all about the UK’s bargaining position regarding Brexit, so the PM’s comments were a bit rich.
Which brings us to the issue of divorce costs. I have referenced the work of the FT’s Alex Barker before, and I am indebted to his analysis of the data for an insight into where the EU’s increased bill comes from. Previously, the bill was estimated at around €70bn – a figure which included numerous questionable items. The extra €30bn is even more controversial, largely due to the demand for contributions to commitments planned for 2019 and 2020, which occur after the UK has already left the EU and which is estimated to cost between €10bn and €15bn. The EU is also believed to be demanding an upfront payment of €12bn to cover contingent liabilities rather than stumping up at the point when they arise. Finally, France and Germany are also believed to be doubtful that the UK has any entitlement to the EU’s assets – a move which is calculated to wind up the UK government.
It should be stated at the outset that the €100bn is a gross figure. If the UK is paying its full share of the budget beyond 2019, it will be entitled to its normal rebate. Once we add in farm subsidies and other items, it is expected that the final figure will be around the €65bn mark. Of course, like any good dealmaker, the EU is bound to start with a high figure in the knowledge that it will be beaten down, but the higher you bid the more chance of getting a figure close to what you believe to be reasonable. The ratcheting up of pressure was likely also partly triggered by the recent UK government belief that it can legally walk away without paying anything at all, and this is the EU’s way of letting the UK know it is not in a strong negotiating position. After all, the UK will not get any form of trade deal if it refuses to pay anything (which, of course, the UK knows). More problematic still is that Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief negotiator, will not put a final bill on Brexit until the negotiations are complete – he simply wants the UK to agree on the methodology.
All told, this puts the UK in a difficult spot. David Davis, the UK’s chief negotiator, will not sign up to such a deal – and for once I have some sympathy. The UK will already be asked to contribute to the unattributed parts of the budget which have not been allocated on an accruals basis (the so-called reste à liquider payments), whose provenance is dubious. To deny the UK any claim on EU assets is morally indefensible, particularly since the UK is such a big net contributor to the EU budget. But to pay for budget commitments beyond the time the UK leaves is a red line. It’s like being charged in a restaurant for a meal you already don’t want to eat, but then you are being asked to pay for the next customer’s food as well.
The whole day has been one of high octane posing. As I have said before, there are deals to be done but if both sides continue to antagonise the other, the prospect of successfully concluding one will diminish. My advice would be to turn down the noise – no trade deal is ever concluded with anything other than a cool head.
Dealing first with the politics (I know it’s dull but this whole debate is driven by it), there is little doubt that the European Commission was responsible for the leaks to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. The details were too precise to be made up, and it is clearly designed to rattle the UK’s political cage in order to remind the government that it will not get everything it wants during the Brexit negotiations (if indeed, it gets anything at all). It is not very edifying but that’s politics for you.
As for Theresa May’s statement, she is right – except it is probably more accurate to say that “no-one in Brussels” wants Brexit to succeed. Why would they? We have known all along that the EU has no incentive to make life easy for anyone who wants to leave: If Brexit is a success the whole basis of the EU is threatened. If the EU is serious about holding together in the absence of the UK’s departure, of course it wants to see Brexit fail – to suggest otherwise is an act of incredible naïveté. The suggestion that there is any meddling in the election was, however, a step too far. In any case, this unnecessary election is all about the UK’s bargaining position regarding Brexit, so the PM’s comments were a bit rich.
Which brings us to the issue of divorce costs. I have referenced the work of the FT’s Alex Barker before, and I am indebted to his analysis of the data for an insight into where the EU’s increased bill comes from. Previously, the bill was estimated at around €70bn – a figure which included numerous questionable items. The extra €30bn is even more controversial, largely due to the demand for contributions to commitments planned for 2019 and 2020, which occur after the UK has already left the EU and which is estimated to cost between €10bn and €15bn. The EU is also believed to be demanding an upfront payment of €12bn to cover contingent liabilities rather than stumping up at the point when they arise. Finally, France and Germany are also believed to be doubtful that the UK has any entitlement to the EU’s assets – a move which is calculated to wind up the UK government.
It should be stated at the outset that the €100bn is a gross figure. If the UK is paying its full share of the budget beyond 2019, it will be entitled to its normal rebate. Once we add in farm subsidies and other items, it is expected that the final figure will be around the €65bn mark. Of course, like any good dealmaker, the EU is bound to start with a high figure in the knowledge that it will be beaten down, but the higher you bid the more chance of getting a figure close to what you believe to be reasonable. The ratcheting up of pressure was likely also partly triggered by the recent UK government belief that it can legally walk away without paying anything at all, and this is the EU’s way of letting the UK know it is not in a strong negotiating position. After all, the UK will not get any form of trade deal if it refuses to pay anything (which, of course, the UK knows). More problematic still is that Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief negotiator, will not put a final bill on Brexit until the negotiations are complete – he simply wants the UK to agree on the methodology.
All told, this puts the UK in a difficult spot. David Davis, the UK’s chief negotiator, will not sign up to such a deal – and for once I have some sympathy. The UK will already be asked to contribute to the unattributed parts of the budget which have not been allocated on an accruals basis (the so-called reste à liquider payments), whose provenance is dubious. To deny the UK any claim on EU assets is morally indefensible, particularly since the UK is such a big net contributor to the EU budget. But to pay for budget commitments beyond the time the UK leaves is a red line. It’s like being charged in a restaurant for a meal you already don’t want to eat, but then you are being asked to pay for the next customer’s food as well.
The whole day has been one of high octane posing. As I have said before, there are deals to be done but if both sides continue to antagonise the other, the prospect of successfully concluding one will diminish. My advice would be to turn down the noise – no trade deal is ever concluded with anything other than a cool head.
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