Brexit Through the Looking Glass

This morning in the office we were kicking around song titles to describe the current Brexit situation. As one old enough to remember the glory days of punk, my contributions were "Should I Stay or Should I Go" by The Clash (released in 1982) and "Anarchy in the UK" by The Sex Pistols (1977). Such is the shambolic state of the Brexit debate that we are beyond the five stages of grief (denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance) and have reverted to outright ridicule.  

It is hard to know where to start but the bulk of the blame for the disastrous sequence of events over the past two years has to be laid squarely at the feet of Theresa May. I have no doubt she is a fundamentally decent woman who believes in delivering the best she can for her country, but as a prime minister she is useless. There is no shame in that. Some people are just not cut out to lead and she is one. But it has got to the stage where she is an outright liability to her party and country. She repeatedly makes promises she cannot keep and continues to bluff her way through, even though she has the weakest possible hand of cards. 

The litany of errors is long: By treating the non-binding referendum result as if it were a winner-takes-all event, May alienated Remain voters and large parts of her own party. Triggering Article 50 without a plan of what the government hoped to achieve was a huge strategic mistake. And the ill-judged election call weakened her domestic authority. Add to that her failure to judge the intentions of the EU, let alone the Brexit ultras in her own party, and the last two years have seen a steady erosion of May’s authority to the point that she makes a lame duck look secure.

The only reason she remains in 10 Downing Street is that the alternatives are either worse or simply don’t want the job under current circumstances. But as The Times noted this morning in an editorial, "Mrs May's attempt at brinkmanship has failed. Without trust and authority it is hard to see what she has to offer, having been trounced twice. The Conservative Party may now decide that only a new leader can find a path to an adequate Brexit." Following parliament’s efforts to prevent May from keeping no deal on the agenda this evening, with her own cabinet colleagues voting against her, her authority is weaker than any prime minister I can recall.

In fairness to the PM, when you are being undermined at every turn by so-called colleagues such as Jacob Rees-Mogg, David Davis and Boris Johnson, a difficult job becomes impossible. The Conservative Party generally is a mess. The pro-Brexit ideologues in the European Research Group have effectively split the party in two with their continued denial of the economic realities facing a post-Brexit UK. There will be no healing so long as they remain in the party. One of the great puzzles of modern British politics is how Theresa May remains so relatively popular (amongst Tories she is second only to – wait for it – Boris Johnson). The answer is she is opposed by Jeremy Corbyn whose dissatisfaction ratings are the highest of any opposition leader in 40 years. Labour has shown no leadership on Brexit and the 48.1% who voted Remain in 2016 believe themselves to be completely disenfranchised by the main political parties.

The great irony of the UK’s current position is that it has spent decades trying to undermine the EU’s drive towards ever-closer union, whilst Brexiteers celebrated winning their “independence” in 2016, only to now have to throw itself on the mercy of the EU to grant an extension of the Article 50 deadline. The sheer, utter, spectacular incompetence of the UK political class in allowing itself to be put in this position defies words.

Having handed the negotiating power back to the EU, what is likely to happen now? Other EU leaders have expressed the view that the UK needs a good reason to be granted an extension, and incompetence in dealing with its own MPs is unlikely to be good enough. And whilst Theresa May has expressed a preference for an extension that is both limited and one-off in nature, the EU is unlikely to give much weight to her wishes. Why should it? It’s not as if she can deliver on what she has promised. Moreover, DExEU has already suggested that the UK is not prepared for a no-deal Brexit in March and there is no reason to suppose it will be any better prepared in (say) three months’ time.

There is thus a strong possibility that if the EU does grant an extension, it will come with conditions attached – one of which may be that it has to run to end-2020. This will not go down well with MPs, many of whom will decry that the UK is being held prisoner by the EU. They may then be forced to make a choice between leaving without any deal and accepting that the only way that Brexit can be delivered at all is by accepting a prolonged delay.

This will raise the risk of a no-deal Brexit which is exactly what most economists have warned against for at least three years. Under these circumstances, I would not be at all surprised if the Withdrawal Agreement that has twice been rejected by parliament by two of the largest margins in the last 100 years will once again find its way back onto the table (and that is indeed being widely trailed on this evening's TV news programmes). Theresa May used to say that no deal is better than a bad deal. Judging by her desperation to get this deal over the line, she now seems to think that the opposite is true.

We should be in no doubt that the political shambles which has emerged over the past two years is the result of a lack of planning, organisation and leadership. Whatever people thought they voted for in 2016, it surely wasn’t this. My favourite quote to describe the Brexit omnishambles comes from fictional spin doctor Malcolm Tucker from the BBC satire The Thick of It who, when faced with political accusations, fired back with the memorable line “How dare you come and lay this at my door! How dare you blame me for this! Which is the result of a political class, which has given up on morality and simply pursues popularity at all costs.” What was political satire in 2012 is the political reality of 2019.

