UK: The immigration situation

It is now commonly accepted that immigration was the single most important topic in the UK’s EU referendum. The level of vitriol generated by this aspect of the campaign shocked many foreign observers, but a look back at history shows that whilst the UK has generally been welcoming to foreigners, the issue has often generated significant controversy. I was reminded of this recently when reading  the third volume of David Kynaston’s superb social history of the UK since 1945 (Modernity Britain) in which he described, using contemporary source material, the level of conflict generated by the Notting Hill race riots of 1958. And just ten years later, when Nigel Farage was still in short trousers, senior Conservative politicians were warning of “rivers of blood” if immigration was allowed to continue unchecked.

We should bear this historical context in mind when looking at the UK’s immigration data, the latest release of which occurred last week covering the period to March 2016. At the aggregate level, net immigration in the twelve months to March totalled 327,000 – down fractionally from the 12 months to December 2015 but double the levels four years ago. Excluding flows of UK nationals, the proportion of immigration from EU countries is still less than 50% of the total, though at almost 49% it is considerably higher than six years ago. Incidentally, EU citizens generally take exception to being classified as immigrants, which has connotations of forced movement similar to what we have recently witnessed from the Middle East, and probably says a lot about the different way in which freedom of movement is perceived in other EU countries relative to the UK. A more cynical interpretation is that immigrants are looked upon as coming from “poor” countries, whereas those coming from richer countries prefer to class themselves as expats.

There has, to be sure, been a substantial increase in those coming from EU15 countries, whose numbers have more than doubled in the past decade largely due to poor employment prospects in the euro zone. The numbers arriving from the EU8 countries (including Poland) are running below 2008 levels, although Poles are now the most populous group of non-UK born residents, having overtaken those born in India. But by far and away the fastest rise in immigrant numbers has come from Bulgaria and Romania, which now account for over 16% of non-nationals arriving in the UK versus 1% in mid-2011, and which has led to a predictable surge in calls for tighter border controls.

But with more than 50% of the total numbers coming from non-EU countries, I remain at a loss to understand why leaving the EU is going to lead to a regaining of control over the UK’s borders that so many apparently seek. As I have long argued, if people have a problem with immigration numbers, they might want to question why the government has failed to control its non-EU borders rather than direct their anger at the EU. It is interesting too that the proportion of immigrants arriving in the UK for study-related reasons is 35% down on its 2010 peak. This may well reflect the fact that foreign students simply do not feel as welcome in the UK following David Cameron’s ill-advised pledge in 2010 to return immigrant numbers to the “tens of thousands.” And with reports suggesting that PM Theresa May’s government is planning a further clampdown on student visas, it is likely that we will see further declines.

People may have differing views on immigration numbers, but it is clear that the Conservatives’ policy over the past six years is proving to be self-defeating. With the government having cut funding to the university sector since 2010, higher education institutions are increasingly reliant on the higher fees that they can charge non-EU students for the privilege of studying here. But if fewer students come to the UK, this will put further pressure on university finances. The government may end up being accused of not only creating a problem but nixing attempts to find a solution.

It is understandable, perhaps, that so many people fear the consequences of unfettered immigration – it is a problem which has echoed down the years. Indeed, it represents the flip side of globalisation which has left so many people struggling to make ends meet in their own home towns. Nor should we underestimate the problems of assimilating huge numbers of migrants with the attendant consequences for local resources and the undoubted impacts on labour markets and wages. But immigration also brings benefits: How, for example, would the NHS function if it were not for the foreign medical staff who help to keep it running? And what about the contribution made by foreigners who choose to settle in the UK and make it their home? For example, the Nobel Prize won by two physicists at the University of Manchester in 2010 (Andre Geim and Konstantin Novoselov) went to men born in Russia, who may have been denied the opportunity to work here under the proposed new rules.

Cameron’s 2010 immigration pledge made him a hostage to fortune. It was a foolish thing to have said and fanned the flames of a problem which ultimately became a fire which consumed him. As his now-reviled predecessor Tony Blair once said “A simple way to take measure of a country is to look at how many want in ... And how many want out.” It is thus ironic that more British citizens are flowing out than are returning, whereas many non-Brits believe the UK is still a land of opportunity.

