Divided we stand

The euro zone’s credibility took a significant beating in the wake of the Greek debt crisis which began to spiral out of control a decade ago. By 2012 it was clear that the monetary union project would have to be reformed, with more emphasis on building internal shock absorbers if it was to avoid the fate of previous attempts to create a union based on fixed exchange rates. Despite all the warm words, however, little progress has been made to create any form of fiscal union. Indeed, the efforts of Emmanuel Macron after he assumed office in 2017 have fallen on deaf ears, particularly in Germany. We now find ourselves faced with the deepest economic crisis since 2008 and arguably the most severe social crisis since WW2 with a fiscal framework which is not fit for purpose. This will be an existential test for the euro zone which cannot afford a rerun of the events of the past decade.

One of the most contentious issues in European economics right now is the prospect of issuing coronabonds – a common debt instrument that will enable the hardest hit countries, such as Italy and Spain, to issue securities guaranteed by all euro zone nations, including Germany. It is, as one might imagine, a hard sell in Germany where the idea of debt mutualisation contravenes the spirit of what the German public thought they had signed up to when agreeing to a single currency (not that they were ever asked). We have been here before: It was a major topic of discussion in 2012 when the prospect of Eurobonds was floated – and rejected – as a solution to help out highly indebted euro members.

To understand today’s concerns we need to recall our history. Whilst it is true that a number of euro zone members were heavily indebted, they were financed by capital flows from surplus countries prior to 2008. But when the music stopped, their creditors decided no longer to play ball. This was understandable but we should not overlook the fact that the heavily-indebted southern nations were allowed to become members of EMU despite not fulfilling the excessive debt criterion. Their creditors actually gave them the keys to the kingdom only to throw them away a few years later. Part of the reason for this lax attitude was because in the late-1990s, the EU only paid lip service to sovereign debt issues. After all, it had been on a downward trend relative to GDP for the preceding 50 years. The real focus was on deficits. Yet when France and Germany continually flouted the 3% of GDP deficit threshold just after the turn of the millennium, they escaped without any fiscal sanctions. Then the bust came and governments started to worry about debt again. Greek anger at the way they were treated in the wake of the 2008 bust is not without foundation.

Today’s problems are different. The world faces a humanitarian crisis and nowhere is suffering more at the present time than Italy or Spain, where coronavirus-related deaths continue to rise. The measures required to curb the spread of the disease are expensive, entailing massive wage subsidies and potentially a nationalisation programme as states are forced to prop up large parts of the economy. Italian anger at Germany’s refusal to sanction coronabonds is thus understandable. But as Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, a former ECB Council member, pointed out whilst coronabonds are a great idea in theory, in practice they “entail a major political choice to transfer sovereignty, on a whole range of issues, from the national to the European level.” He has a point: If the euro zone is to act as guarantor for debt, it needs to be backed up by tax raising powers. As Bini Smaghi put it, “Eurobonds cannot be issued to finance current expenditure, unless such expenditure and the resources to cover it are brought under the responsibility of the EU.” Moreover, if we introduce such mutual bonds today, what is to stop countries from issuing them in future to finance pet projects backed by Germany’s excellent credit rating?

Instead, Bini Smaghi and large parts of the northern European establishment prefer the idea of using the European Stability Mechanism, established in 2012, to disburse the funds. Unfortunately, any funds disbursed by the ESM are conditional on an adjustment programme, whereby borrowers must agree to abide by a series of conditions. Some form of legal change would thus be required to make it acceptable to Italy because as it currently stands, the ESM has a stigma attached to it.

Whilst the arguments against coronabonds have a sound legal basis, this is not the time to be hiding behind the letter of the law. Something has to give, and the longer northern European EMU members drag their feet, the more pressure will build up inside the euro zone. And as I have pointed out before, Italy is not Greece – it has the largest sovereign bond market in the euro zone which is five times that of Greece, and it will not be so easy to intimidate. And if we do not get some form of common bond and Italy is forced to issue BTPs and significantly expand its debt-to-GDP ratio, it will certainly not accept a period of austerity after the crisis has passed, simply to placate those who believe its debt level is too high.