Monetary policy: What's the alternative?

The news last week that the ECB will commit to keeping interest rates on hold for the remainder of this year and provide additional liquidity in the form of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) is an illustration of the central bank’s concern about the economic slowdown. But it also reflects the continued reliance on monetary policy to support the economy in the absence of any other options.

That the euro zone economy has lost momentum is not in doubt. But this to a large extent reflects a number of exogenous factors, such as the Chinese slowdown, which is at least partly the result of the trade dispute with the US. ECB President Draghi indicated as much in his prepared statement, telling the assembled journalists that the loss of economic momentum was primarily due to “the slowdown in external demand” and that “the risks surrounding the euro area growth outlook are still tilted to the downside, on account of the persistence of uncertainties related to geopolitical factors, the threat of protectionism and vulnerabilities in emerging markets.” Responding to this slowdown by committing to keep rates unchanged makes some sense. But what is less obvious to me is why, when factors beyond the control of the ECB are responsible for the loss of economic momentum, is the ECB prepared to activate monetary measures designed to target the domestic economy, particularly TLTROs which operate at one remove? Moreover, why wait until September to initiate them?

In the ECB’s words, TLTROs “provide financing to credit institutions … at attractive conditions to banks in order to further ease private sector credit conditions and stimulate bank lending to the real economy.” And whilst it is true that in recent months the rate of loan growth to the euro zone private sector has slowed (chart), the most notable loss of momentum has been in corporate sector loans which is likely to be a consequence of global business conditions. Increasing liquidity supply is all very well, but there are serious questions as to whether demand for additional cheap credit exists. Indeed, unlike 2008-09 when the credit crunch was actively holding back economic recovery, today we are awash with liquidity. But the euro zone’s problem is magnified by the growing split between northern and southern states. For example, borrowing costs for Italian banks have risen since last summer as concerns grow regarding the government’s fiscal stance. The TLTROs are thus of more benefit to southern Europe than the north.

Draghi’s comments also repeated the long-standing message that “structural reforms in euro area countries need to be substantially stepped up to increase resilience, reduce structural unemployment and boost euro area productivity and growth potential.” This is a message which has been part of the ECB’s communications strategy since the days of Wim Duisenberg and in fairness has been heeded by the likes of Germany. But Italy’s growth performance remains by a considerable margin the worst in the G20 and recent efforts in France to broach the subject of reform were met with a wave of public protests which caused the government to back down. But the fact that the euro zone’s potential growth limit today stands at 1.5% compared to 2% at the start of monetary union does illustrate the necessity to heed Draghi’s call.

But the biggest failing across large parts of the industrialised world in recent years has been the unwillingness to use fiscal policy as a tool of economic management, which has thrown the burden of adjustment onto monetary policy. Draghi did point out that fiscal policy across EMU is mildly expansionary but “countries where government debt is high need to continue rebuilding fiscal buffers.” Whilst accepting that excessively high levels of debt have economic costs, notably the fact that they represent claims on future resources, Italy has consistently run a primary surplus over the last 20 years of around 1.5% of GDP. Requiring additional fiscal tightening in Italy is only going to prove counterproductive. The extent of fiscal tightening across many European countries is captured by the decline in cyclically-adjusted government spending (here, see Table 6A) which in Germany has fallen by 10 percentage points of potential GDP since the mid-1990s whilst in Ireland it is down by 15 percentage points (and nearly 40 points since mid-2010).

A lax monetary policy cannot offset a fiscal tightening of that magnitude. For one thing, monetary policy operates in an indirect route in which the benefits may get lost in the transmission process (e.g. if there is limited demand for credit). Moreover, a long period of low interest rates is likely to have adverse side effects. Our future incomes as represented by pension savings require us being able to generate a decent rate of return on the income we set aside to provide for tomorrow. The ECB’s policy of holding the short end of the yield curve deep in negative territory, whilst buying up to one-third of the euro zone debt stock, has resulted in German maturities up to nine years falling into negative territory. Following last week’s announcement by the ECB, even the nine-year segment fell below the line whilst the benchmark 10-year Bund yield at one point hit just 0.05%.

That is not going to help our future incomes. Nor does it help banks, which rely on a positively sloped yield curve in positive territory to generate income. With the ECB deposit rate at -0.4%, banks have no incentive to hold excess liquidity at the central bank. Even the BIS has pointed out that profitability is a crucial area of banking resilience since this determines the extent to which they can recover from losses resulting from economic shocks. Although much progress has been made to weather-proof bank balance sheets thanks to legislation implemented in the last decade, profitability – particularly in Europe – remains well below pre-2008 levels. With European bank price-to-book ratios still well below unity, this indicates that investors are not very optimistic with regard to a recovery in profits.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that central banks, particularly the ECB, continue to operate a lax monetary policy because there are no other policy options. But the longer we operate policy consistent with economic conditions prevailing in 2009, the greater will be the potential adverse long-term consequences. Whilst this is all part of Draghi’s “doing whatever it takes” strategy outlined in 2012 to hold the euro zone together, we are now at the point where the ECB needs help from governments to get the economy back on its feet.

