Farewell Liz, we barely knew ye

It is becoming increasingly difficult to know where to start in describing the political implosion at the heart of Westminster. A catastrophically-timed mini budget which attempted to kick-start growth by cutting taxes has proven to be a catalyst for a collapse of the Conservative government – perhaps even the party itself. In the last week alone, we have seen the departure of the third Chancellor since July (we are now onto our fourth in the shape of Jeremy Hunt) a second Home Secretary and we are now about to have the third prime minister in less than two months. Fans of political fiction could never have dreamed that they would be able to watch such drama unfold in real-time. It would be funny if it were not so serious.

How did it come to this?

Historians will undoubtedly have a field day in analysing Liz Truss’s shortest prime ministerial tenure on record. They will likely conclude that the Tory party implosion was a long time in the making. Tempting though it is to date the start of the rot to the Brexit campaign in 2016, the split within the Conservative party on the twin questions of Europe and the role of free markets in the economy – both of which played a key role in the recent shenanigans – dates back to at least the 1970s. More recently, the huge antipathy towards the EU demonstrated by large parts of the Tory party during John Major’s tenure as PM in the 1990s never quite spilled over into the mainstream at the time but it did poison the well. We have since been drinking from it for too long.

Undoubtedly, the Brexit campaign was an accelerant in the process. One of the potential benefits that Brexit offered was the chance for the UK to revamp its economic model – a deregulated model, free from the perceived constraints of the EU. This was never a realistic option: Putting up barriers to trade with the UK’s main trading partners could never be compensated for by trade with other nations. As the howls from small companies dependent on exports became louder it was increasingly clear that the economic costs of Brexit were mounting. Undaunted, the Truss administration doubled down with a policy of unfunded tax cuts that in their view would unleash the UK’s growth potential. We should perhaps not have been too surprised given that both Truss and Kwasi Kwarteng were authors of the infamous book Britannia Unchained which argued that Britain suffered from “a bloated state, high taxes and excessive regulation." It went on to suggest that “The British are among the worst idlers in the world. We work among the lowest hours, we retire early and our productivity is poor. Whereas Indian children aspire to be doctors or businessmen, the British are more interested in football and pop music."

When it came to putting the policy into practice, markets understandably took fright. Big, unfunded tax cuts at a time of slowing growth and rising interest rates were never going to fly. Had the policy been introduced more stealthily, it is possible that the Truss government could have made more progress towards its goals. It might have given Truss more time in office. But a big bang approach was the wrong strategy at the wrong time. With the Tories having warned for years that the economic plans of the Labour opposition would result in markets taking fright at eye-wateringly high public deficits, it is ironic that it took a Tory government to blow a huge hole in public finances and spook the markets. The likelihood that a UK government will attempt a similar policy of gambling with tax cuts to boost growth in the near future is low. The Singapore-on-Thames model espoused by many Brexiteers looks dead in the water.

It is also worth noting in passing that the MMT model of public finances does not come out of this episode unscathed. As I pointed out in 2019, “whilst it is true that governments will always be able to repay their local currency debt, it does not justify continually expanding the deficit without limit. In what can be thought of as the ‘when you’re in a hole, stop digging’ theory, governments have to be aware of the extent to which there will always be willing buyers of debt. If one government expands its deficit without limit but another is more prudent, bond investors will always favour the more prudent debt issuer.” If there is any silver lining to the clouds of recent weeks, it is that governments have been made aware of the existence of the budget constraint that proponents of MMT told us did not exist.

What happens now?

We should be in little doubt that the Conservative Party’s economic strategy lies in ruins. Announcing a radical tax-cutting policy, only to be forced to backtrack under market pressure, has blown the government’s credibility. The markets are thus likely to continue to demand a risk premium to hold UK assets for some time to come (memorably described by the economist Dario Perkins as the “moron premium”). This has raised howls of anguish in certain quarters that UK economic policy will increasingly be subject to market approval. But it did not have to be this way. So long as the UK continued to respect the domestic constraints imposed on policy actions by the OBR, the Civil Service and the Bank of England, markets would probably have continued to fund the UK’s mounting fiscal and current account deficits. Sacking the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury because he did not buy into Kwarteng’s plans; ignoring the OBR’s offer to assess the mini budget and calling the independent BoE’s mandate into question served to undermine trust in the UK’s solid institutional base. No longer can the UK rely on the kindness of strangers: It will come at a price.