Interest rates: Absolute zero

The Kansas City Fed’s Jackson Hole Symposium is closely scrutinised by market watchers for any indications of changes in the Fed’s policy stance, and sure enough, most of the headlines over the weekend focused on Janet Yellen’s comment that “the case for an increase in the federal funds rate has strengthened”. But this is to overlook a lot of other interesting material which comes out during the course of the two day session. This year’s symposium was entitled “Designing Resilient Monetary Policy Frameworks for the Future” and if there was any takeaway, it is that central bankers believe they still have sufficient ammunition to provide cover for the economic recovery. It was also evident that central bankers are aware of the impact of low interest rates on the structure of the global monetary system, and that we are not going back to a pre-2007 world anytime soon. 

Marvin Goodfriend’s paper was interesting and makes the point that we should ignore the zero bound constraint on interest rates altogether, primarily because “the effectiveness of evermore quantitative monetary stimulus is questionable.” He argues that one way to facilitate an end to the lower bound constraint would be to abolish paper money and replace it with electronic money. This is not a new idea, having been kicked around since the 1930s and gaining currency (if you’ll pardon the pun) in the wake of the financial crisis. Indeed, Goodfriend’s policy prescriptions echo those made by Andy Haldane a year ago. In brief, this policy relies on central banks making it unattractive to hold cash, thus raising the incentive to hold it in an electronic account overseen by the central bank. The downside, of course, is that this reduces the control which individuals have over their own cash balances: you no longer have the choice of the bank or the mattress – it’s the central bank or nothing, which may persuade many to shift into assets such as property or gold, thus creating bubbles elsewhere.

A bigger objection to removing the lower bound on interest rates is that it has a massive distortionary impact on expectations. Will investors be willing to fund projects if the rate of return is zero or negative? Will we be prepared to continue handing over 30-40% of our earnings in tax (more in continental Europe) when we simultaneously have to invest to provide a fund for our retirement? How does the banking sector cope in a world of increasingly negative rates? Will we eventually reach a situation where customers are charged for depositing funds (actually, yes, with corporate clients in some countries already facing this problem)? For all these reasons and more, it should be evident that a prolonged period of zero or negative interest rates may lead to consequences which we cannot yet foresee and could cause major long-term economic disruption. It is one thing to try the policy on a temporary basis but when it becomes the norm, something is wrong.


Whilst I agree with Goodfriend’s point that QE is at the limit, the notion that we should abolish the lower bound should be treated as an interesting thought experiment and nothing more. The idea that central banks can continue to operate an ever looser monetary policy, but still fail to achieve their economic objectives, should act as an indication that there are deeper seated economic problems which require alternative solutions. Indeed, former Fed governor Kroszner argues that “many central banks are being asked to do things they simply can’t do. Central banks can try to fight deflation. Central banks can’t simply create growth.” Indeed, the ECB has made the point since its inception in 1999 that it cannot create the conditions for a sustainable pickup in growth on its own. Governments need to play their part with structural policies designed to raise the economy’s speed limit.

A bigger problem is that in the wake of the financial crisis, many European economies have been trying to accelerate with the brakes on. In other words, they have operated a very loose monetary policy and a tight fiscal stance. This reflects a misunderstanding about the nature of the shock which hit in 2008. Whilst this may have been understandable in the immediate wake of the crisis, we have had long enough to review the evidence to realise that the current policy mix is not delivering. It is clearly not creating stable jobs in sufficient quantities to allow economies to generate escape velocity, and as a result lots of people are taking out their frustration by voting for populist politicians. This is not the whole story: it certainly does not explain the rise of Donald Trump, but it is part of a wider narrative. We have already seen in the UK how this has panned out, but it is still not too late for other European countries to learn from this mistake. Failure to do so will have major adverse consequences for the euro zone in the years to come.

Brexit: An economist strikes back

One of the reasons for starting this blog was to counter some of the popular misconceptions associated with economics. Last week, for instance, I pointed out that although the UK economy has posted some decent data releases since the Brexit referendum, it was still too early to draw any definitive conclusions. One of the reasons for making this point was to set down a marker before the Brexiteers began sounding the all-clear. And sure enough, we were regaled with a couple of articles in the broadsheets suggesting that there really was nothing to worry about.

At least Larry Elliot's article in The Guardian acknowledged that much of the hysteria was whipped up by Project Fear (aka George Osborne) and that is still too early to be sure how things will ultimately turn out. However, it was interesting to note that the readers comments section noted overwhelmingly that the UK has not yet left the EU and maybe we should save the optimism for when we have.