The law of large numbers

The news that the government is to inject £1.6bn into the economies of some of the UK’s less well-off regions after Brexit is not unwelcome, but it is a piffling sum in the grand scheme of things. The government’s press release stated that the Stronger Towns Fund “will be used to create new jobs, help train local people and boost economic activity – with communities having a say on how the money is spent.” The press release did not say how long it would take to disburse the fund, but in a radio interview this morning the Communities Secretary said it would be available until 2026.

To put this into context, the UK’s GDP last year was £2.1 trillion which means that the total amount of the fund is equivalent to less than 0.1% of annual output. Spread over seven years the package is invisible in macro terms – £228 million per annum, or 0.01% of GDP. For reference, the troubled retailer Debenhams PLC is the smallest company in the FTSE All Shares index by market cap – the 646th largest firm in Britain – yet it still made a gross profit last year of £232 million. In other words, the government is distributing an amount equal to Debenhams’ annual profits to “create new jobs, help train local people and boost economic activity.”

We can slice the numbers up another way. The £1.6bn fund is split into an amount of £1bn to be allocated on a needs-based basis to eight English regions, with the government setting out the specific amounts, whilst the remaining £600 million goes into a fund that communities in any part of the UK can bid for. The population of the eight regions in question is around 46.5 million, implying that the fixed £1 billion element of the fund will allocate just £21.50 per person. Over a seven year period that is just over £3 per person per annum, with people in the south east being allocated 59 pence per annum whilst those in the north east receive the princely sum of £5.69 (chart). I must have missed the bus which carried the slogan “Vote Leave and get a fiver.” 

Clearly this is not enough to provide any sort of fiscal boost, which would lead us nicely into a discussion of how ineffectually the government has used fiscal policy since 2010 (and one day we will revisit this particular topic). But there is another issue here which goes to the heart of how economic issues are reported. Far too often, headline figures are reported in absolute terms without giving any context, particularly when it comes to government outlays. Take, for example, the UK’s defence budget. In FY 2009-10 outlays totalled £45.9bn measured in 2016-17 prices, and the government can argue that for the last three years spending has risen in real terms. What they don’t say is that savage cuts between 2010 and 2015 mean that defence outlays are currently 20% below 2010 levels in real terms.

Another particular favourite are the migration statistics. Remember how the government promised to cut net immigration to the “tens of thousands”? Latest data show that as of September 2018, annual net immigration was still running at 283k – admittedly down from a record 336k prior to the EU referendum but still a long way from target. And here is the real kicker. Net migration from the EU has indeed fallen to the tens of thousands (57k in the year to September, down from 189k in mid-2016). But non-EU migration hit record levels of 261k. This, you will recall, is the component over which the UK has control but it would appear not to have taken back the control the electorate believed it voted for (never mind the fact that the data are barely fit for purpose).

There does seem to have been a growing tendency in recent years to misrepresent economic data for policy purposes. The claim that the UK would save £350 million per week by leaving the EU was a misrepresentation based on the UK’s gross budget contribution, not the net figure. It was based on a grain of truth but was distorted beyond credibility. More generally, data are taken out of context and represented as fact when they are only a partial representation of the truth. It is a growing problem and social media exacerbate the issue by allowing misconceptions to become established before they can be refuted.

The press has a duty to hold a lot of this stuff to account but often politicians get away with it. There are some journalists who do a great job in calling out the nonsense but all too frequently the focus is on the personalities behind the story rather than the substance. For that reason, I can heartily endorse Full Fact, a charitable organisation that spends its time checking the numbers behind the spin. Of course, the misuse of economic statistics is not a new phenomenon. Back in 1935, Roy Glenday told the Royal Statistical Society, one of the commonest pitfalls awaiting the economic statistician “is to draw general inferences from partial and limited experience.” More than 80 years later, it is the politicians who increasingly try to pull the wool over our eyes.

Downing Street cred

Yesterday’s announcement that Theresa May will, for the first time, countenance the possibility of an extension of the Article 50 deadline came not a moment too soon. To recap, the PM announced: (i) that she will offer a second meaningful vote on the Withdrawal Agreement no later than 12 March; (ii) if parliament rejects it yet again, then the government will table a vote no later than 13 March to ask MPs if they accept leaving without a deal; (iii) if they do not, parliament will be asked to vote on 14 March whether it will vote for an extension of Article 50 beyond 29 March.