The fiscal austerity unleashed under David Cameron dramatically hollowed out public services to the point that by 2019 their performance in many instances was already worse than in 2010. The hit resulting from the Covid pandemic has pushed many of them over the edge (see chart below). In its latest Performance Tracker, the Institute for Government notes “these are not isolated problems in individual services, but interconnected structural failures – particularly in the health and care and criminal justice systems … Governments since 2010 may have been seeking efficiency over resilience but achieved neither.” 

Viewed in this light the policy of cutting taxes was always a non-starter. It would become impossible to deliver even basic public services by lowering taxes, and the breathtaking inequity of the strategy beggars belief: Those whose taxes were being cut were not those most reliant on the crumbling public services infrastructure. As it is, the government is likely to have to find more savings. Having rolled back much of its plan to cut taxes, with the proposal to cut corporate and income taxes now off the table, the government has maintained that it will not raise NICs which leaves an £18bn hole in the public finances on a 5-year horizon (0.8% of GDP). This is not a propitious inheritance for the new PM, whoever they may be.

On that note, the UK continues its descent into an irony-free political zone with news that Boris Johnson has considerable support amongst Tory MPs should he wish to return to 10 Downing Street. This is the same Johnson that MPs turfed out over the summer due to his chaotic government style. Were he to make a return, and it is far from certain that he will, this could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back and splits the Conservative Party, with many MPs potentially siding with the opposition to trigger a general election. In any case, if he has any sense Johnson will steer well clear of the premiership, for he cannot possibly hope to gain. The economic situation is far worse even than when he left office and his style of government is not suited to the austerity which is increasingly demanded by markets (indeed markets took fright on the news that Johnson was in the frame). He cannot play the Brexit card as he did in 2019 and he faces a far more credible Labour leader in Keir Starmer than he did when up against Jeremy Corbyn.

Over the past 50-odd years the UK has faced down a series of economic crises with each one portending an end to the face of Britain as we knew it. Invariably, however, it rebounded and demonstrated a resilience that surprised the doomsayers. But this time, as they say, is different. The UK has not faced a political crisis such as the current one in well over 60 years (since the Suez Crisis of 1956). What makes this worse than any other episode in living memory is that the country’s institutional framework is dramatically impaired after years of neglectful governance which will reduce the UK’s resilience in the face of shocks. In 1975, a Wall Street Journal  editorial observed the reduced state of the British economy and concluded ‘Goodbye, Great Britain, it was nice knowing you.’ The events of recent weeks certainly feel as though something has been broken that will not easily be put back together again.

Alienation nation

It has been a hell of a month in the UK. Four weeks ago, the death of the Queen marked a symbolic shift in the institutional fabric, the implications of which we have yet to work out. Her funeral was an event televised around the world and confirmed that whatever else the UK does, it remains a world leader in pomp and ceremony and projecting its imperial past to relay an image of itself far beyond its significance as a modern global power. Four days after Her Majesty was laid to rest, the realities of modern Britain were highlighted by the government’s unveiling of what was described as the worst budget (sorry, not a budget – a fiscal event) of modern times – perhaps ever.

As an economic package it was gobsmackingly awful. For the full details, see here. But in short, the government (or perhaps we had better describe them as the latest collection of radicals to hold parliamentary office) outlined a Growth Plan with the stated aim of restoring the trend GDP growth rate to 2.5%. This entailed a series of supply side measures which amounted to unfunded tax cuts totalling £45bn or 2% of GDP. The rise in NICs announced last year will be reversed; planned increases in corporation taxes are to be scrapped; the basic rate of income tax will be reduced from 20% to 19% next April and it planned to abolish the higher rate of income taxation (45%) before it did a U-turn on the idea.

As a package of economic measures, it was always doomed to fail. First, the UK’s trend growth rate is hampered by unfavourable demographics so it will be hard to raise without a very big rise in productivity. The evidence does not support the notion that companies will boost investment in response to lower taxes, thus putting a hole in the productivity-enhancing rationale for lower taxes. In addition, an influential IMF paper in 2015 comprehensively debunked the notion that cutting taxes for the well-off has any impact on growth (“a rising income share of the top 20 percent results in lower growth – that is, when the rich get richer, benefits do not trickle down”).

