Showing posts with label privatisation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label privatisation. Show all posts

Thursday, 4 April 2024

Water, water ...

One of the motivations for setting up this blog eight years ago was to highlight that continued reliance on the private sector for solutions to economic problems is a far from optimal strategy (see my June 2016 post, here). The recent furore regarding the failings of the UK water industry, along with the vexed problem of how to organise the rail network, are examples in a long line of businesses which have failed to live up to post-privatisation expectations. At a time when government is vexed by the problem of persistently low productivity, this makes it all the more important that infrastructure works efficiently.

Looking back to the 1980s and 1990s, you might recall that one of the main arguments advanced by the Conservative governments of the time was that the private sector would run businesses more efficiently and productively than the public sector. By introducing market discipline, competition, and incentives for innovation, this would lead to cost reductions and improved performance. In addition, private companies would have stronger incentives to improve service quality and customer satisfaction in order to attract and retain customers. While there were examples of industries which did benefit from a return to the private sector – telecoms being the prime candidate, which gained from a technological revolution – in many instances, privatisation simply meant swapping a public sector monopoly for one in the private sector. As a result, they had little incentive to innovate and could rely on a captive market to sustain revenues.

Where did it all go wrong?

Evidence to suggest that the water industry has not generated the post-privatisation efficiency gains that were claimed for it comes from a study by the consultancy Frontier Economics published in 2017 (chart below). Their analysis suggests that total factor productivity in the water industry did pick up immediately after privatisation but that it quickly slowed thereafter, doing nothing to dispel the suggestion that the industry has lived off the assets it inherited at the time of privatisation in 1989.

Yet the failings of the privatisation model introduced in the UK over the last thirty-odd years go far beyond the shoddy way in which customers are treated (overpriced train journeys, effluent being dumped in rivers, electricity companies that went bust at the first sign of trouble in global energy markets). One of the issues that privatisation was meant to tackle was reduced reliance on a pay-as-you-go model, in which the current generation of taxpayers stumped up for investment from which the next generation would benefit. Under a pay-when-delivered model, it was planned that balance sheets be used to pay for the initial cost of investment and future customers pay for the services they consume and so long as prices were set appropriately, the business would generate a decent rate of return. In addition to this being a sound economic basis, there was also a political motive for doing this as far as water was concerned. Planned EU legislation in the 1980s and 1990s required a significant rise in future investment which the government did not want to pay for, nor did it want customers (aka voters) to have to pay for it either. Getting private companies to use their debt-free balance sheet to pay for investment seemed like an expedient solution (water companies were debt free on privatisation).

But as the Thames Water debacle shows, that is not what happened. Newly privatised companies resorted to borrowing against assets on the balance sheet, much of which was ultimately used to pay shareholder dividends. As a result, Thames Water now has huge debts which threaten it with bankruptcy. This has forced a return to a pay-as-you-go model with today’s customers being asked to fund investment while servicing today’s debt.

Regulatory failure

While the public rightly puts most of the blame for the failures of privatised utilities on its managers, we should not ignore the fact that in many cases regulators have been remarkably complacent. First off, regulators in the electricity and water industries failed to stop companies from leveraging up their balance sheet from the 1990s. The companies perhaps ought to have behaved more responsibly but it is the duty of regulators to step in when irresponsible behaviour occurs.

Second, regulators did what they often do, and conduct regulation by rule book. As the economist Dieter Helm points out, the periodic reviews they conducted generated huge amounts of admin which companies struggled to process. As Helm notes: “company boards find that they are essentially asking the regulators to make decisions for them. In recognition that the “customer” is Ofwat rather than the household and business users, utilities engage in lots of lobbying, and try to work out what answer the regulator wants, rather than what their customers want and the wider environment needs ... Utilities start by trying to guess the answer the regulator (and the government of the day) might want, and then shape their business plans around them.” Both these elements chime with the situation in the financial services industry pre-2008 when regulators failed to rein in the (dubious) actions of many banks and issued vague directives without giving clear guidance as to whether institutions were compliant. And as we know, the UK regulator ended up being abolished and a large part of its responsibilities transferred to the BoE.

A final problem, though one which is perhaps only recognisable in hindsight, was that regulators applied the wrong cost of capital – a key metric used in determining the allowed rate of return and thus the appropriate prices for consumers. They applied a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) averaged across all areas of the business, rather than looking at each individual area separately. As a result, for each individual business WACC turned out to be too high for the cost of debt and too low for the cost of equity, providing an incentive for privatised utilities to switch from equity to debt and encouraging the gearing that proved to be so problematic for Thames Water (for more detail, see the work by Helm here or here). Here too, there are echoes of the failures of the VaR models which so underpriced financial risks prior to 2008.

 

Nationalisation is not (necessarily) the answer

Not surprisingly, this has caused a political uproar which threatens to rebound on the Conservative government which has long been an advocate of privatisation, while giving ammunition to those at the other end of the political spectrum who advocate taking assets into public ownership. However, nationalisation is not necessarily the best solution (it might be for rail, but that is a subject for another time). The arguments continue to rage as to whether renationalisation would result in an industry which is better aligned with customer interests. But the biggest argument against it is the fact that the state currently does not have the funds available to buy the utilities without issuing significant amounts of additional debt, and certainly does not have the cash available to fund the necessary investment. Many utilities are foreign owned (over the last 20 years Thames Water has had German, Australian and Canadian owners) and nationalisation would sit uncomfortably with efforts to attract foreign investment. As Helm has consistently pointed out, the UK suffers from a sizeable savings deficit – the current account deficit is a measure of the excess of domestic investment over savings – which implies that it is already reliant on the kindness of strangers to fund investment.