But Allister Heath, writing in The Telegraph made the mistake of blaming economists for Project Fear. As Heath put it, economists "need to relearn a little humility, especially when it comes to trying to understand the impact of a gargantuan event such as Brexit ... As recently as a few days ago, something like 90 per cent believed that Armageddon was on the cards merely as a result of the Leave vote."

Now I know and like Allister, but on this one he is just wrong. Wrong, because just about all of the analysis put out by economists on this issue talked about the longer-term implications of Brexit. Broadly speaking, the consensus view is that it will lead to a decline in output of between 3% and 6%, relative to what would otherwise have happened, over a multi-year horizon. This does not mean an outright decline in output of such a magnitude. For example, if the economy grew at 1% per annum for five years rather than 2%, the former case delivers a 5% output loss over the five year horizon relative to the latter. The slower growth case does not necessarily mean that the economy suffers an outright recession but the output loss would be quite significant all the same, and we would certainly feel this in the labour market. It is also worth highlighting that most of pre-referendum analysis was predicated on the basis of the output loss after Article 50 was triggered, not after the Brexit vote.

As for learning humility, most economists I know realise that we cannot forecast the future with any degree of certainty and I am happy to admit that the only thing I know for sure about my forecasts is that they will be wrong.  But months ahead of the referendum, I made four predictions regarding the immediate market reaction in the event of a Brexit vote: (i) sterling would collapse by around 10% in the wake of the referendum; (ii) the BoE would cut interest rates; (iii) after an initial collapse, UK equity prices would rally due to the fact that a weaker pound would raise the sterling denominated value of foreign earnings and (iv) UK bond yields would rise. The only one of these which has not happened is (iv), the rest all came to pass. So we are not all completely clueless.

Simon Wren-Lewis in his blog makes the point that "the reporting of economics in a good deal of the UK press is hopelessly biased by politics." This is a view he has held for quite some time, but particularly since the press completely misrepresented the economic records of the Conservative and Labour parties during the last election. And in view of much of what has been produced on the economics of Brexit in certain sections of the media, I can understand where he is coming from.

I know as well as anyone that economists are not able to predict the future, but contrary to Heath’s assertion, we are not ideologues. Indeed we tend to be a pretty rational bunch. After all it was economists who, for their sins, came up with the concept of rational expectations. For some reason, the ideological expectations school failed to take off.

The best laid plans ...

Economic plans set out by politicians ahead of an election are probably not worth much more than a cursory analysis, but that does not stop people trying. Ahead of the US presidential election, a lot of ink has been spilled trying to figure out the respective merits of the two candidates' plans. As usual, the candidates talk a lot about taxes and how many jobs they will create. But whilst this may be all well and good in a dictatorship where the election winner has carte blanche to act as they please, it certainly does not wash in western democracies where the head of government is beholden to parliament (or Congress in the US case).

Donald Trump has called for lower taxes and a simplification of the tax code, reducing the number of tax brackets from seven to four, and for the top rate of tax to fall from 39.6% to 33%. In his words, "The rich will pay their fair share, but no one will pay so much that it undermines our ability to compete." Analysis by the Tax Foundation of the Republicans’ tax plan, released in June and which is similar to Trump’s, would disproportionately benefit the rich by raising the post-tax income of the top 1% of earners by 5.3%. But the Republican nominee goes much further, by proposing to completely eliminate estate taxes which would clearly benefit those rich enough to be able to pass on more than $5.45 million of assets to an individual (or $10.9 million to a married couple). This does not sound like a policy aimed at the blue collar workers amongst whom Trump is so popular.

Hillary Clinton, meanwhile, proposes to maintain the existing seven brackets but is also in favour of an additional surcharge on those earning more than $5 million per year which would be used to fund programmes such as free education for the less well off. Both candidates favour limiting tax deductions, with Clinton limiting them to a total of 28%. Analysis of their respective tax plans by the Tax Policy Center suggests that the Clinton plan would raise revenues by $1.2 trillion over the next ten years whilst Trump would cut them by $11.2 trillion. On the spending side, the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget estimates that Clinton's spending increases would broadly match the higher tax take but Trump makes no effort to close the gap, with the result that his plans will result in much higher deficits. His plans thus sound more suited to Europe, which is crying out for stimulus, rather than the US which no longer is.