It may be stretching it too far to suggest that failure to act on this issue will precipitate a breakup of the single currency. But the bloc simply does not have the automatic stabilisers which are necessary to combat shocks in a fixed exchange rate system. And the longer this problem is ignored, the greater will be the problems in the longer term. As the German economic historian Albrecht Ritschl has pointed out  “Germans prefer to let their history start with the zero hour of 1945“. But German historians know the price of failing to tackle deep-seated economic problems, particularly when it comes to debt.

Any letter you like - except V

It has become clear in recent days just how much damage the sudden stop in economic activity triggered by the COVID-19 crisis is likely to cause. The services PMIs across Europe collapsed sharply in March with the UK recording an all-time low on data back to 1996 which represents five standard deviations from the mean. The release of today’s US initial jobless claims data showed an extraordinary rise which was 33 standard deviations from the mean on weekly data back to 1967 (chart).  This is an economic collapse the likes of which none of us has seen. It can be likened to the economic equivalent of hitting a wall at high speed: Not only does the car get smashed up but it will take time to recover from any injuries sustained.

It is for this reason that my doubts about a V-shaped recovery continue to mount. The BoE noted in the UK context that “given the severity of that disruption, there is a risk of longer-term damage to the economy, especially if there are business failures on a large scale or significant increases in unemployment.” Many companies have effectively been forced to cease business as a result of the lockdown implemented earlier this week, which will have major implications for cashflow, and a number of them may not resume trading when restrictions are finally lifted. To give some idea of how much the collapse in spending is going to impact on the economy, UK restaurant bookings have slumped to zero over the second half of March based on data from Open Table. On average, restaurant traffic is 55% below levels in March 2019 and with a weight of 9.5% in total spending this alone will reduce consumer spending by 5% relative to a year ago. Assuming restaurants do not reopen in April, the drag on annual spending will double. Notions of a 10% collapse in Q2 GDP suddenly do not look so fanciful.

A measure of the swing in expected 2020 economic growth against the 2019 outturn gives us an idea of where the Covid-19 effect is likely to hit hardest. Assuming Italian GDP falls by 5% this year following a small gain of 0.3% last year this produces a total swing of 5.3 percentage points. By contrast, Chinese growth is only expected to slow from around 6% to 4%, producing a total swing of 2 percentage points. In the UK I currently expect something like a 4.5 percentage point swing. Naturally, forecasts at this stage are little more than guesswork so we should not read too much into the numbers, but given the severity of the crisis in Italy it is reasonable to assume it will take a major economic hit.

Obviously we have no clear idea about the duration of the crisis but the standard assumption is that the bulk of any output contraction is concentrated in the first half of the year. That is itself a huge assumption, but even if turns out to be true, many businesses will not survive the current hit despite the huge amount of support that the government is prepared to give. This will prove to be a searing economic experience for many of us, and that is without discussing the human costs associated with coronavirus. But it will not only be small firms that change their behaviour. Large firms will also be more circumspect given the impact that this year’s recession will have on earnings which will act to hold back investment, and in any case they are likely to hold off on big spending plans until they are confident that demand is once again on an upward path.

It is, of course, too easy to extrapolate the bad news out into the future without taking account of the resilience shown by western economies. On the basis of what we know about the coronavirus now, there will be an economic recovery and probably sooner rather than later. But to give some idea of the impact of economic shocks, I looked at the three major recessions in the UK over the past 40 years and discovered that on average it takes almost four years for output to recover its pre-recession peak. An output collapse of 4% this year followed by three years of trend growth of 1.5% indeed means the usual four year cycle will hold. Matters will be all the more difficult for many western economies given that potential growth today is far slower than prior to 2008 as a consequence of an ageing population and the sluggish nature of productivity growth over the past decade. Recall that in the wake of the Lehman’s collapse it took an awful long time to be convinced that the economy had turned the corner. I suspect the same may also happen this time around.