As a political gambit, the fiscal event is probably the worst brand-destroying exercise since jeweller Gerald Ratner described his products as “total crap” and suggested that some of the earrings he peddled were “cheaper than a prawn sandwich from Marks and Spencer’s, but I have to say the sandwich will probably last longer than the earrings.” Ratner did not last long in the job after that. The findings by the Resolution Foundation that the richest 20% of earners will benefit from two-thirds of the gains from lower taxes may not directly have influenced voters, but they know well enough when they are getting a raw deal. This has contributed to Labour’s opinion poll lead widening from 12% four days ago to 24% today (chart below). Just as in 1992 when the perception of Tory economic competence was shattered by sterling’s ejection from the ERM, so the fiscal events of recent weeks could have the same impact on the current government.

Indeed, it was the pound that was initially the centre of attention in this fiasco as it briefly plunged to all-time lows against the dollar early last week. But it is the gilt market, where rising yields forced pension funds to scramble for cash to meet margin calls on their hedging instruments, where attention is focused and BoE action to calm the market (the merits of the BoE's actions are a subject for another day). To the extent that mortgages are priced off the gilt curve, rising yields imply that mortgage rates are likely to rise sharply, thus making life harder for households already facing a major cost-of-living squeeze. As it is, data from Refinitiv suggest that the 129 bps rise in 10-year gilt yields in September was the biggest monthly jump on record (chart below).

What’s next?

If the last few weeks have demonstrated anything it is that handing the keys to the kingdom to increasingly ideological governments is doing no favours for the economy or the majority of most of those dependent on it. Indeed as the excellent FT infographic (below) suggests, “out of 275 parties in 61 countries, the Tories under Trussonomics rank as the most rightwing of all” with the author concluding that “The Tories have become unmoored from the British people.”

It has almost become a cliché to repeat Dean Acheson’s 1962 quip that Britain lost an empire but failed to find a role but it goes to the heart of the Brexiteer fantasy that somehow leaving the EU would restore past glories. What many of us pointed out is that it would actually weaken Britain, exposing those weaknesses that could be masked by remaining within the EU. But at least Britain could console itself with the fact that it had a stable political system, not prone to chaos, and administered by a competent civil service.

Chaos is now the watchword in government and whilst the competence of the civil service is not in question, the firing by Kwasi Kwarteng of his most senior Treasury official sends a bad signal about the quality of advice the government can expect to receive. The fact that the OBR’s offer to provide an economic assessment of the government’s fiscal plan was rejected also calls into question the form of scrutiny to which the government is prepared to be subjected.

The fact that the government has back-tracked on cutting the 45% tax rate is a further forced error from both a political and market angle. It was slated to cost only £2bn and will not change the market’s view of the unfunded tax giveaway. The real error is failing to find ways to plug the revenue gap resulting from NIC cuts and income tax reductions. Markets will not easily be assuaged although the fact that yields fell following the announcement suggests that they expect more backtracking in the weeks to come. Politically, the government now looks weak because it has performed a U-turn despite Liz Truss’s assertion yesterday that she was committed to abolishing the 45% tax rate. Moreover, if market pressure does force the government to find savings, it may be forced to cut spending further. It is pretty certain this will not be a vote winner. Public services have been stripped to the bone in the last decade and voter appetite for further austerity is limited.

I concluded my last blog post more in hope than expectation by noting that “voters will be hoping that she [Truss] can deliver them out of the dark place into which Boris Johnson led them. Surely she cannot do worse. Can she?” A month in the job and she has more than lived down to expectations. Every prime minister it seems, manages to be worse than the last. This is not a cycle that the country can afford to continue. In the words of Martin Wolf in an unusually strongly worded FT opinion piece, “these people are mad, bad and dangerous. They have to go.”

In Liz we Truss(t)

Three years and 43 days ago, I asked “If Johnson is the answer, what is the question?” I never did get an answer to that question. As the blond bombshell moves out of Downing Street to be replaced by Liz Truss, a similar question can be asked of her. But whereas Johnson “only” had to deal with the difficulties of Brexit, Truss has two problems to contend with. On the one hand, she faces arguably the most toxic combination of economic circumstances in living memory. On the other she leads a fractured and fractious party which seems in many respects to have lost its way. How she deals with these issues will not only define her premiership; it may well determine the future of the current incarnation of the Conservative Party.