Where the Trump plans really start to fall apart is in the area of trade, where there are calls for the renegotiation of trade deals to favour the US and to walk away from those deals which are not viewed as favourable. Meanwhile, Trump has also advocated a 35% tariff on goods imported from Mexico and a 45% tariff on Chinese imports. To put it bluntly, a proportion of the income tax savings which US consumers would derive under President Trump would be clawed back in the form of higher goods prices resulting from higher tariffs. Not that Clinton's trade views are that consistent either. In a bid to tap into the Zeitgeist on trade issues, Clinton now suggests that the Trans-Pacific Partnership is not necessarily the best deal for America, even though she was involved in the negotiations.

John Cochrane argues in a blog post that the Clinton plan is not really a plan at all and that it represents little more than a wish list of ideas. Allowing for the fact that he is not particularly well disposed towards Clintonite policies in the first place, he has hit the nail on the head when it comes to describing candidates' plans (and not just in the US). They can only ever be a wish list. For example, whilst both Trump and Clinton suggest that they will boost the US manufacturing sector, the forces determining its fate lie well outside the control of any US president. For better or worse, we live in a globalised economy and we have to accept that for all the material benefits this has brought, there are costs in terms of a redistribution of jobs. Attempts to reverse the process will also impose major costs – particularly in the case of Trump’s plans.

Often, some of the things which candidates promise on the stump turn out to be things they bitterly regret. Take for instance David Cameron's 2010 promise to reduce annual UK immigration to "the tens of thousands" from levels around 250,000 at the time (it has since risen by a third). It made him a hostage to fortune which he could never deliver upon, and was compounded by the ludicrous decision to hold a simple in-out referendum on EU membership. And we all know where that led.

Taking the UK's post-Brexit economic pulse

Latest data suggest that the UK economy shrugged off the result of the Brexit referendum, with retail sales last month rising by 1.4% relative to June whilst the number claiming unemployment benefits fell in July for the first time since February. These numbers do come as a surprise, particularly given the immediate uncertainty in the wake of the referendum held two months ago. They would also appear to vindicate those who thought that Brexit would not cause much damage to the economy. Indeed, the recent collapse in the pound may have contributed to the strength of retail sales, with the ONS suggesting that there was “anecdotal evidence … suggesting the weaker pound has encouraged overseas visitors to spend.” Against that, the collapse in the currency also triggered an outsized gain in producer input prices in July which rose by a larger-than-expected 3.3% versus the previous month.

So what to make of it all? The good news is that the consumer may have experienced a brief wobble in the wake of the referendum but has since shrugged off any woes. But we should not go overboard. For one thing the pickup in inflation, which looks to be heading our way, will squeeze real income growth so we may find that there will be a slowdown in consumer activity over the next twelve months. Not on the same scale as 2008, of course, but enough to curb the contribution of consumer activity to overall growth. Second, corporate data, notably the PMIs, suggest that companies have been much more cautious. If evidence begins to emerge that they have cut back on investment or hiring, we may yet see some evidence of a Brexit shock in the employment and retail figures.

But for all that, the data do come as a pleasant surprise, especially in view of the fact that the NIESR estimated overall activity contracted in July – a view which may be revised in view of the strength of retail sales data. We will, of course, need further confirmation as to how well the third quarter GDP figures panned out, and it is still early days with a lot more evidence still to come in before we can even make a guess for July. Two things strike me, however:

1.  The immediate aftermath of the referendum is fading away like a very bad dream. It is thus likely that at least some of the cries of anger expressed in the Brexit vote will become less strident now that people have had their say. This in turn means that the government will take its time before implementing Article 50, with some newspaper reports last weekend suggesting it could be delayed until 2019;
2.  A lot of the economic forecasts made in the immediate aftermath of the referendum were constructed against the backdrop of considerable political uncertainty, which faded once Theresa May obtained the keys to 10 Downing Street. This in turn suggests that we may see some upward revisions to some of the more pessimistic UK growth forecasts as political life turns more tranquil (although this may simply reflect the calm before a greater political storm).

However, before we all get too carried away, let us remember that the UK has not yet left the EU. Anyone crowing that recent figures support the view that Brexit is not the disaster it is cracked up to be, should remember a couple of things. First, it is actually leaving the EU – with all the consequences that entails – which will be decisive for the UK’s economic future, not simply the decision to go. And second, the impacts will be felt over a period of years, not months. One swallow may not make a summer but lots of crows add up to a murder.

The state of macreconomics: A practitioners view

The academic blogosphere is currently abuzz with posts about the state of macroeconomics in the wake of an article by former IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Blanchard's post, which is well worth reading for anyone interested in a non-technical overview of the models used in cutting edge academic research, highlights that these models are "seriously flawed, but they are eminently improvable and central to the future of macroeconomics."