That said, the 2020 recession will be a catalyst to revisit many areas of the economy that have been ignored over the past decade and I will deal with them in more detail another time. But to throw out a few ideas at random, we are likely to find ourselves paying a lot more attention to the lessons of Keynes than we did a decade ago. Whatever else we take away from the 2020 experience, it is that there is a role for the state as an agent of last resort to step in when there is deficient demand. State capitalism is thus going to be higher up the agenda in many countries and it will be difficult for governments to introduce austerity programmes when this is all over. After all, we have had a decade of it in the UK and where has it got us? We will also have to have a public debate about how much state we want and how we plan to pay for it. I suspect the era of tax cutting may be over for a long time to come.

However, the future can make fools of us all so we should revisit some of this blue sky thinking in future to see whether it stacks up. Nonetheless I am struck by the fact that just as the post-1945 era was very different to the pre-1939 world, so we might look back at the unprecedented events of 2020 as the point at which the world economy changed.

Rising to the challenge

After another week of market drama, with big price corrections and a drying up of market liquidity, central banks and governments are stepping up to the plate to provide the biggest support package in modern times. We should not be under any illusions about the nature of the economic shock that is unfolding before us and as a response risk is being socialised to an unprecedented degree. This is a recognition that the coming shock is likely to be significantly worse than Lehman’s for the simple reason that COVID-19 is affecting everybody’s daily lives, not just a small section of the community. 

The market position 

From a market perspective, the wild movements we have seen in recent days represent attempts to find an equilibrium based on a complete absence of information. Precisely because we have no idea of how bad the COVID-19 infection rate will be nor how badly the economy will be impacted, investors cannot make even the roughest of guesses as to where the bottom is. We hear lots of reports from investors keen to put their funds to work, arguing that there are bargains to be had. But whilst this is understandable, it may be totally wide of the mark. What appear to be solid businesses today might suffer significant knock-on effects in future as they emerge from the other side in worse shape than we thought. 

Take airlines as an example. Admittedly they were operating on thin margins anyway, so they were always going to be badly affected by the collapse in international travel. But the risk is that people will change their post-crisis behaviour, perhaps because they are less willing to travel or because they start to pay more heed to the environmental implications of air travel. As a result, investors looking for bargains today may be disappointed if they back the wrong horse.

This underpins my view that we should be wary of accepting the consensus view that there will be a V-shaped economic recovery. In a sense, a lot of displaced activity in the coming months will be “permanently” lost. After all, people will not visit restaurants or bars twice as frequently in future to make up for the activity that they will be forced to forego during the spring. And in the early stages of any recovery, the crisis mentality is likely to persist with the result that the rebound may be much slower than supposed. Thus, rather than taking a year to recoup lost output it may take up to two (or even more). Suggestions that this may mark the start of a second Great Depression may sound alarmist, but the idea that we are about to return to business as usual strikes me as overly sanguine. Without wishing to sound trite, recall that 10 years after the crash of 1929, the world was hit by another shock in the form of World War II which resulted in the biggest expansion of the state in history. Dark times indeed! 

Monetary policy has acted with what limited scope it had left 

The policy response was a little bit slow to get off the mark at first but the authorities have reacted decisively in recent days to do “whatever it takes” to provide support. Central banks have committed to pumping in huge amounts of liquidity, in the form of direct asset purchases to ensure markets can continue to function and in the form of loan guarantees for businesses to ensure their continued operation during the worst of the crisis period. The renewed bond buying is an easy way to provide liquidity to banks but this is a blunt instrument to support the overall economy. However, it will support the bond market following a period last week when it wobbled following concerns at the sheer amount of debt that governments will be forced to issue. 