Theresa May's credibility dwindles by the day 

I have been pointing out for months that an Article 50 extension was the most sensible outcome given parliament’s failure to agree what it wants, and it is good to see that reason finally appears to have penetrated 10 Downing Street. A bigger question is what took the PM so long to understand the reality of the UK’s position? It is understandable that she wants to get parliament to accept the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated in November, but her strategy of insisting there was a choice only between her deal and no deal was never realistic.

More than anything the decision confirmed the impression of a prime minister whose authority has disappeared like a badly fixed wig in a hurricane. Over the past two years May has promised that the government would decide the timing of Article 50, until the Supreme Court determined that it was a matter for parliament. She gambled on a general election and lost her parliamentary majority. She promised that “we will take back control of our laws and bring an end to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice” but is now pushing an Agreement with the EU in which “the UK’s domestic courts and authorities will be required to have due regard to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.” May has also faced down a leadership challenge in which one-third of her party’s MPs failed to support her and when the Withdrawal Agreement was put to the vote it was defeated by the biggest majority inflicted on any government since 1924. Then there is the small matter of the parliamentary rebellion two weeks ago by members of her own party, which failed to offer support for the negotiating position with the EU that they had instructed her to take. And now, the prime minister who has promised parliament more than 100 times previously that the UK will leave the EU on 29 March is prepared to renege on that commitment as well.

This lack of credibility matters for what happens next. A three-month postponement of the Article 50 deadline will nominally give the PM more time to renegotiate with Brussels. But the EU has already stated that it will not renegotiate the Irish backstop arrangement, which is such a sticking point for Brexit-supporting MPs. Nor is it likely to grant major concessions to a leader who cannot guarantee that they will be passed by parliament. In addition, May cannot simply replay the trick of telling MPs that if they do not pass her Withdrawal Agreement the UK will crash out of the EU at the end of June without a deal, given that she has already blinked in the face of reality.

Nor is the economics credible

As if we needed reminding of the damage that a no-deal Brexit could cause, DExEU yesterday published a summary document outlining the difficulties that the economy would face. In short, it highlights the lack of preparedness with government departments reported as “being on track for … just over two thirds of the most critical projects.” The UK has signed trade agreements with only one of its major trading partners (Switzerland which was the 12th largest export market in 2017) though does have arrangements in place with Chile, the Faroe Islands, members of the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) Economic Partnership Agreement, Israel and the Palestinian Authority (which makes me wonder what Liam Fox has been doing since autumn 2016). 

In addition, DExEU also speared one of the options put forward by Brexit supporters that Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) will allow tariff-free trade with the EU for a ten-year period. As DExEU pointed out, “This is a misunderstanding of what the rules are … [since] it would require the agreement of the EU.” And as the Secretary of State for International Trade told the House of Commons on 14 January this year, the “suggestion would not deal with all the regulatory issues—the non-tariff barriers—that are so important to many businesses.”

DExEU also pointed out that “there is little evidence that businesses are preparing in earnest for a no deal scenario, and evidence indicates that readiness of small and medium-sized enterprises in particular is low.” Other gems include the nugget that 30% of the UK’s food supply comes from the EU and “the potential disruption to trade across the Short Channel Crossings would lead to reduced availability and choice of products” with the result that “food prices are likely to increase, and there is a risk that consumer behaviour could exacerbate, or create, shortages in this scenario.” The report goes on to point out that the “service sector (which makes up around 80% of UK GDP) is supported by free movement of people and a range of cross-cutting regulation such as mutual recognition of qualifications. In a no deal scenario … the UK would risk a loss of market access and increase in non-tariff barriers.” It concludes that a no-deal Brexit on 29 March “does not allow Government to unilaterally mitigate the effects of no deal.”

None of this comes as any surprise to the economics profession, which has been warning of these issues for more than three years. Given the complexity of the issues outlined in the report, matters will be no different on 30 June. Of course much of this can be avoided if the UK signs the Withdrawal Agreement. But this would make the UK an EU rule taker, which is (i) a much worse position than the one we enjoy today as an EU member and (ii) not a position the Brexiteers have shown any willingness to sign up to. That said, in an interview this morning in the Financial Times, Jacob-Rees Mogg, the keeper of the Brexit flame, suggested he was prepared to back down from his hardline position on the Irish backstop. Perhaps he now realises that if he blocks the Withdrawal Agreement, the bad Brexit that would result may be the only one he will get given that the Labour Party has moved towards backing a second referendum which may reverse the 2016 result.

Those suggesting we should just “get on with it” because “that’s what the people voted for” are wrong. There are no good outcomes – only less bad ones. But it would help if certain politicians, starting with the prime minister, were more honest about the trade-offs that Brexit entails. That way, voters might be able to make less ill-informed choices rather than relying on slogans painted on buses.