As Blanchard notes, DSGE models are based on microfoundations, and essentially model the behaviour of various representative optimising agents (firms, households, central banks) whilst making a number of unrealistic assumptions. These are not just simplifying assumptions – they are probably downright wrong. One such example is the assumption of pricing behaviour assumed in such models which is designed to handle nominal rigidities. This so-called Calvo pricing assumption  is elegant but is not observed in the real world, thus rendering it somewhat useless. Blanchard goes on to point out that such models are mathematically dense, and thus are impenetrable even to many economists. As he put it, they are bad communications devices. My major criticism of such models, and one echoed by Blanchard, is that they are designed to fit the theory rather than the data with the result that they are empirically unsound. This probably reflects the way I was taught to do econometrics, but there is a quaint old fashioned notion that models should be congruent with the data.

Paul Krugman argues very strongly that Blanchard is too kind on such models and that far from offering scope for improvement, they have led us up an intellectual cul-de-sac. In his view they have contributed no insight into the workings of the economy and that old-fashioned ISLM models offered more useful predictions in the wake of the financial crisis than did DSGE analysis.

Others, such as the always readable Simon Wren-Lewis are less trenchant in their view but still critical. As SWL put it "DSGE completely dominates academic macroeconomics, and there is no way that all these academics are going to suddenly decide this research programme is a waste of time ... What is at issue is not the existence of DSGE models, but their hegemony." He has long argued that journal editors have routinely turned away good papers on the grounds that they do not offer a microfounded or general equilibrium approach and he offers the hope that "criticism from one of the best macroeconomists in the world might" prompt them to change their view.

Now I am no academic but I have spent enough time building and running economic models to know when a modelling paradigm is going broadly in the right direction. And I am pretty sure that DSGE is not the way for someone like me to go. My job is to understand how the economy fits together, and we know that there are structural changes over time which means that things that once worked no longer do. Estimating structural models allows us to do that, in order to see whether econometric relationships which once held continue to do so. The models I use are structural forecasting models, which would not have looked out of place 20 years ago, and many academic economists dismiss them out of hand. For one thing, they often struggle to model expectations in a way which satisfies academic thinking (though I am quite happy to pretend that the rational expectations revolution never happened). In addition, they are not identified (i.e. it is impossible to derive a specification for each individual variable in the equation which gives a unique specification in terms of others in the system) and the economic theory underpinning such models is often ad hoc.

To a degree, these criticisms are all valid. But these models have not been usurped by a superior paradigm, and certainly not by DSGE. I thus have a lot of sympathy with Krugman's view that macroeconomics has taken a wrong turning. DSGE models do not help most economists to understand how the world really works, and they certainly do not help to inform the general public. They are highly sophisticated mathematical tools which explain the world as many economists think it should be, rather than as it really is. DSGE models were a brave attempt to try and move the economic debate forward but they have failed. If economics wants to be more relevant to the wider policy debate, we need to find better ways of understanding how the world works, but as Wren-Lewis notes, too much intellectual capital has been sunken into the field to hope that it will go away quickly.

However, perhaps macroeconomics is ready for a Popper-style paradigm shift in which empirical falsification will prompt another generation of economists to push the field in a new direction and get us out of the rut into which we appear to have sunk. We could certainly do with a bit more public credibility and in that sense DSGE models are clearly not the way to go.

Project Stupidity kicks in

As a general rule I am not given to reading newspaper editorials, preferring to form my own biases rather than imbibing those of others. But this one from the Daily Telegraph is so extraordinary that it simply cannot be allowed to pass without comment. It is entitled "Don't blame Brexit for this rate cut. Blame Project Fear" and argues that the Bank of England is responding to irrational fears by easing monetary policy. As it happens, I am not sure that bold monetary easing is necessarily the right response to a shock of this nature although it is easy to understand why the MPC acted as it did. But when the Telegraph goes on to say that the economic problems facing the UK in the wake of the Brexit referendum are "due to the pessimism of the previous government, the Labour Party, Barack Obama, global institutions, sections of the media and, of course, the Bank [of England] itself" the only sound I hear is the rattling of loose screws.

I'm not sure whether the Telegraph is in the habit of allowing inexperienced teenagers to dictate their editorial policy, but it seems that Project Stupidity is taking over from Project Fear as the dominant feature of the post Brexit debate. I would certainly suggest to anyone working for me, who tried to pass off such a work of fiction as a piece of analysis, that they might want to seek alternative employment. It is risible, and shame on the Telegraph for allowing this to be published in a newspaper which is read around the world. 