Whilst loan guarantees are a positive step, they are still loans, which means that many companies operating with already-stretched margins will have to take on additional debt in order to survive. Many small businesses are going to take a major hit as their income flows dry up and there will inevitably be staff layoffs which will hit people particularly hard at the lower end of the income scale. Governments have increasingly realised this and have moved quickly to adopt unconventional fiscal solutions. 

But fiscal policy is where the action is

The UK acted swiftly on Friday to unveil its Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS), in which the government has committed to pay up to 80% of the wages of furloughed workers, up to a limit of £2,500 per worker each month. This will cover the period March to May and will be extended if necessary. It will not be cheap. Some back of the envelope calculations suggest that if 10% of employees are laid off, this could cost up to £8bn per month if all workers are paid the maximum amount. This will obviously vary according to the average payout and the proportion of furloughed workers and the table below shows some illustrative monthly fiscal costs.

In addition to these measures, the UK government has announced a deferment of business VAT payments due between now and the end of June and has extended the period of interest free loans to small businesses from 6 to 12 months. It has also raised the standard rate of Universal credit and Tax Credits for one year from 6 April, with the result that claimants will be up to £1040 per year better off, and has committed to providing an additional £1bn of support to renters. As one who has called for many years for greater use of fiscal instruments to support the economy, it is gratifying to see the government act decisively in this way. There are those who have pointed out the irony that it is a Conservative government which has acted to leverage up the UK national balance sheet, having criticised Labour governments for doing just that. But in truth, this is the right thing to do. People are being asked to make sacrifices and need support to help them do so.

A question which has been put to me by non-economists is who is going to pay for all this largesse. In truth, we are – maybe not immediately, but in the longer run. The UK government will have to significantly raise borrowing – it is too early to determine by how much – and if other governments around the world follow suit, there is going to be a lot of competition for bond investors’ attention. Under normal circumstances, bond yields would be expected to rise sharply in anticipation of big increases in national debt, which would in turn imply a rising proportion of tax revenue being used to service debt. Governments would thus be expected to respond with fiscal tightening. After a decade of austerity, this will clearly not be a vote winner. However, we can expect central banks to continue bond buying in an effort to keep interest rates low as we enter a period of intense financial repression. Low interest rates appear set to stay in place for years to come.

Future historians will likely look back at this week in 2020 as the point at which the world changed. Hopes that we would resume our march towards pre-2008 normality appear to have been dashed for good. We are now on a different economic and social path, and nobody knows where it will lead.

It is not irrational to be concerned

If we thought that Brexit was a major economic challenge it pales into insignificance compared to the threat posed by COVID-19. As the days unfold, the spread of the disease is following the normal pattern associated with infections, which in the early stages follows an exponential curve until it begins to level off. It is quite obvious that things are going to get worse before they get better which is going to result in a lot of human misery, never mind the economic consequences.

If we can take a step back, however, it provides a fascinating test bed for many of the theories put forward by behavioural economics, which applies psychological insights to the economic actions that we take, and which is in stark contrast to the assumption of rationality which underpins much of conventional thinking. I was reminded of this by the signs which began to appear reminding us all to wash our hands in a bid to spread the disease. This is a classic application of nudge theory which attempts to provide positive reinforcements to encourage a particular course of action. Supermarkets have known for years that prominently displaying a particular type of item encourages sales and it has also been used by various health campaigns (recall the famous 1980s campaign designed to combat AIDS “Don’t die of ignorance”). Nudge theory works up to a point, in as much as it does have an impact on short-term behaviour although its usefulness as a determinant of long-term behaviour is open to debate. However, as this study noted just a month ago, the case for hand washing as a first step to control the spread of epidemics appears indisputable.

Perhaps one of the most contentious issues in the early stages of the outbreak is the extent to which people are stocking up on provisions in case they will be needed. This led to the bizarre situation last weekend whereby shops were completely sold out of toilet rolls and other forms of sanitary wipes, whilst hand sanitizers are virtually impossible to get hold of. The government’s advice is that people should not panic buy. But can we really describe the current situation as panic buying?