What to do?

Since we cannot easily nationalise Thames Water, and imposing yet more red tape would not seem to be a viable option, we may be left with little option other than to place it in administration. This is effectively what happened to the privatised rail operator Railtrack in 2001. Rather than nationalise the whole operation, however, there is a strong case for splitting it into smaller parts with different regional responsibilities and maybe with different functional responsibilities (e.g. one for water supply and one for treating sewage), selling off the good bits and putting the bad bits into special administration.

Either way, it seems socially irresponsible to allow a company that has failed to properly manage the largest water company in Europe to be allowed another go at getting it right. This may be the right time to redraw the contract between the state and the market, and learn some of the lessons of the last thirty years. In short, the companies must strike a better balance between serving their shareholders and their customers, entailing effective regulation (not simply more of it, but better targeted regulation); breaking up private sector monopolies; more strict controls over pricing and more effective sanctions against those who transgress. On the assumption that a new government will have to pick up the pieces of this problem in the not-too-distant future, the Thames Water problem could provide a good opportunity to reimagine how utilities should be run in the twenty first century.

Sunday, 1 October 2017

Public or private: The debate continues

The debate on whether a free market or state enterprise is the superior form of economic governance is an old one which comes to the surface every now and again. It is currently being rerun once more, with numerous plebiscites across the industrialised world making it clear over the past 18 months that voters are keen to explore alternatives to a system which is perceived to have failed following the global financial collapse of 2008. The popularity of Bernie Sanders, particularly amongst younger voters, during the US presidential primaries last year testifies to the fact that there is a market for politicians prepared to speak about collective solutions to many of society’s current economic ills.

Nowhere is this debate more pronounced than in the UK where Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn has called for “21st century” socialism in an echo of the slogan used by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. Following on from the relative success of the Labour Party in the June election, Corbyn’s speech to his party faithful last week called for higher taxes and more government spending in a bid to differentiate Labour from the free market policies of the Conservatives. Ahead of her own party conference, Prime Minister Theresa May hit back in a speech by declaring the free market economy “the greatest agent of collective human progress ever created.” Neither is wholly right or wrong: there is some merit in both systems. But in reality, in a modern economy neither the total primacy of markets nor the heavy hand of government can hope to deliver the outcomes which their proponents believe. Mixed economies are the ideal – the hard part is to get the balance right.

Many free market idealists point to the success of the industrial revolution which was characterised by a market economy comprised of large numbers of small companies. But whilst this did deliver a significant increase in material living standards, it also had adverse side effects in the form of wealth and income disparities as some people became exceedingly rich at the expense of those who did back-breaking manual labour. Another side effect was that many small companies grew large enough to attain monopoly positions, which in the US triggered action by the government to rein in the “robber barons” via antitrust laws. There is no small irony in the fact that the US government’s action represented interference by the state in the operation of private sector companies. It pulled the same trick in the 1980s by forcing the breakup of AT&T at a time when the pro-market Ronald Reagan occupied the White House.

What this highlights is that governments do have a role to play in market economies by ensuring an institutional framework in which the interests of the consumer are best served. Ironically, the EU has been one of the great guarantors of consumer interests across Europe. Those of you who travel throughout Europe can thank the European Commission for the abolition of mobile roaming charges and for the widespread adoption of the European Health Insurance Card. The Commission also forced Microsoft to unbundle Internet Explorer from the Windows operating system because it “harms competition between web browsers, undermines product innovation and ultimately reduces consumer choice.” Those who criticise the EU for its stifling bureaucracy perhaps ought to look again at its record in championing competition which promotes consumer welfare.

This is not to say that a system of central planning will necessarily work either, as the examples of the Soviet Union and pre-Deng Xiaoping China have shown. In a less extreme example, Britain in the 1970s was characterised by institutional rigidities which overrode the operation of market forces, notably in the labour market, which held back growth and resulted in high inflation. It was thus not hard to make the case at the end of the 1970s for applying a new economic broom and applying the ideas advocated by Milton Friedman and his Chicago colleagues. It was argued that the prevailing problems could be cured by allowing the market to eliminate rigidities (restrictive practices, credit rationing etc.) and that a bright new dawn of prosperity lay ahead. And for a long time it worked. Voters got used to relative stability and rising incomes, until one day Lehman’s went bust.

Arguably, this was the point at which voter tolerance for the free market snapped. The popular narrative is that bankers played in a system without any rules and in which market forces ruled. Worse still, the private sector losses were loaded onto the public balance sheet and the system was reset to continue on its way, whilst the austerity required to get public finances in order hit the poorest disproportionately hard. Whilst this is a stylised version of what happened, enough people believe it such that they want change.

What this does highlight is that all economic policies have a limited shelf life as the downsides begin to show through. Corbyn’s call for a renationalisation programme taps into this wave. Thirty years ago, it was argued that opening up former state-owned utilities to competition would boost efficiency and improve choice for the consumer. I never fully bought that argument: Selling utilities off to the private sector was never going to automatically increase real choice. We still buy many of the same products delivered via the same distribution network – it’s not like competitors entered the railway market offering us new routes. The one stand out example where the policy worked was in telecoms but that was only because the mobile revolution changed the face of the business.

As Tim Harford concludes in an FT article on privatisation, “the picture is mixed, the details matter, and you can get results if you get the execution right.” The flipside of Harford’s conclusion is that the promise by Jeremy Corbyn to renationalise a significant proportion of the utilities will not necessarily produce better results. Equally, Theresa May’s push for the free market is not guaranteed to produce better outcomes either. There is a role for both systems: It is not clear whether the two competing political versions in the UK have the balance right.