Such abrogation of responsibility will not be allowed to stand. Those responsible for promoting the case for Brexit without giving a clear vision of the economic consequences will continue to be held to account. And the Telegraph gave plenty of column inches to such parties, notably Boris Johnson. Not everyone writing for this newspaper takes such a blinkered view, however. Ben Wright took a much more pragmatic view, arguing in a very sensible article that whilst the deed is done, the "grumpy Remainers" perform a necessary service by acting as a check on the worst instincts of the gung-ho leavers.

But before we all get carried away with the impact that Brexit will have on the economy, let us remember that we have no real idea at this stage, thus rendering the efforts of those who wish to get their retaliation in first rather futile. The NIESR has suggested that GDP contracted in July, but its estimate is based on nowcasting techniques rather than hard data, so we should be wary of extrapolating too much from that. Data later this week on retail sales will give us a firmer view of how consumers acted last month. The survey evidence is mixed: British Retail Consortium data suggested a decent rate of expansion in July although the CBI's Distributive Trades Survey pointed to a weaker outturn. However, the forecast consensus is that spending held up.

Whatever happens in the next few months, it is likely that the real damage will occur only over the medium term. It is only then that we will see the full impact of the cancellation of an investment project here or a factory closure there. And by reducing immigration flows, the UK will also limit the contribution to potential GDP growth from labour. This may not be noticeable immediately but if the economy grows by, say, 0.25% more slowly per year this adds up to an income loss of 2.5% over 10 years, 5% over 20 years etc. Had this performance been repeated over the last 43 years – coinciding with the period of EU membership – the economy would be around 10% smaller than otherwise (and that does not account for any second round effects which would likely raise the potential losses).

I have made it clear all along that I believe the UK will be poorer by being outside the EU, although I never signed up to the worst predictions of George Osborne that it would lead to imminent collapse. But I have also pointed out that many of Britain's economic problems are home made and are not all the result of international issues, as the Telegraph editorial suggests. The Brexiteers have long made the claim that building better relations with the rest of the world will help the economy to make up for the shortfall in loss of trade with the EU. Undoubtedly some of them will be frothing at the mouth in the wake of the suspension of the Hinkley Point deal which threatens the flow of Chinese investment. But it just goes to show that the UK is not the attractive investment location it is cracked up to be if foreign capital can only be lured with deals which are inimical to the interests of British taxpayers. So the challenge to Brexiteers remains: Convince us you have an economic plan. I have been listening for months and all I hear is the sound of silence. And don't blame any economic downturn on Project Fear. This is down to you, and the lies which were spun during the referendum campaign. And I for one will continue to hold you to account.

The nuclear option

The recent decision by the new British prime minister to put the decision to build a nuclear power station at Hinkley Point on hold highlights a number of weaknesses in key areas of British policy. The fact that the Cameron administration wanted to go ahead with it at all, on the basis of the cost structure put forward, was bad enough. But this was compounded by Mrs May’s decision to freeze the project just after the EDF had agreed to go ahead with the deal. To compound this triumph of diplomacy, Mrs May’s government managed to annoy Chinese investors by citing security concerns arising from Chinese involvement in such a sensitive infrastructure project. And this in the wake of a Brexit referendum which will leave the UK ever more dependent on non-EU investment. You almost could not make it up. 

To put this deal into context, the UK has agreed to phase out all coal-fired power stations by 2025. That is all well and good, except for the fact that we will need to make up the shortfall by generation from other sources. According to DECC, last year the UK produced 22.6% of its energy from coal so in simple terms the UK will phase out almost a quarter of its generation capacity within a decade. No wonder the government was desperate to bring Hinkley Point online. But in their haste to do a deal, the Cameron government realised that it would be virtually impossible to assemble a UK team to do the job in the decade or so that it would take, and turned to EDF – which is 85% owned by the French government – to do the job for them.