Panic can best be described as taking irrational actions in the face of extreme stress. However, as an economist, the notion of taking preventive action strikes me as a perfectly rational forward-looking response. Whilst I am less sure about the need for such huge quantities of toilet rolls, there is a case for having some emergency food provisions. Indeed, the Swiss government has long recommended that each household should have a stock of drinks and food for a period of seven days in the event of a disaster (not that they all do). If you believe that a major problem is about to be visited upon you, which in the worst case will prevent you from leaving your home, a sensible forward-looking economic actor will make some sort of contingency rather than trust to luck. You certainly do not have to be some hardline survivalist (or prepper, if you prefer) believing in the imminent collapse of society to anticipate that the information given by governments today will change in future in response to changed circumstances. However, there is also an element of herd instinct driving some of the recent actions by individuals. We may not in the end need the huge quantities of toilet roll that have been purchased, but in the event we do, you certainly do not want to be the individual who has ignored the actions of the rest of the herd.

Human history is littered with examples of catastrophe, from plagues to harvest failures which once upon a time were a regular occurrence.  These required societies to set aside a store of food to tide them through the hard times, but modern societies which rely heavily on just-in-time inventory management are unable to cope with shocks of this magnitude. Many western societies are unused to making such provisions and it feels very alien to our way of living to have to think in such terms. It ought to act as a wakeup call on so many levels. Our supply chains are long and easily broken and should force us to think more carefully about the limits to globalisation. As I noted in this post in 2016, my views on weighing the costs and benefits of globalisation have changed over the years. The current episode has also made people realise the benefits of international cooperation. Admittedly the rapid spread of COVID-19 has been made possible by the extent to which borders have opened up but equally the solution to what is now a global problem will also have to be global.

As for recent market moves, investors’ actions of late have not been entirely irrational. Financial investors always have to deal with decision making under uncertainty, but today the uncertainty levels have risen to unprecedented levels. I have long extolled the virtues of the distinction between risk and uncertainty which was made by the economist Frank Knight in his magnum opus Risk, Uncertainty and Profit  a century ago. In his words, “risk means in some cases a quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is something distinctly not of this character.” A known risk “is easily converted into an effective certainty” while “true uncertainty … is not susceptible to measurement.” Accordingly it makes perfect sense for markets to sell off in what is the biggest shock to markets since 2008. The unknowable economic consequences are such that we cannot predict what will happen to corporate earnings other than to say there is no near-term upside, and it is impossible to call the bottom of the current slide. However, most investors believe things will get worse before they get better.

And they have certainly been bad of late. On the basis of UK data going back to 1709, the performance of the FTSE All Shares so far this month has been worse than at any time since the collapse of 1720 following the bursting of the South Sea Bubble when prices declined by 38% in September and a further 25% in October of that year. The 1720 episode was the response to a good old-fashioned bubble. The collapse of 1987 (which was bad enough) was attributable to global monetary tensions and exacerbated by automatic trading systems which contained no circuit breakers. Today, it is attributable to genuine concerns about life and death and in the grand scheme of things, market moves can often seem somewhat trivial.

The storm before the tsunami

To say it has been a wild market ride today would be an understatement. Based on daily data back to 1985 (a total of 9179 observations) the 7.7% decline in the FTSE100 is the fifth largest correction in recent history, beaten only by double digit declines in the wake of Black Monday in 1987 and two days of correction in October 2008 as the Lehman’s fallout continued to reverberate. The 7.9% decline in the DAX was also the fifth largest correction in the German equity market although the US correction did not even make the top 10.