Over the summer, as the Tory Party devoted its efforts to matters other than governing, there was a distinct sense that many voters felt abandoned as the cost-of-living crisis intensified. This has been reflected in polling data which give Labour an 11 point lead – not by any means terminal for Truss but not a good position from which to start. Aside from the cost-of-living issues, there are a whole lot of other matters in her in-tray which her predecessor singularly failed to tackle (indeed, probably made worse): the increasing strain on the NHS; generally low morale amongst public sector workers and the dreadful state of the criminal justice system to name but three domestic items. Added to this are international matters such as maintaining relationships with the EU and dealing with Russia and an increasingly assertive China. Perhaps Rishi Sunak can console himself that the leadership contest was a good one to lose.

Big government is back

However much Truss may profess her love of a small state and associated low taxes (her campaign pledges included unfunded tax cuts), all western European nations now realise that the state will have a big role to play in keeping the economy – perhaps even the wider social fabric – intact. Nowhere is this more evident than in the debate over how to provide support to consumers whose energy bills will spike sharply this winter in the absence of intervention.

Despite her opposition to “handouts” Truss really has little choice – politically and economically – other than to cap household energy bills which would otherwise rise by 80% in October, with the average household paying £3549 per year (150% more than in winter 2021-22). The prospect of a further 50% rise in January 2023 would mean that the average household would be required to pay 17% of its net income in the form of energy costs. To get a sense of how big this increase is in real terms, see the chart below based on calculations by the Resolution Foundation. This would make its presence felt in inflation, which the BoE estimated in August would hit 13% at the end of 2022 and would feed through to affect other prices where energy is a significant input cost. The fact that the price cap is likely to rise even more than the BoE assumed suggests that inflation would rise even further with Goldman Sachs suggesting that this could push inflation above 20% in the early months of next year.

On the basis that many businesses would go to the wall if the full costs of energy were passed on to the consumer, the government is believed to want to limit the rise in energy bills to around 27% (restricting average household bills to a still-significant £2500 per year). But this will not come cheap. It has been suggested that freezing household energy bills at current levels could cost up to £100bn (over 4% of GDP) as the government subsidises the difference between the price paid by the distributor and the consumer, with another £50bn expected for business support. What then becomes important is how the subsidy is funded. 

One option would be to levy a windfall tax on the profits of energy distributors. Since the cap is designed to limit the amount that distributors can charge per unit of energy such that their profit margin is limited to 1.9%, if the wholesale price of energy were to double, so profits also double. The case for a tax on these excess profits is appealing on social justice grounds. However, Truss takes the view that levying higher taxes sends the wrong signal for a government that wants to support enterprise. Consequently, it is likely that the government will fund the subsidy by increased borrowing. This will of course raise debt levels, and the idea that a future generation of taxpayers should fund the energy needs of today’s consumers may strike some as distasteful.

Suggestions that the Truss government will reverse the recent rises in corporation taxes and NICs in a budget later this month at a time when the public sector is desperate for additional funding does strike me as bad policy. As I have noted previously, the UK (in common with other western European nations) does not have the favourable demographic profile that will prevent tax cuts from putting a significant hole in public finances – in contrast to the 1980s. Back in 2010, Bill Gross described the Gilt market as resting on a bed of nitroglycerine. What was an inaccurate portrait of UK public finances in 2010 may be more apt description of the current situation.

The political dimension

We should also not overlook the political challenges that Truss will face. Although she won 57% of the votes cast in the leadership ballot, this was on a turnout of 82% implying that only 47% of those eligible voted for her. The fact that 53% of party members voted for her opponent or did not vote at all, is hardly a ringing endorsement. It should not be forgotten that Rishi Sunak polled more votes than Truss amongst MPs in each of the five ballots prior to the final one amongst party members. Although the Tories will present a unified face  in public – at least for a while – there is little doubt that the Tory party remains split along ideological lines with the Brexit fissures continuing to run deep.

The ultras in her cabinet and on the backbenches continue to see the EU as the bogeyman responsible for many of the UK’s ills. Truss herself has become a convert to the Brexit cause. Despite having supported Remain in 2016, she has had to continue to sound hawkish on Brexit in order to appeal to the party faithful. However, as every PM has found to their cost, tough talking is not the way to achieve success in EU negotiations. Worse still, with the global geopolitical situation increasingly unstable, it is incumbent on the UK to find common cause with the EU on a range of economic and political issues. Truss knows only too well that the EU issue has played a role, directly or indirectly, in the downfall of her three immediate predecessors. 

Whatever one’s views on Truss – and her approval ratings are not exactly stellar – voters will be hoping that she can deliver them out of the dark place into which Boris Johnson led them. Surely she cannot do worse. Can she?