In order to sweeten the deal, the government offered a guaranteed fixed price of £92.50/MWh (2012 prices) which will be adjusted for inflation over the 35 years of the contract. The difference between this strike price and the market price will be made up by the UK taxpayer. Earlier this year, the National Audit Office calculated that with the price of electricity having fallen to £45/MWh since the deal was agreed in 2013, this would raise the cost to the taxpayer from an original estimate of £6.1bn to £29.7bn. As far as EDF is concerned, this would generate a double-digit return on equity (estimates vary from 13% to 20%), which in essence makes this a project largely funded by the UK taxpayer  to support a French state owned enterprise. So where, you may ask, do the Chinese fit in? Back in 2015, the Chinese state-owned CGN agreed to fund one-third of the expected £18bn construction costs, thus easing the burden on EDF, and in return would be considered for the provision of reactor technology at the planned Bradwell nuclear station.

A cursory glance at the headline economics suggests that the finances of Hinkley Point simply do not stand up. But the reason why they are so bad is that they reflect the desperation of the Cameron government, aided and abetted by George Osborne, to scramble together a deal to get a nuclear station online by 2023 (a deadline which everyone now knows will not be met) in order to meet carbon emissions targets whilst managing to keep the lights on. It is the product of policy on the hoof. To compound the problems, the reactors proposed for Hinkley have run into technical difficulties, which has raised doubts about their suitability. Add in the fact that the costs of building Hinkley recently exceeded the entire market cap of EDF and that numerous European states have filed objections on the grounds that the government is breaching EU rules on state aid, and it is understandable why the project remains beset by doubts.

Theresa May’s objections to the deal on national security grounds are surely to miss the point. If she were to object on financial grounds, surely that would be sufficient. But then that would be to admit that the government of which she was part has committed an act of fiscal stupidity (doubly ironic when you think of George Osborne’s austerity mantra) and would annoy the French even more than this delaying tactic has already. Whilst it is understandable that the government might have concerns about allowing the Chinese to have a big say in a crucial infrastructure project, citing these concerns in public is no way to win friends and influence people (let alone win foreign investment deals). In any case this eleventh hour delay, which smacks of capriciousness, makes life more difficult for foreign investors looking for certainty in the wake of the Brexit vote.

What the government needs to do – and fast – is to come up with a credible energy policy. The UK needs Hinkley if it is to close its coal-fired stations by 2025. My guess is that this won’t happen and their life will be prolonged. I also suspect that the government will agree to go ahead with Hinkley, albeit on altered financial terms. Though whether the French and Chinese will be willing to go through all the negotiations again is a lot more doubtful.

An un-save-ry business

The Bank of England’s action yesterday to ease monetary policy by driving interest rates deeper into all-time low territory has both positive and negative aspects. On the plus side, the fact that the central bank has acted pre-emptively illustrates that it is aware of the potential economic consequences of the Brexit vote. Another welcome innovation was the Term Funding Scheme, which is designed to ensure that banks can obtain funding at a cost “close to Bank Rate” which in turn means that they can pass on a significant chunk of the lower interest rates to their customers. As the BoE pointed out, the all-in cost of funding in the wholesale market is close to 100 bps and the TFS will ensure that banks can access funding at between 25 and 50 bps, depending on their lending volume. In this way, banks will be able to avoid the margin compression which is such a problem in a low rate environment, and hopefully will prevent many of the distortions which have been such a feature of the euro zone in recent months.

Two other elements of the package were an additional £60bn of gilt purchases and up to £10bn of corporate bond purchases, both of which were designed to further reduce yields, thereby giving additional monetary stimulus, and triggering portfolio balancing by forcing investors out of bonds and into other assets. Perhaps the most impressive part of the package was that it demonstrated a degree of joined-up thinking. The distortionary effect of low interest rates on banks’ business models is a well-known problem and the BoE clearly went some way towards addressing this crucial issue in a way which the ECB has not.

But it is not all good news. Driving interest rates ever lower is placing a serious burden on savers and is most certainly having an adverse effect on our retirement incomes. When pressed on this during the press conference, Governor Carney basically suggested that it is a choice between sacrificing savers and putting lots of people out of work. I think this is a false choice. For one thing, the Brexit fallout represents an uncertainty shock which is not readily amenable to monetary solutions. Lower borrowing costs will not determine whether Nissan decides to continue investing in its British operations. Indeed, if the Brexit negotiations go awry, Nissan could put lots of people out of work AND savers retirement incomes will still be under pressure.

What is more pernicious is that many policymakers, past and present, argue that more monetary easing does no harm so why not just do it. But that is also false. As noted above, low rates hurt savers. And there is another problem: By national accounting definition the current account deficit represents the difference between domestic saving and investment. If we reduce the incentive so save, so the economy can only invest by borrowing from the rest of the world – and the UK just happens to have one of the biggest current account deficits in the OECD (exceeded only by Colombia). So you still think that low rates are a good idea?