I have been through a few market corrections in my time, and each of them was triggered by a unique set of circumstances. Today’s moves, however, were only partly initially related to equities. They were triggered by the 30% collapse in the oil price following Saudi Arabia’s decision to launch an oil price war and were exacerbated by coronavirus concerns. The Saudi decision came after Russia refused to join OPEC countries in extending existing production curbs in a bid to drive oil prices higher and the Saudis are clearly trying to force the Russians back to the negotiating table. This is bold and risky strategy. Whether or not it works, the shock decline in oil prices put initial pressure on the oil majors and triggered a broader market selloff at a time when sentiment was already extremely nervous. Momentum effects then took hold as equities competed to go ever lower.

Faced with this kind of environment, there is nothing anyone can do but stand back and watch the carnage unfold. Interest rate cuts will be of no real help, even though the Fed, ECB and BoE are likely to deliver additional monetary easing before the month is out. Policymakers can perhaps impose bans on short-selling or impose circuit breakers on the market which will temporarily limit the downside but they are on the whole powerless. The flip side of the equity selloff has been the surge into safer havens such as government bonds and gold, with the US 10-year Treasury yield falling to a new all-time low of 0.5% and the 10-year German Bund trading at -0.86%, implying that investors are so keen to preserve their capital that they will accept a negative return on their holdings of sovereign German debt because the expected loss of principal is greater than the negative yield on Bunds. Without wishing to be too gloomy, a lot of countries are now apparently at much greater risk of recession than perhaps we thought a week ago.

In the face of an equity correction of today’s magnitude, it is easy to extrapolate into the future and make the case for further huge declines. But much depends on the nature of today’s shock. If it merely represented a kneejerk reaction to the oil collapse which got out of hand, markets could easily rebound a little in the near-term. But if it reflects concerns about the impact of the coronavirus on the wider economy, which is more likely, I would expect a lot more downside before we reach the bottom. I noted in this post that the US market had the potential for another 10-20% downside. The market is already 7% below where it was when I wrote that, and as the number of non-Chinese virus cases continues to increase, the potential for economic disruption continues to grow.

The fiscal response

With monetary policy all but exhausted, governments will have to step up to the plate to deliver measures to support the economy. We will have a great chance to see what the UK government is made of when it delivers its post-election Budget on Wednesday. Much of the very good pre-Budget analysis prepared by NIESR or the IFS has now been overtaken by events. It was originally planned that this would be a Budget which attempts to deliver more spending, particularly for those regions which have been left behind by austerity. This was to be a reset of policy – the so-called “levelling up”. But now it will be dominated by efforts to limit the impact of COVID-19.

There are essentially three areas that the government will have to address: (i) ensuring liquidity-constrained businesses can continue to operate; (ii) providing support for individuals who lose income and (iii) maintain the delivery of public services. There are various things the government can do: In the case of (i) more generous payment terms in areas such as employer social security contributions would help to limit the burden (e.g. a payments holiday whereby firms do not have to pay contributions for those workers who are sick with the coronavirus). To tackle issue (ii), the government could reduce the time it takes to get access to Universal Credit payments (as I argued here) and addressing (iii) might involve significant increases in the budget for the National Health Service.

As the IFS points out, in fiscal years 2008-09 and 2009-10, the government’s fiscal expansion package was equivalent to 0.6% and 1.5% of GDP respectively. That is a high benchmark but the UK does have the fiscal headroom to try something similar today. Other governments across Europe will have to follow suit. The German government, for example, has previously dragged its feet but there are indications that it is now prepared to boost spending to support companies which apply for aid to offset wage costs during labour layoffs. As the UK examples cited above show, fiscal policy does not necessarily have to take the form of big infrastructure spending programmes: tweaks to the tax and benefit system can provide much more targeted help.

The time for waiting is over with action required to at least prepare the economy for the worst case outcomes. There is after all, no point in the likes of Germany continuing to run surpluses for the sake of it. We should welcome any moves towards fiscal easing. For too long, governments have been absent from the fiscal policy fray and have left it to central banks to manage the economy. Whether it will mark the start of a more targeted approach, or whether we will soon revert to a period of retrenchment remains to be seen. But whatever else governments do, they must act soon. If nothing else, markets will ultimately punish them for failing to act.