Another thing that concerns me is that central bankers have been loath to tighten monetary policy even once a recovery appears to be underway. There is thus a real risk that we get sucked into a world of low interest rates for far longer than is necessary, with all the attendant risks outlined above. And finally, there is general recognition that the Brexit problem is by no means as serious as the shock in the wake of the Lehman’s bust. So why then has the BoE implemented a monetary stance which is even more expansionary than we saw in 2009?

Maybe I am being a little too harsh. But the problem is that monetary policy remains the only game in town, given that the previous occupant of 11 Downing Street pursued an aggressive austerity policy which left no room for fiscal expansion. Many economists would welcome a change of policy on this front. And if over the course of the next year or two we do see a more activist fiscal approach, the BoE should be far less squeamish about raising interest rates. After all, savers could do with a break after seven years of squeeze.

The lowdown on interest rates

Over the course of the past seven years, monetary policy has been at its most expansionary setting in history, a point made by Andy Haldane in a speech last year. Indeed, we have become dangerously used to interest rates at near zero – and in some cases below.

It used to be thought that when interest rates get close to zero, there was very little else central banks could do. But in 2001, the Bank of Japan began the process of flooding financial markets with liquidity by buying huge quantities of financial assets in a bid to head off deflation (so-called quantitative easing). In 2002, Ben Bernanke argued, in what has gone down as one of the most influential speeches in modern central banking history, that a policy of central bank balance sheet expansion was guaranteed to reflate moribund economies and if it was failing in Japan, this was primarily a result of specific Japanese factors. Little did we know that western central banks would quickly exhaust all their conventional ammunition in the wake of the meltdown triggered by the Lehman’s bankruptcy, and that by 2009 the Fed and Bank of England would  be pumping huge amounts of liquidity into the financial system with the European Central Bank following suit in 2015.

We don’t have space to go into a detailed discussion of these unconventional monetary policies here, but suffice to say that although I was critical of the QE strategy in 2009, it did serve a purpose by preventing a market meltdown, and it probably did help to stabilise the real economy and set the stage for a recovery. The key point, however, is that it helped markets first and foremost. It did so by forcing investors to abandon the safe haven of government bonds, as central bank purchases drove down yields, and into riskier assets yielding higher returns. But with the ECB only starting to embrace QE last year, when global markets were a lot more stable than in 2009, this struck me as too little too late. It has had no discernible impact on generating a pickup in activity and although the ECB will doubtless argue that the situation would have been worse in its absence, that remains unproven.

What has become apparent is that central banks have become addicted to the provision of cheap liquidity. Indeed, in the euro zone the interest rate on cash deposits at the central bank is negative, as the ECB tries to force banks to lend rather than hold excess cash balances. There is little evidence that this policy is working.

In fact, lowering interest rates in the current environment is merely helping to magnify economic distortions. For one thing, they have forced investors to raise asset prices out of line with fundamentals by producing market bubbles which may well pop in future (at the very least, they raise market volatility by increasing the degree to which markets are dependent on central bank policy). For another, they distort the operation of the financial system, the main purpose of which is to match those with excess funds and those with insufficient funds. But in an environment of excess liquidity, banks are simply holding excess cash which – in the euro zone at least – is a drain on profitability because they have little option but to hold it at the central bank, which incurs a penal rate of interest. Then there is the problem of how savers can build up their balances in order to generate sufficient for their retirement. Today’s consumers may enjoy the dubious privilege of low rates today, but they will not thank central banks tomorrow when they see what their retirement funds are worth.

So it is against this backdrop that the BoE is widely expected to cut interest rates this week. But the truth is it will do little good. Whatever else the Brexit shock is, it is not a monetary shock to the system as we saw post-Lehmans when the global financial system seized up. At that point, radical monetary easing made sense. Lower interest rates today cannot compensate for any uncertainty shock which may cause companies to cut back on investment and employment. Nor is there any real need to expand QE – the BoE has already taken action to reduce banks’ countercyclical capital buffer which does much the same job.

The BoE will argue that the harm caused by inactivity outweighs the harm of further easing and the markets certainly will not take kindly to inaction. But the lesson of the past seven years is that once policy is eased, it has proven very difficult for central banks to consider unwinding it. We may not know the longer-term costs of cheap money for many years to come but it increasingly looks to me as though monetary policy is almost out of road and it is time for some heavy lifting from fiscal policy.